Scholarly article on topic 'Reconstruction of the Aceh Region following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami disaster: A transportation perspective'

Reconstruction of the Aceh Region following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami disaster: A transportation perspective Academic research paper on "Social and economic geography"

CC BY-NC-ND
0
0
Share paper
Academic journal
IATSS Research
OECD Field of science
Keywords
Indian Ocean tsunami / Reconstruction / Aceh / Indonesia / Qualitative data / Interpretive approach

Abstract of research paper on Social and economic geography, author of scientific article — Ryo Matsumaru, Kozo Nagami, Kimio Takeya

Abstract Aceh, located in the northernmost area of Sumatra Island, is one of the regions that suffered the most damage from the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. The process of reconstruction after a large-scale disaster is considered an opportunity to create a safer society, especially for developing countries, however the accumulation of knowledge about how to improve reconstruction is insufficient. The affected areas have diverse social and economic characteristics and unprecedented restoration efforts have been made. The Indian Ocean tsunami disaster, therefore, provides numerous research opportunities, and many surveys and other researches have been conducted to better understand what happened and how the reconstruction process could be improved. However, the majority of such research has focused on housing reconstruction, rebuilding livelihoods and community rehabilitation and there has been only limited research on transportation-related issues. Thus, there is significance in evaluating the reconstruction of Aceh from a transportation perspective, a dimension that has yet to be examined systematically. As a first step in the effort to evaluate various aspects of the reconstruction of Aceh from a transportation perspective, this research aims to present three transportation-related issues within the reconstruction process—1) the road network in the Banda Aceh coastal area, 2) mobility in relocation sites, and 3) reconstruction of the Banda Aceh–Meulaboh road—and to conduct a preliminary analysis of these issues by adding the viewpoint of disaster management and reconstruction, the authors' area of specialization. For conducting a preliminary analysis, existing information such as research papers, articles and reports and data collected through interviews and field reconnaissance conducted by the authors were utilized as much as possible, and such “qualitative data” was analyzed by applying the “interpretive approach”, considered an appropriate analytical framework for qualitative data.

Academic research paper on topic "Reconstruction of the Aceh Region following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami disaster: A transportation perspective"

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

IATSS Research

Reconstruction of the Aceh Region following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami disaster: A transportation perspective

Ryo Matsumaru a,*< Kozo Nagami b, Kimio Takeya b

a IRM Ltd., Japan

b Japan International Cooperation Agency, Japan

ARTICLE INFO

ABSTRACT

Article history: Received 30 December 2011 Received in revised form 2 June 2012 Accepted 3 July 2012

Keywords:

Indian Ocean tsunami

Reconstruction

Indonesia

Qualitative data

Interpretive approach

Aceh, located in the northernmost area of Sumatra Island, is one of the regions that suffered the most damage from the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. The process of reconstruction after a large-scale disaster is considered an opportunity to create a safer society, especially for developing countries, however the accumulation of knowledge about how to improve reconstruction is insufficient. The affected areas have diverse social and economic characteristics and unprecedented restoration efforts have been made. The Indian Ocean tsunami disaster, therefore, provides numerous research opportunities, and many surveys and other researches have been conducted to better understand what happened and how the reconstruction process could be improved. However, the majority of such research has focused on housing reconstruction, rebuilding livelihoods and community rehabilitation and there has been only limited research on transportation-related issues. Thus, there is significance in evaluating the reconstruction of Aceh from a transportation perspective, a dimension that has yet to be examined systematically. As a first step in the effort to evaluate various aspects of the reconstruction of Aceh from a transportation perspective, this research aims to present three transportation-related issues within the reconstruction process—1) the road network in the Banda Aceh coastal area, 2) mobility in relocation sites, and 3) reconstruction of the Banda Aceh-Meulaboh road—and to conduct a preliminary analysis of these issues by adding the viewpoint of disaster management and reconstruction, the authors' area of specialization. For conducting a preliminary analysis, existing information such as research papers, articles and reports and data collected through interviews and field reconnaissance conducted by the authors were utilized as much as possible, and such "qualitative data" was analyzed by applying the "interpretive approach", considered an appropriate analytical framework for qualitative data. © 2012 International Association of Traffic and Safety Sciences. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

1.1. Indian Ocean tsunami disaster

On December 26, 2004, an extreme earthquake with a magnitude of Mw 9.1 [1] took place near the Sunda Trench, off the coast of the Indonesian island of Sumatra. The earthquake generated a large tsunami that spread across the entire Indian Ocean, causing devastating damage to the coastal areas of countries that face the Indian Ocean, including Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, India, and even some East African countries [2].

Aceh, located in the northernmost area of Sumatra Island, is one of the regions that suffered the most damage from the Indian Ocean tsunami (Fig. 1).

* Corresponding author. Tel./fax: +81 3 3329 4605. E-mail address: matsumaru.ryo@irm-j.co.jp (R. Matsumaru).

Nicobar is.

Phuket • Banda Aceh

1000km if fry™ Malaysii

Earthquake epicentres* Earthquake affected Tsunami affected

Sumatra

Indonesia

♦Earthquake data: USGS Map. AusAJ0

Source: Prepared by the author based on AusAID map [3]. Fig. 1. Location map.

Source: Prepared by the author based on AusAID map [3].

0386-1112/$ - see front matter © 2012 International Association of Traffic and Safety Sciences. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.iatssr.2012.07.001

According to a BRR1 report [4], more than 166 thousand people were dead or missing in Indonesia (approx. 0.1% of the country's total population) and an estimated 1500 km of coastline was affected, mainly on the west coast of northern Sumatra Island [5]. The tsunami that struck the coastal area of Banda Aceh measured 6-12 m high [6] and traveled 2 km inland from the coast, reaching as far as 4 km in some places. Thousands of buildings were washed away. Urban infrastructure such as roads, electricity, water supply and telecommunication, and public services such as education, health and public transportation, received massive damage. In Banda Aceh alone there were approximately 15,000 people dead or missing, nearly 10% of the population at the time. Many people were also forced to live in evacuation shelters. The overall number ofevacuees in Indonesia is said to have been 500,000 at its highest point [7], many of them from Banda Aceh. The tsunami struck approximately 30 min to 1 h after the earthquake, but many people in Banda Aceh were unable to escape in time as the city was unprepared for tsunamis. This, in addition to the fact that residential areas along the coastline of Banda Aceh were developed on low lying ground, offering no higher ground for evacuation, was the primary factor that amplified the damage.

Meanwhile, the western coastal area was also subject to massive damage, with tsunami heights of approximately 15 m to 30 m [6]. Villages located along the western coastal area suffered a devastating amount of damage and the arterial road (national road) running along the west coast was fragmented in several places.

The extent of the damage from the disaster was estimated at 46.5 trillion Rp. [8,9], rivaling the 50.4 trillion Rp. gross regional product of Aceh Province [10]. Looking at Indonesia as a whole, however, economic growth from 2004 to 2006 was not particularly impacted [9]. The effect ofthe disaster on the Indonesian economy as a whole was minimal.

1.2. Motivation and purpose

After the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster, large-scale disasters such as cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, the Great Sichuan Earthquake in China, the Haiti Earthquake, and the Great East Japan Earthquake have occurred frequently. The process of reconstruction after a large-scale disaster is considered an opportunity to create a safer society, especially for developing countries. However, the accumulation of knowledge about how to improve reconstruction is insufficient, because research on post-disaster reconstruction has only started relatively recently. Even in Japan, such research only became active after the Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake in 1995.

The Indian Ocean tsunami disaster was one of the largest disasters we have ever experienced. The affected areas have diverse social and economic characteristics, and unprecedented restoration efforts have been made. The Indian Ocean tsunami disaster, therefore, provides numerous research opportunities. In the Aceh region, the target area for this research, many surveys and other researches have been conducted to better understand what happened and how the reconstruction process could be improved. However, the majority of such research has focused on housing reconstruction (e.g. [11,12]), rebuilding livelihoods (e.g. [13,14]) and community rehabilitation (e.g. [15]).

Although the tsunami disaster brought fundamental changes in the concepts of land use and how people live, which are closely related to transportation and transportation services, there has been only limited research on transportation-related issues. Thus, there is significance in evaluating the reconstruction of Aceh from a transportation perspective, a dimension that has yet to be examined systematically.

As a first step in the effort to evaluate various aspects of the reconstruction of Aceh from a transportation perspective, this research

1 BRR: Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Wilayah dan Kehidupan Masyarakat Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam dan Kepulauan Nias, Provinsi Sumatera Utara (Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of the Regions and Community of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and the Nias Islands of the Province of North Sumatra), established in April 2005.

aims to present three transportation-related issues within the reconstruction process—1) the road network in the Banda Aceh coastal area, 2) mobility in relocation sites, and 3) reconstruction of the Banda Aceh-Meulaboh road—and to conduct a preliminary analysis of these issues by adding the viewpoint of disaster management and reconstruction, the authors' area of specialization.

2. Analytical framework

Since the purpose of the research is to conduct a preliminary analysis of the underlying issues in the Aceh reconstruction, existing information such as research papers, other articles and reports on the reconstruction process as well as data collected through interviews and field reconnaissance conducted by the authors beginning just after the disaster through to the present2 were utilized as much as possible.

The collected information, including both descriptions in research papers, technical reports and other articles and interviews recorded in the authors' field notes, was treated as "qualitative data." The "interpretive approach3", considered an appropriate analytical framework for qualitative data, was applied for analysis.

In Section 3 and Section 5, issues were initially identified through the authors' field survey and analysis and discussions on the issues have been made using the existing information and authors' observation at the field. As for the analysis and discussion in Section 4, the results of interview surveys were also utilized as important information to understand the situation.

3. Road network reconstruction in the Banda Aceh coastal area

3.1. General

The road network in the coastal area of Banda Aceh was severely damaged by the tsunami. After the disaster, by reviewing the spatial plan4 of Banda Aceh, a reconstruction master plan covering the road network plan was formulated. In the master plan, the proposed road network followed the one that existed before the tsunami, with some roads designated as tsunami escape routes because housing had been allowed in the coastal areas affected by the tsunami.

This section first outlines the reconstruction planning process that is the basis for understanding the road network plan and then evaluates the road network in coastal area from the perspective of tsunami disaster management.

3.2. Urban planning process and tsunami disaster management

The formulation of an urban reconstruction plan to build a city that would be safe from tsunamis started immediately after the disaster.

2 A total of six field surveys (interviews and field reconnaissance) in Aceh, Indonesia were conducted during the period from January 2005 to September 2011 to collect information and to better understand the progress of reconstruction and related issues. Semi-structured interview survey method was used. It takes at least about an hour in average (sometime more) for one interview to create "rapport" with a respondent to obtain wider range of information, therefore the number of samples is comparatively small if comparing to the sample numbers of quantitative analysis. The actual purpose of the interview was not to identify issues in transportation in the reconstruction process in Aceh but to understand the impacts and response of the community to the disaster and to identify issues in housing reconstruction. However, during the interview survey, many of the respondents expressed concerns on transportation when they explained their living environment.

3 The "interpretive approach" is an analytical framework for understanding social events using qualitative data obtained from interviews, observations, and records in text, voice, or video formats, and is characterized by describing the entirety of a situation by interpreting causal relationships between individual acts and/or subjective meanings revealed in the process of organizing the information. In addition, at least one author was involved in ongoing field surveys; the data collected thereby was considered consistent, an important element for securing the reliability of qualitative data.

4 In Indonesia, urban planning is often referred to as "spatial planning."

Photo 1. Housing built along the coast (August 2011).

Source: JICA [17]

Fig. 2. Land use plan proposed in the master plan. Source: JICA [17].

BAPPENAS5 was placed in charge and established an outline urban reconstruction plan, called the Blueprint, in January 2005. In the Blueprint, the city was divided into multiple zones, with the area within 2 km of the shoreline named the Buffer Zone6 and restricted for housing. The concept for this zone was basically followed in the Reconstruction Master Plan supported by JICA,7 and a top-down approach was taken for this master plan planning process.

On the other hand, in contrast to the top-down approach, and in response to the people's requests for early housing reconstruction, USAID8 began to support the formulation of a Village Plan, a

5 BAPPENAS: Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, National Development Planning Agency, Indonesia.

6 According to Sugiyasu et al., the Buffer Zone was changed 4 times on the Blueprint, the Blueprint revision, JICA zoning, and the Village Plan. At each point of change, the Buffer Zone was handled as a restricted area, an area for residences with permission, an area required for evacuations, and an area for housing based on the agreement of residents [16].

7 JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency), which provided overall support in the drafting of the urban reconstruction plan, began formulating the Master Plan in March 2005 to support the concept of the Blueprint.

8 USAID (United States Agency for International Development) was also an active bi-

lateral donor organization in Aceh reconstruction.

community level reconstruction plan, in May 2005 through a participatory and bottom-up method undertaken in parallel with JICA's master plan formulation process. The opinions of residents who wished to stay in the same village were respected; based on such community agreements, approval was granted to rebuild residences in coastal areas.9 As a result, many houses were rebuilt in the zones designated as restricted on the Blueprint, that is, in coastal areas that had been flooded by the 2004 tsunami (Photo 1).

In both the Blueprint and the Master Plan that followed it, the concept for minimizing damage was to restrict housing and economic activity in the areas that had been catastrophically damaged in the 2004 tsunami, minimizing the number of people in these areas. However, after the Village Plan was accepted by BRR and housing reconstruction allowed in the coastal areas, the concept had to be changed from regulating activity through zoning to ensuring safety through disaster prevention measures.

9 Although it was said that this was done in agreement with the wishes of the community, through interviews it was discovered that this was not necessarily the case. Most people had to return to the place where they originally lived because they had no other choice.

Source: JICA [17]

Fig. 3. Escape route network as proposed in the master plan. Source: JICA [17].

Photo 2. Improved road (designated as an evacuation route) in 2011.

Taking this change of concept into account, JICA considered and proposed coastal structures that incorporated the placement of evacuation roads and facilities within the reconstruction master plan, which

was finally published in December 2005 (Fig. 2). In addition, as a model project, roads were improved (widened) to serve as part of an evacuation route network, signs were installed, and four-story community buildings on pilotis were built (to function as evacuation sites) [18].

3.3. Evaluation of the road network as an escape route for tsunamis

As no tsunami prevention structures along the coast of Banda Aceh have yet been installed, even a small-scale tsunami could cause a great deal of damage. Providing some means to escape from a tsunami is the only way to save residents' lives. In this context, the proper functioning of escape routes in the event of a tsunami is crucial for reducing damage. In this paper, such functioning will be evaluated from the perspectives of 1) an escape route network for the whole coastal area and 2) community level road networks, as discussed below.

3.3.1. Road network for the whole coastal area

In the reconstruction Master Plan, some roads are designated as tsunami escape routes and form a network (Fig. 3), and some designated escape routes have already been improved (Photo 2) with Japanese assistance.

During the site survey in September 2011, improved escape routes were found to be well-maintained and capable of functioning properly in the event of a tsunami. When the route is observed and evaluated as part of a whole network, however, the following major issues can be identified.

The first is the extent of the escape route network. The two figures shown (Fig. 4) compare the area inundated by the 2004 tsunami with the escape route network proposed in the Master Plan.

As shown in the figures, the escape route network extends only up to the national road (indicated in red) that was flooded by the 2004 tsunami, with only a single inland route designated as an escape route. It must be said that the extent of the network is insufficient from the perspective of ensuring a safe evacuation. Furthermore, when evacuees arrive on the national road, they are supposed to be carried along in the northeast/southwest directions. However, these directions are not the right ones for escaping an imminent tsunami, as the road runs parallel to the coastline. In addition, there is a high probability of creating further congestion as evacuees become entangled with people evacuating on motorcycles, etc., and thrown into confusion. Additional escape routes further inland are, therefore, required.

Another issue with the escape route network comes from using the road network that was created before the disaster. Former road alignments and bridge locations were preconditions when

Source: JICA [17]

Fig. 4. Comparison of inundated area and evacuation route network. Source: JICA [17].

Source: Prepared by the author based on Google Earth.

Fig. 5. Comparison of inundated area and evacuation route network. Source: Prepared by the author based on Google Earth.

considering the escape route network, so some routes do not follow the shortest distance from the coast to inland areas. It is understandable that roads form the framework of a city and acquisition of land for new roads would be difficult. Nevertheless, having allowed housing in the disaster-stricken areas and adopted the concept of decreasing damage through evacuation as the primary countermeasure, a fundamental change in the road network for tsunami evacuation would have been one option to ensure the safety of the area.

3.3.2. Community level road network

Since owners retained title to the same land they owned before the disaster, many villages and/or communities were rebuilt in almost the same form as before the tsunami. No measures similar to the land readjustments in Japan were undertaken.

Looking at Blang Oi Village (Fig. 5, Photo 3), located approximately 1 km from the coast, where the authors conducted field surveys, the shape of land plots was maintained with roads rebuilt in the same locations as before the disaster. Within the village, such roads are narrow (approx. 5 m) and winding, causing problems both for the road network and for the physical conditions of tsunami disaster management.

Photo 3. Blang Oi Village on the coast of Banda Aceh (August 2008).

Although traffic volume in the village is limited and two cars can pass each other, a situation of unfavorably narrow and winding roads hinders smooth transportation that the authors experienced. Furthermore, the shortest distance to the main roads that have been designated as evacuation routes cannot be taken when using automobiles or motorcycles because of poor linkage to the main road. These conditions lengthen the time required for evacuation, leading to a greater likelihood of damage. Furthermore, the density of the residences is not very high now, but if it should increase with a growing economy, leading to densely constructed houses of two stories or higher, collapsed buildings in the wake of an earthquake could block roads and contribute to increased damage.

Several rebuilt residential areas in the same situation as Blang Oi can be seen near the coast. When evaluating the community level road networks from a tsunami disaster management viewpoint, it would be hard to say that the restored communities are safer than before as they remain subject to a repeat of the disaster. They must, therefore, be reviewed for safety from tsunami disasters and improvements made as early as possible.

3.4. Discussion

The Great East Japan Earthquake disaster on March 11, 2011, left nearly 19,000 people dead or missing; most were killed or swept away by the tsunami. Some victims were caught by the tsunami due to traffic congestion during their escape. This suggests the need for comprehensive preparedness combining a network of physical escape routes with traffic management.

In the Banda Aceh coastal area, although restoration of the road network is underway, and some attempts to create a safer area can be observed, the escape route network should be expanded and the physical condition of community level road networks should be improved. In addition to such physical improvements, a traffic management perspective to facilitate smooth evacuation must be introduced.

As determined through interviews and simulations [18], the 2004 tsunami arrived on the shores of Banda Aceh approximately 30 min after the earthquake, giving residents only a limited time to evacuate. Special traffic management policies should be considered to smooth traffic flow in the event a tsunami is predicted, such as limiting all coastal area roads to one-way traffic heading inland.

Source: Prepared by the author based on Google Earth.

Fig. 6. Location of Pante Riak and Labuy.

Source: Prepared by the author based on Google Earth.

Photo 4. Labuy relocation site (Photo: August 2008).

Making such measures effective requires further quantitative analyses with traffic simulations of the escape route network. Additionally, the implementation of drills and awareness programs are also desirable10 to ensure that residents understand the traffic measures against tsunami.

4. Housing relocation and mobility

4.1. General

Tsunami victims who lost their houses and could not rebuild on the land where they lived before the tsunami were relocated to collective housing relocation areas.11 In Banda Aceh, these housing relocation sites are located on the periphery of urban areas that were unaffected

by the tsunami or on hilly areas some distance from the Banda Aceh city center. Victims moved to such relocation areas were forced to live in a totally different environment from the one in which they had originally lived.

According to the survey conducted by the authors, most residents living in the relocation sites are satisfied with their current living conditions, although they note insufficient public transportation as a transportation-related problem at the relocation sites.

This section focuses on Labuy and Pante Riek (Fig. 6), two relocation sites with different characteristics, in discussing the importance of public transportation for livelihood recovery.

4.2. Existing situation and evaluation of relocation sites

10 New residents have moved to coastal areas in addition to those who lived there before the tsunami. There is some concern that these new residents have no experience of the tsunami disaster. During the May 2010 earthquake, many coastal residents (both 2004 disaster victims and newer residents) failed to evacuate, suggesting that awareness of the tsunami disaster will decline with the passing of time.

11 Victims who could not rebuild their houses in their original locations because the land was washed away, or who lived in rented housing, were eligible to apply for collective relocation. For this type of housing relocation site, the government of Indonesia provided the land (ownership transfer or free leasing, etc.) while NGOs, etc. built the houses. Victims who moved to the relocation sites got title to both land and house at no charge. Basic infrastructures including roads, water, and electricity, are in place in all housing relocation areas, with some, depending on the donors in charge of development, also including meeting halls and schools.

4.2.1. Labuy

Labuy is located on a hill about 15 km east of the center of Banda Aceh, more than 30 min away by car. Several donors built housing complexes on land provided by the government in the neighborhoods of Labuy (Photo 4), and people began moving there in 2007. That year, about 15,000 people lived in the area, whose population was expected to double over the next 5 years [19,20].

In the housing block where the survey was conducted, an Arabic donor had constructed semidetached houses (Photo 4 (left): 36 m2, 2 rooms + living room and kitchen). Both houses and land were provided to relocated residents at no cost.

As these housing complexes are located on a hill, away from the main road with its buses and public transportation services to the Banda Aceh city center, residents have to walk a certain distance or take transportation services to the main road that are provided by individual service providers, such as becaks or single-seat motor bikes.

In interviews held in 2008 and 2011, people indicated that they were generally satisfied with their lives but dissatisfied with the lack of public transport.

In December 2007, a report prepared by ADB/BRR [19,20] noted the importance of public transport and recommended that services be provided to residents. In the interview survey conducted in August 2008, however, the lack of transport services was raised as an issue in the area. Furthermore, since the same issue of public transport also came up in the April 2011 survey, the problem appears to remain unresolved, with sufficient mobility for residents not yet secured.

4.2.2. Pante Riek

Pante Riek is located along the Aceh River about 4 km from the coastline where the relocated lived prior to the tsunami disaster. A Taiwanese NGO, the Tzu Chi Foundation, has built housing complexes on land provided by the Indonesian Government.

According to a report by Nakazato et al. [12], about 700 houses were constructed on the site, with each house measuring 42 m2. The report notes that residents showed general satisfaction with life at the relocation site, and did not express dissatisfaction regarding public transport at the time they were surveyed in March 2008.

In the survey conducted in 2011 by the authors, residents remained satisfied with their lives overall but expressed the view that public transportation was insufficient. The awareness or needs of the residents had perhaps changed over the several years since their relocation.12

However, as the Pante Riek site is located relatively close to the Banda Aceh city center, with easy access to necessary activities and resources, the problem of public transportation expressed by the residents would not be recognized as a major issue by the authors when it is compared to the same problem at the Labuy relocation site.

4.3. Discussion

As of 2011, at both the Labuy and Pante Riek relocation sites, no planned public transportation services had been provided. This inadequate provision of public transportation services, particularly in areas affected by the tsunami and in relocation sites in Banda Aceh and the vicinity, is considered to be due to the following reasons.

The first reason public transportation has not been properly provided is because of the principles of reconstruction established by BRR. According to the BRR reports [22,23], supplying houses to tsunami victims was made the highest priority, while restoration of physical and social infrastructure was planned to come later (Fig. 7).

Due to the application of this reconstruction principle, the restoration of physical and social infrastructure could not keep pace with the reconstruction of houses, causing insufficient provision of public services relative to the needs of people in rebuilt housing areas and relocation sites. Particularly with respect to public transportation, despite the very high demands on public transport because tsunami victims had lost property such as vehicles and motorcycles, altering their modes of transport, the provision of public transport services was inadequate to meet their mobility needs.

Another reason was the lack of a proper policy and plan for public transportation services. Although the restoration of transportation was mentioned in the BRR report [22], the transportation networks

12 The needs of victims change with the passing of time. As an example from temporary housing, people are initially satisfied to have been able to enter the housing. However, it has been reported that discontent increases with the passing of time and changes in lifestyle [21]. It can also easily be predicted that changes in awareness will occur in a similar manner when moving into permanent housing.

Source: BRR [23]

Fig. 7. BRR's plan for reconstruction activities.

Source: BRR [23].

it addressed were those over comparatively longer distances, such as those linking major cities with sea and air transport, and there was no clear description of the restoration of public transport services within cities or suburbs. This shows that the government placed a lower priority on the restoration or provision of public transport services.

Transport services in the areas affected by the tsunami had primarily been provided by private companies or individuals, and this may be one reason that public transportation services for relocation areas were not included within the scope of public sector reconstruction, while securing land, supplying basic infrastructure, and providing houses and other social facilities were considered to be public sector tasks.

According to interview surveys with residents, people who moved to the relocation sites were not given a choice about their place of residence, and most could live only where they were placed. Although the authors surveyed only two sites, it was noted that Labuy is 15 km away from the city center while Pante Riek is closer and more convenient. Even if the victims lived in equally convenient places before the disaster, there is disparity in the convenience of their new residences, including transportation, irrespective of their intentions.

The process of reviving after a disaster is extremely vulnerable, and even small expenses for transport might have a negative impact on the victims. Therefore, special care for the victims is necessary to ensure their revitalization. In this context, inequality in terms of mobility convenience and cost will lead to differences in the progress of rebuilding their lives. Therefore securing fairness in mobility among victims is essential, and should be done by providing appropriate transportation means based on an analysis of user characteristics and demand. This is the responsibility of the government, and it is necessary to have a plan to provide public transportation that integrates with the housing relocation plan.

The problem with transport at relocation sites is not an issue unique to Aceh but can also be seen in other areas of Indonesia and Sri Lanka that were affected by the Indian Ocean tsunami. This may be an issue we will face with housing relocation schemes for tsunami victims of the Great East Japan Earthquake, and the example offers a good lesson for considering the provision of appropriate public transportation.

5. Reconstruction of the Banda Aceh-Meulaboh road

5.1. General

Extending approximately 240 km, the Banda Aceh-Meulaboh road is an arterial road classified as a national road13) that runs

13 According to the Indonesian Road Classification system, roads are classified into two categories: primary roads and secondary roads. Primary roads are further divided into arterial roads, collector roads, and local roads. Arterial roads and class 1 collector roads are administered by the Ministry of Public Works and called "national roads."

along the west coast of northern Sumatra Island. With low road density and limited access between inland and coastal areas, the Banda Aceh-Meulaboh road was the only link between these areas. Most of the people and goods traveling in the region were highly dependent on the road, which supported the regional economy.

Since much of the road was located near the shoreline, it suffered devastating damage by the tsunami. Between Banda Aceh and Meulaboh, approximately 57 km of the road was completely washed away, and 140 km was severely damaged. In addition, 76 bridges—approximately half of the 142 bridges along the affected section—were reported damaged by the tsunami [24].

Two different donors, Japan and the United States, undertook reconstruction of the road. An imbalance in the progress of reconstruction between the two donors was evident. It is inferred that this imbalance affected the reconstruction of the communities and economy along the road. This section outlines the reconstruction process and discusses the issues related to the road reconstruction.

5.2. Reconstruction process

The Indonesian army was in charge of clearing road obstacles and emergency repairs immediately after the disaster. Emergency repairs were completed in March 2005.

The first survey for reconstruction of the Banda Aceh-Meulaboh road was conducted by the Japanese government in March 2005. Shortly after the Japanese survey began, the U.S. also dispatched an assessment team to assist in restoring the same road. Subsequently, the governments of Indonesia, Japan, and the U.S. reached an agreement regarding assistance for road reconstruction work. It was decided that the U.S. would take charge of restoring the section between Banda Aceh and Calang, and Japan the section between Calang and Meulaboh.

Based on this agreement between the three governments, the Japanese team started reconstruction work for the 120 km section between Calang and Meulaboh in May 2005, following the basic alignment of the existing road. Reconstruction work for this section began in December 2005 following a design and procurement process. Within approximately one year, by December 2006, the work was completed and the road in service. Travel time from Calang to Meulaboh was thus shortened from more than 7 h to 2.5 h with completion of the road restoration work [25].

On the other hand, reconstruction of the 145 km section between Banda Aceh and Calang that was to be performed by the U.S. was delayed. The final road alignment was decided in June 2006 and the work begun at the end of 2006, with reconstruction ultimately completed around mid-2011.

5.3. Issues and discussion

With two donors applying different ideas to reconstruction, the progress of reconstruction was imbalanced. This imbalance led to six years of imperfect road network conditions that affected the following: 1) economic revitalization and economic loss, 2) community recovery, and 3) people's feeling of inequality in reconstruction.

5.3.1. Effect on economic revitalization and economic loss

Due to the delay of reconstruction work on the section between Banda Aceh and Calang, the damaged road, especially sections where road alignment was to be changed, continued to be used after only emergency restoration work had been completed. Even as late as August 2008, more than three and a half years after the disaster, there were still several places along the road where conditions were very poor or where rivers had to be crossed using boats (Photo 5).

When the authors traveled by automobile from Banda Aceh to Meulaboh in August 2008, it took nearly 9 h. At that time, the road between Calang and Meulaboh had already been restored, and travel time for that segment was roughly two and a half hours. Approximately three-fourths of the time required for the entire trip, therefore, was used in covering approximately half the total distance. According to the driver who accompanied the authors, the time required to travel between Banda Aceh and Meulaboh before the disaster was 5 to 6 h. Thus, it had become necessary to spend an entire day to cover just a half-day's distance.

The segment between Banda Aceh and Calang has higher traffic volume than the segment between Calang and Meulaboh [24]. It took more than six years for the entire road to be opened, more than four years after the Calang-Meulaboh segment. This type of delay in reconstruction kept the road network imperfect and perhaps contributed to the stagnation of goods distribution, sharply increased freight costs, and the loss of various economic opportunities. It can thus be inferred that the delay greatly affected the region's economy and recovery.

5.3.2. Effects on community recovery and inequality in reconstruction

The authors specialize in disaster management and disaster recovery/

reconstruction, and from experience, recognize that rebuilding livelihoods, or returning to the lifestyle enjoyed prior to a disaster, is one of the most crucial issues in community recovery. The delay in the reconstruction of the region's arterial road, which left victims in a difficult situation while they tried to rebuild their lives in their own communities, was likely a factor that led residents to leave their communities despite having hoped to rebuild their lives there.

Building a road to high specifications in a safe place, shifting its alignment to prevent damage from another disaster, was important,

Photo 5. Roads that continued to be used after only emergency repair work (August 2008).

and the ideas and methods behind this road reconstruction are considered sound. However, continuing to use a road with only emergency repairs for a period of more than six years, and forcing inconvenient transportation on users is questionable. Appropriate measures such as temporarily paving or temporary bridge installation could have been taken in order to help rebuild lives in a more timely manner.

In addition, when recalling that the segment between Calang and Meulaboh was restored to nearly its original state in two years, it can be said that this contributed to a recovery disparity between communities as well as feelings of unfairness.

Developing countries like Indonesia cannot do without foreign assistance after such a large-scale disaster. Nevertheless, recipients should set reconstruction policy. Efforts to minimize imbalance in reconstruction are necessary because people's lives are highly dependent on roads in areas that lack a range of transportation modes such as railways and mass transit. The difference in road restoration progress was directly related to a disparity in people's progress in recovering from the disaster.

6. Conclusion

Reconstruction of Aceh as a whole seems to be progressing well. However, some issues remain even when observing the restoration only from a transport-related perspective. In this paper, three cases of reconstruction in Aceh were examined and issues were discussed. Those issues can be classified into those related to "better urban development," such as securing smooth evacuation routes and providing appropriate mobility to victims, and "better reconstruction," such as providing adequate public transportation services to avoid unfairness among the victims.

The issues related to "better urban development" are the ones that need to be addressed by incorporating current research findings related to large-scale disasters like the Great East Japan Earthquake and Hurricane Katrina, which will be important in Aceh from now on.

On the other hand, the reconstruction of Aceh is progressing, and for this reason, solutions for issues toward "better reconstruction" cannot be applied there. Therefore, knowledge, findings and lessons that have been obtained through this research are expected to be utilized in reconstruction after other disasters. In particular, the situation in Aceh has shown that an uneven distribution of transportation services resulted in unfairness in reconstruction and highlighted the prominent role that transportation plays in promoting well-balanced reconstruction. This lesson is also suggestive with regard to recovery from the Great East Japan Earthquake.

As was mentioned in Section 1, the evaluation and discussion of the cases presented in this paper were made primarily based on field surveys conducted by the authors and on a review of existing information. There are, undeniably, many areas that need further and more detailed examination, especially through quantitative analysis.

90% of the world's natural disasters are concentrated in Asia, with developing countries particularly vulnerable to damage. Under these circumstances, and as a result of the Great East Japan Earthquake, matters related to transportation in city areas and relocation sites, as well as transportation planning for building safe, robust and resilient communities are now being much discussed. The authors' hope, therefore, that the observations in this paper will be of some help in future research on disaster management and transportation planning, and in promoting collaborative work between both sectors, particularly in developing countries.

[Note] The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the view or policies of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).

References

[1] USGS, (Online), http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2004/ us2004slav, (Accessed 25 10 2011).

[2] UNOCHA, Indonesia, Maldives, Sri Lanka: Earthquake and Tsunami OCHA Situation Report No. 18, 2005(0nline), http://reliefweb.int/node/163549, (Accessed 25 10 2011).

[3] AusAID, (Online), http://www.ausaid.gov.au/hottopics/images/tsunamiregion2. gif, (Accessed 25 10 2011).

[4] BRR NAD-Nias, Enriching the construction of recovery, In: Annual Report 2007, BRR NAD-NIAS, Indonesia, 2008.

[5] R Matsumaru, Influence of Social Characteristics on the Reconstruction Process after the Indian Ocean Tsunami Disaster, Doctoral Thesis, Yokohama National University, 2010 (in Japanese).

[6] Research Group on The December 26, 2004 Earthquake Tsunami Disaster of Indian Ocean, The December 26, 2004 Earthquake Tsunami Disaster of Indian Ocean(Online), http://www.drs.dpri.kyoto-u.ac.jp/sumatra/index-e, (Accessed 25 10 2011).

[7] Disaster Reduction and Human Renovation Institution (DRI), Banda Aceh tsunami disaster survey report on the Sumatra-Andaman earthquake, In: DRI Survey Report No. 13, 2005.

[8] BAPPENAS and International Donor Community, Indonesia preliminary damage and loss assessment, In: The December 26, 2004 Natural Disaster, BAPPENAS, Indonesia, 2005.

[9] Bank Indonesia, Monetary(Online), http://www.bi.go.id/web/en/Moneter/, (Accessed 2510 2011).

[10] Badan Pusat Statistik Gross Regional Domestic Product at Current Market Prices by Provinces, 2004-2010(Online), http://dds.bps.go.id/eng/, (Accessed 2510 2011).

[11] C. Ochiai, R. Shaw, Participatory housing reconstruction effort in Aceh, Indonesia, Resilience Learning from the Tsunami 4 (2008) 15-17.

[12] H. Nakazato, O. Murao, K. Sugiyasu, The livelihood problems in permanent house in Banda Aceh as of March 2008, In: Reports of the City Planning Institute ofJapan No. 7, 2008, (in Japanese).

[13] J. Kennedy, J. Ashmore, E. Babister, I. Kelman,J. Kennedy, J. Ashmore, E. Babister, I. Kelman, The meaning of 'build back better': evidence from post-tsunami Aceh and Sri Lanka, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 16 (1) (2008).

[14] C. Thorburn, Livelihood recovery in the wake of the tsunami in Aceh, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 45 (1) (2009) 85-105.

[15] C. Ochiai, R Matsumaru, M. Kobayashi, Study on the re-establishing process of a community and its capacity for problem solving after the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster: case study of temporary housings in Meulaboh in Aceh Province, Indonesia, Journal of the City Planning Institute ofJapan (44-3) (2009) (in Japanese).

[16] K. Sugiyasu, O. Murao, H. Nakazato, Comparative study of urban recovery master plan by Indonesia, Thailand, and Sri Lanka after 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, In: Reports of the City Planning Institute ofJapan, No. 7, 2005, (in Japanese).

[17] JICA, The study on the urgent rehabilitation and reconstruction support program for Aceh province and affected areas in North Sumatra, Urgent Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Plan for Banda Aceh City, JICA, 2005.

[18] J. Sasaki, Y. Komatsu, R Matsumaru, RUA Wiyono, Unstructured model investigation of 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami inundation in Banda Aceh, Indonesia, Journal of Coastal Research (2011) SI64.

[19] ADB/BRR NAD-Nias, Labuy Site Analysis Report (LSAR), ADB/BRR NAD-Nias, 2007.

[20] ADB/BRR NAD-Nias, Labuy urban satellite development plan, In: Executive Summary & Final Presentation Workshop Report and Action Plans, ADB/BRR NAD-Nias, 2007.

[21] C. Ochiai, R Matsumaru, Changing needs and living environment in temporary housing, Meulaboh Indonesia, In: Proceedings for Annual Conference, Japan Society for Disaster Recovery and Revitalization, 2008, (in Japanese).

[22] BRR NAD-Nias, Laying Down the Foundation for a Better Tomorrow, BRR NAD-Nias, 2005.

[23] BRR NAD-Nias, Aceh and Nias One Year After the Tsunami: the Recovery Effort and Way Forward, BRR NAD-Nias, 2006.

[24] JICA, The study on the urgent rehabilitation and reconstruction support program for Aceh province and affected areas in North Sumatra, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of West Coast Road in North Sumatra, JICA, 2005.

[25] JICS, (Online), http://www.jics.or.jp/jigyou/musho/nonpro/in_tnm200701.html, (Accessed 25 10 2011) (in Japanese).