Scholarly article on topic 'Engaging the Quiet Mission: Civil Society in Breaking the Cycle of Violence in the Post-conflict Poso, Indonesia'

Engaging the Quiet Mission: Civil Society in Breaking the Cycle of Violence in the Post-conflict Poso, Indonesia Academic research paper on "Social and economic geography"

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Procedia Environmental Sciences
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Abstract of research paper on Social and economic geography, author of scientific article — A. Trihartono, N. Viartasiwi

Abstract This research investigates how civil society has contributed to human security, especially in the context of maintaining peace in the post-conflict society of Indonesia. Unlike former studies that have paid the most attention to the fundamental role of the state actors, this study emphasizes the importance of civil society as a non-state actor. This research pays attention, mainly but not exclusively, to the case of society in the post-conflict of Muslims and Christians in Poso, Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. The finding suggests that the role of civil society is evolving and essential in creating favorable conditions for maintaining peace, particularly in breaking the so-called cycle of violence. This study demonstrates that the emerging role of non-states actor, quietly but significantly, is supportive and cannot be overlooked in post-conflict society. Hence, providing space for further discussion of the role of non-states actors in backing up sustainable peace is indispensable. As a result, civil society has also been on the frontline in developing human security.

Academic research paper on topic "Engaging the Quiet Mission: Civil Society in Breaking the Cycle of Violence in the Post-conflict Poso, Indonesia"


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Procedia Environmental Sciences 28 (2015) 115- 123

The 5th Sustainable Future for Human Security (SustaiN 2014)

Engaging the quiet mission: Civil society in breaking the cycle of violence in the post-conflict Poso, Indonesia

A.Trihartono* and N. Viartasiwi

Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto-Japan 603-8577; Jember University, Jember, Indonesia,68121, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto-Japan 603-8577


This research investigates how civil society has contributed to human security, especially in the context of maintaining peace in the post-conflict society of Indonesia. Unlike former studies that have paid the most attention to the fundamental role of the state actors, this study emphasizes the importance of civil society as a non-state actor. This research pays attention, mainly but not exclusively, to the case of society in the post-conflict of Muslims and Christians in Poso, Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. The finding suggests that the role of civil society is evolving and essential in creating favorable conditions for maintaining peace, particularly in breaking the so-called cycle of violence. This study demonstrates that the emerging role of non-states actor, quietly but significantly, is supportive and cannot be overlooked in post-conflict society. Hence, providing space for further discussion of the role of non-states actors in backing up sustainable peace is indispensable. As a result, civil society has also been on the frontline in developing human security.

© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license



Keywords: civil society; breaking the cycle of violence; human security; Indonesia.

1. Introduction

Academic debates about the concept of human security and its application are still going on. Human security has also been a major issue that has sparked many discussions worldwide.1 Among the most important discussions of human security is the focus of the issue and the actor in protecting the security of our daily practices. As security

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +62-812-3461-2754; fax: +62-331-335586. E-mail address:

1878-0296 © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license


Peer-review under responsibility of Sustain Society

doi: 10.1016/j.proenv.2015.07.017

cannot be understood solely in terms of being free from all threats in the military context, the concept of human security focuses on the security of individuals and communities in their daily lives. The vital aspect of human security is that all individual and communities can live well so that people and the dignity of humanity are free from all kinds of threats.2 As a result, the concept of human security is integrative, concerning the solidarity of all human beings, not defensive, as are military means or protecting territory.3 In addition, regarding the actor (s), an aspect that has received the most attention in the study of human security is the role of state actors as the ultimate agents of human security. However, attention to the role of non-state actors in guarding and supporting human security is still inadequate. Only a few studies have examined the role of non-state actors like civil society in protecting human security.

This paper investigates the role and contribution of non-state actors to human security in post-conflict society. In particular, it emphasizes how the role of civil society as non-sate actor is essential to creating favorable conditions for maintaining peace. It shows the contribution of non-states to breaking the so-called cycle of violence in the post-conflict area of Poso, Central Sulawesi, Indonesia.

This paper is divided into four sections. The first discusses human security in terms of the issue and the actor(s). The second and the third focus on the legacy of the conflict and post-conflict governance in Poso. Finally, the paper spotlights the role of non-state actors in guarding human security. Throughout this study, we demonstrate that, silently but significantly, civil society has also been on the frontline in peace building by working to break of the cycle of violence in post-conflict society.

2. Human Security

What are the issues and who are the actor(s) regarding the application of human security? Human security has been defined in several perspectives such as Japan government, Canada government, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).4 Although the definitions vary slightly, the notion of human security has common ideas and linkages: Human security focuses on human protection. Japan government perspective defines human security as the preservation and protection of the life and dignity of the human being. Thus, human security can be assured only if people are free from fears and want. Japan government perspective identifies human security as any effort to protect human life from any threats to livelihood, including poverty, environmental degradation, drugs, organized transnational crime, infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, refugees, and so forth.5 Meanwhile, the Canada government perspective interprets human security as freedom from threats to individual rights.4 From the Canada government perspective, human security means freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights. The Canada perspective of human security pays attention to priorities, namely civil rights, supporting peace, conflict prevention, government and accountability, and public safety. The UNDP provides a universal understanding of the human security. In the 1994 UNDP annual report, the human security approach focused on individuals and groups, which is known as a people-centered approach. According to UNDP, the threat not only appears in conflicts between states, but the sources of threats also emerge from within the state itself. As a result, the UNDP perspective is, to some extent, more people-centered rather than state-centered.6 In this sense, security is seen as how far people in life can make their own choices. Security also means how many people can access to markets and the availability of social opportunities. At its most basic, it is about how free and safe people are to apply their choices in their lives in both the short and the long term. In the final UN report titled "Human Security Now," human security is defined as " protect the vital core of all human lives in ways, that enhance human freedom and human fulfillment."4 The heart of human security, thus, is to protect the fundamental aspect of human freedom as the essence of life. Human security is about creating a system of political, social, environmental, economic, military, and cultural together to protect and respect human dignity.7,8,9

Interestingly, in most discussions of human security, attention is given to the state (s) as the ultimate actor. Since the state (s) has almost all the instruments to support human security, highlighting the state makes sense. Only a few studies have spotlighted the role of non-state actors in protecting human security. Although there are some academic works on the relationship between civil society as a non-state actor and human security, they are still very limited. One study of civil society in the Indian state of Meghalaya, part of the region known as Northeast India, emphasized non-state actors in the mission of protecting human security.10 Another study examined the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the African human rights mechanism that offer to the improvement of issues

relating to human security.11 This paper to emphasizes the contribution of non-state actors in protecting human security, especially in the context of peace building in the post-conflict society of Indonesia. It especially considers the role of civil society in breaking the so-called cycle of violence in post-conflict area of Poso, Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. The presence of non-state actors in protecting human security is also significant.

3. Conflict in Poso, Indonesia

Poso was the scene of a communal conflict in which forceful hostilities took place between Christians and Muslims between 1998 and 2001. The Poso conflict was rooted in its history. Separation between communities along religious lines has existed since the colonial period. In pre-colonial times, indigenous groups living in coastal areas had been exposed to Muslim sea traders and became Muslims. On the other hand, diverse ethnic groups lived in the interior highlands, following their animist beliefs. In the early 1900s, Dutch Protestant missionaries, namely the Netherlands Mission Society (Nederlands Zandeling Genootschap), came to convert indigenous animist groups to Christianity. The society's headquarters was established in Tentena, Poso.12 Furthermore, the Dutch missionaries organized these new convert Protestants as allies in opposition to the Muslim-influenced coastal kingdoms. The colonial administration gratified its allies with education, health facilities, agricultural knowledge, and positions in the local bureaucracy. By favoring Christians over Muslims, they created a situation that associated Islam with anticolonial resistance. Soon, Poso, especially its mission center of Tentena, was well-known as one of the most successful Christian mission fields in the Netherlands Indies.12 To differentiate themselves from other ethnic groups, especially from Muslims, many groups living around Poso Lake-Tentena identified themselves ethnically as Pamona (To'Pamona; orangPamona). They became one of the biggest ethnic groups in Poso.

After Indonesia's independence in 1945, the so-called Darul Islam (1952-1965) and Permesta (1957-1961) became regional separatists, disturbing Central Sulawesi. Darul Islam from South Sulawesi tried to banish interior highlander animists and Christians, while Permesta, who were mainly Christians from North Sulawesi, defended them. However, there was a period when Darul Islam and Permesta united to fight the central government for regional autonomy. After that conflict, in the Poso Lake region, a Pamona militia called the Central Sulawesi Youth Movement (Gerakan Pemuda Sulawesi Tengah, GPST) arose in opposition to Permesta at the same time its forces were committing violence against the Highland communities. The complexity of the dynamic of conflict in the region has persisted.

In the New Order regime of the Suharto period (1966-1998), the majority of the population were still Pamona Protestants, and their leaders held partial control over the local bureaucracy. Lorraine Aragon described Poso and Central Sulawesi in the 1980s as "Fields of the Lord" because of their geographic isolation and their devotion to Christianity.17 However, those privilege changed when the central government chose Central Sulawesi as a new transmigration destination in 1973.

To stimulate development in Sulawesi, the government constructed the Trans-Sulawesi Highway, which was completed in 1990. The highway also attracted voluntary migrants from another part of Sulawesi Island. The migrant population, which was mostly Muslims, gradually shifted the balance between Christians and Muslims in Central Sulawesi, especially in the Poso District. The Muslim population steadily replaced the local Christian ethnic group as the majority.

In addition, the development of the highway brought modernity into the heart of Sulawesi. It facilitated trading and brought agricultural products in from other regions. The voluntary migrants from South Sulawesi brought with them the knowledge of cash crop farming of an exported commodity: cocoa.16 When cocoa became an important product for export, there was a rapid change in agricultural practices in Central Sulawesi, including Poso. Cocoa created classes of agrarian haves and have-not. The financial crisis that began in late 1997 exacerbated the economic gap. During this period, the price of cocoa was increasing due to the fall of the rupiah exchange rate against the dollar. The cultivation of cocoa also encouraged further migration into the Poso area. In addition, lured by the modern lifestyles, the natives start selling their customary lands to get cash. The lands were bought by successful immigrant farmers, which later became the source of conflict in line with Van Klinken's argument that the land was a source of conflict.12

Furthermore, national politics had an enormous impact on the political and social dynamics of Poso. In the last decades of Suharto's regime, there was a resurrection of the Muslim community in Indonesia's political contest s.

Nationwide, Christians grew anxious about the possibility of becoming marginalized.15 When the national regime changed and turned to favor Muslim politicians side, tensions among Muslims and Christians were high. Regime change altered the balance of power between the two groups and fueled growing demands to improve the status of Muslims in politics.15 Poso was no different. Successful Muslims entrepreneurs came into the region, and the better-educated young Muslims increasingly occupied desirable civil service positions. Furthermore, competition between elite Muslims and Protestants for military posts and government positions, including the position of the head of Poso district (Bupati), intensified.14 Since the Muslim majority were mostly living in the soon-to-be Morowali District and Tojo Una-Una District, the idea of pemekaran, or "blossoming" as an instrument to win power in Poso was plausible.

Hence, the Poso conflict had no single cause, but arose because of the nexus of several events. First, there was the community power struggle, both political and economic, between natives and migrant communities. Second, the long rivalry between indigenous Protestants and migrant Muslims had made the Muslims feel jealous and suspicious of the Protestants' sense of nationalism. Third, the elites struggled for power, which exacerbated communication gaps between the two communities.

In 1998, the Poso District was the biggest district in Central Sulawesi province. Its geographical area was 29.923,88 km2, equivalent to 98% of the province. Poso is home to some indigenous ethnic groups such as the Kaili, Tojo, Bungku, Mori, Pamona, and Lore (with its sub-groups, the Bada, Napu, Besoa, and Payapi/Tawaelia). It was also home for migrant ethnic groups such as the Gorontalo, Bugis, Makassar, Balinese, Javanese, Minahasan, Mandar, and Chinese. The population was 400.264. Protestants accounted for 35.7% of the population, while Catholics amounted to 0.54%. Christians dominated the interior highlands. Muslims account for 61.2% of the population, mostly in coastal areas. Hindus made up 2%, and Buddhists accounted for 0.39% of the population. Historically, many areas were ethnically concentrated long before violence broke out.

The current Poso District is much smaller than the Poso was during the crises. It endured two splits after the conflict. The split,a so-called pemekaran or "blossoming," is an administrative subdivision of existing districts and provinces to create new units.12,13The first split occurred on December 5, 2000, when Poso was divided into Poso District and Morowali District. The second split was in 2002, when the remaining Poso District became the Poso District and the Tojo Una-Una District.

The communal conflict between Christians and Muslims peaked in 2000. The violence in Poso (Central Sulawesi) led to the division of Muslims and Christians to create exclusive areas and communities in 1998. After three years of episodic fighting, the death toll was estimated at more than 1,000, with thousands more injured. On December 19-20, 2001, the Indonesian government mediated a meeting between the two warring parties in Poso. The parties agreed to end their conflict and to work together to keep the peace in Poso. The agreement was encapsulated in their joint declaration, known as the 10-point " Malino Declaration."

To seek reconciliation, police officials, ministers, and members of the National Human Rights Commission visited Poso and Tentena in December 2001. The initiative to hold a peace agreement came up as a result. On December 19 and 20, 2001, in the hill town of Malino, South Sulawesi, representatives of the two warring parties who had been chosen by leaders of each side gathered to construct a peace agreement. There were many technical obstacles and disagreements such as securing different accommodations for the warring parties and the debatable terms "peace" and "forgiving." However, Jusuf Kalla, the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare (currently the Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia), who is also a native Sulawesi, successfully let the mediation team and helped secure resources for rebuilding and other crucial follow-up activities. The agreement consisted of 10 key points, which included deferring to legal procedures, recognizing pre-conflict rights and ownership, returning internally displaced persons (IDPs), and rehabilitating infrastructure. Twenty-five Muslim leaders and 23 Christian leaders signed the accord. The peace agreement is known as the Malino Accord (Deklarasi Malino). Following the declaration, the government established a working group named Pokja Malino at the provincial, district, and subdistrict levels to spread the message and monitor and implement the agreement. The working group's members were the Malino declarers minus two individuals allegedly involved in unlawful actions. Security forces maintained a weapons confiscation program and deployed more troops. The development changed the nature of violence in Poso.

4. Post Conflict Governance

Poso has been recognized as a successful case of post-conflict reconstruction. The government proudly declared that Poso was already peaceful. Speedy economic growth, massive investments, and peaceful elections were seen as tokens of the tamed Poso. Unfortunate, this study found that to some extent, Poso is the opposite of the government's claims. People in Poso are living in constant fear of chaos and violence. They live separately inside their communities and religious groups, and they are easily manipulated for the benefit of local political elites. A decade after official reconciliation, social cohesion is far from complete. This paper suggests that peace in Poso is not real. It is order, not peace, that exists in Poso.18

In the context of Poso, every conflict is local. This premise is widely accepted in peace and conflict studies. Bringing the idea into the field, we took a careful step in analyzing Poso's conflict and peace-building. We examined post peace-agreement security reform in Poso. The Malino peace accord tried to end the conflict by reconciling community leaders. However, the most important matter for the people (i.e., justice for the victims) was not accommodated since the accord was also intended as a symbol of forgiveness. The justice system tried only three persons as war criminals for mass murder and did not dig deeper to find the masterminds. When the militia groups translated the accord as partially law enforcement, they developed their own system of justice. The system became the factor in a set of violent crises after the peace accord until 2007,18 when security improved rapidly.

However, another problem was discernable when political elites started to use ex-combatant groups to strengthen their political bases. Instead of reintegrating ex-militia members into civilian lives, the elites enhanced the groups' expertise in violence. These groups represent the visible future problem of Poso. In economic reconstruction, the Poso district government has conducted specially designed programs for the post-conflict area to boost the economy. But the programs were far from successful due to lack of long-term planning and low capacity of the field officers. In addition, the programs mainly targeted ex-combatants and their families, and they did not cover most of the population and the victims of conflict. Also, the profuse post-conflict recovery aid was seen by political elites as an opportunity to enrich themselves.

Regarding Poso's economic recovery, the government's attempts to draw investment to the region have overlooked its impact on people's livelihoods. The government oversimplified the peace-building, seemingly believing that economic growth in the district would automatically end all conflict. As a result, many development policies did not support the peace-building process in the region. The government's claim that economic development will reconcile people's disagreements has been proven false.

All in all, we can assume that Poso's local government has failed to reform the post-conflict good governance. Security conditions at this moment are fostering potential future conflicts for many reasons. There are some aspects such as the political use of ex-combatants by political elites, economic jealousy between communities, excessive exploitation of natural resources, and persistent social distrust among communities. To the international community, these problems are difficult to assess because "visible" violence no longer exists and the local political economy seems to be stable in Poso, at least on paper. Thus, we are easily convinced that the peace-building process is on the right track. Poso District government has created development policies that do not support peace-building efforts in the region.18

Presently, Poso cannot be considered to be conducive to protecting human security. Poso is still in the process of recovering and will require a lot of effort to create human security in the area and return the situation to normal. In that context, civil society plays an important role in keeping peace at the grassroots level. The efforts of civil society are illustrated in the following section.18

5. Civil Society in Post Conflict Peace building: the Silent Works

Building lasting peace in conflict-torn societies is among the most complex challenges for peace and security. Peace building requires sustained support for efforts across the broadest range of activities. Those include monitoring ceasefires; assisting the return of displaced persons; improving human rights protections and fostering reconciliation after past atrocities; demobilizing and reintegrating combatants; and promoting the reform of justice and security. The truth of recent years has also led people to focus as never before on peace building. Those efforts

reduce a risk of relapsing into conflict by strengthening local capacities for conflict management, and, last but not least, lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development.

In the context of post-conflict governance in Poso, some aspects need to be highlighted. First, post-conflict programs were mostly created to highlight symbolic and ceremonial reconciliation rather than true actions at the grassroots level. Second, planning, implementation, and monitoring of post-conflict development did not substantively involve civil society. Third, women were outside the circle of peace building because they were seen only as the victims of violence. Finally, most efforts focused on celebrating the agreement at the elites' level rather than supporting improvements at the grassroots level through breaking the cycle of violence.19,20

5.1. Toward breaking the cycle of violence

An interesting aspect in the implementation of post-conflict peace building in Poso is that while civil societies and women did not play significant roles in the process, our finding suggests that they silently but significantly were the agents of peace building. In fact, civil society has cooperated with women, who contributed to breaking the cycle of violence. Civil society has grasped the opportunity to empower women, who previously were victims of the conflict but have become agents of peace. These activities go unnoticed at the micro level (community group or family).21, 23 In a post-conflict society, awareness about the significance of peace can be spread by conducting efforts to prevent widespread resentment among family members. Breaking the cycle of violence, therefore, is about preventing families from falling victim to rumors and incitement that encourage conflicts.

In post-conflict Poso, breaking cycles of violence means the community can effectively pinpoint core breaking points. It is also all about collective efforts to transform society from a culture of conflict to a culture of peace. Breaking the cycle of violence departs from genuine reconciliation efforts by starting at the grassroots level. Learning from conflicts in another areas namely Ambon and Maluku, for instance, many women acted as agents of peace by connecting the warring parties through simple daily activities.24 In a post-conflict society, awareness that peace is vital can be spread by working to prevent widespread resentment among family members. In addition, families must be protected from falling victim to rumors and incitement that encourage conflicts. Breaking the cycle of violence in Poso has been implemented by (1) increasing mutual understanding between diverse communities; (2) preventing the spread of revenge to members of families and children; and (3) increasing inclusivity among people by encouraging interaction between various communities in public places such as traditional markets and schools. In this sense, women have been the foremost players as agents of peace.25

Admittedly, breaking the cycle of violence is not easy to measure. There are neither any pledges that these activities will be successful, nor is the effectiveness of the activities easy to predict. Therefore, the situation is not attractive to the media and donors. The efforts of civil society in empowering women to participate in breaking the cycle of violence were also overlooked in the academic literature. Such efforts are frequently viewed as less meaningful. That said, in the context of Poso, the efforts of civil society to empower women often take place far from the frenzied media coverage of, for example, the Malino Agreement and other symbolic actions. However, efforts toward breaking the cycle of violence have been made by civil society and women as part of their determination to build a lasting peace. Given how little attention these peace actions have attracted, we call this a silent mission.

5.2. From Conflict Victims to Peace Builders: Civil Society Supports the Role of Women

Too often women in conflict situations are portrayed as powerless victims. The reality in Poso is that at the micro level (families and neighborhoods), women are at the forefront of peace building. Women, who know the cost of conflict so well, are also better equipped than men to serve as peace educators, both in their families and in their societies. They have proven instrumental in forming bridges rather than walls among conflicting societies.22

Optimizing the role of women in supporting peace building is essential. At the most basic level, women can be agents for the dissemination of peace ideas. Women also have been filters of all information that seeps into their families and homes that could spark conflicts. Women identify rumors as the seeds of hostility and hatred of other parties. Women neutralize distortions that were absorbed by their family members. Women avoid the widespread resentment that can fuel continuing conflict. In the end, the opportunity for women to be peace building players is obvious, especially in the context of how women in the family can help break the cycle of violence.

All steps in optimizing women as agents of peace-building can be accelerated by empowering women as essential agents in peace building. Empowering includes providing information about the importance and significance of the peace building process, extending awareness for all citizens, and providing facilities for the implementation of the learning process. All these steps ensure that the process of transferring knowledge to women can be done to make them aware of the importance of their role in peacebuilding.22

Measures and efforts to optimize the role of these women became a priority for civil society in Poso. Some NGOs participated in a peace building process by empowering women by establishing women's schools (Sekolah Perempuan). Empowering women was the method of transferring knowledge to women and their families. Empowering women through Sekolah Perempuan can actively disseminate ideas about the importance of peace and of breaking the cycle of violence within the family and community groups.

Civil society provides basic knowledge women need in post-conflict Poso, including economic empowerment, confidence-building measures, and knowledge of human and civil rights. Knowledge is the main asset for any effort to engage in peace building. Although it is small in scope and mostly at the grassroots level, we argue, that this step is by no means without meaning.

These civil society movements to empower women as agents of peace building are as important as what the state has done to clear the path to peace. In fact, in some cases, civil society's and women's efforts have taken concrete steps and have clearer goals and achievements. Statistics do not reveal how much violence has declined or what percentage of conflict has been reduced in the post-conflict period, but at the very least, the awareness of peace has been noticeable among those women and their families who become part of Sekolah Perempuan 25 Most members of the school see peace and normal life as their priorities because they are essential to the life of both the family and a society.25 Most importantly, the schools stress that communication and dialogue are the way to peace rather than solving problems through violence.

Table 1 shows some efforts conducted by civil society to break the cycle of violence byempowering women.

Table 1. What Had Civil Society Done?

Actors Activities

Sekolah Perempuan PAMONA Educating women as the agents of peace

MOSINTUWU Women School Women's empowerment and educating women as

the agents of peace

Aisyiah Women's empowerment

KelompokPemuka Agama (Religious Leaders Group) Educating religious members as the agents of peace

In this paper, we will only highlight two women's school that aim to empower their students, PAMONA Women's School and MOSINTUWU Women's School.

• Women School for Peace (Sekolah Perempuan untuk Perdamaian, SPP) PAMONA

The Asian Muslim Action Network (AMAN) Indonesia create the School of Women for Peace (SPP), thus accomplishing three important things for women in Poso. This school is dedicated to disseminating the idea of peace to women and empowering women in social and economic skills. SPP aims to first build the character of peace, namely the nature of peace in women's behavior through the development of feminine traits in the family and society. Second, it promotes peace by focusing on enhancing understanding of pluralism and multiculturalism. The school delivers the idea by include a plurality of the Indonesian nation that cannot be denied, overlooked, and removed. Third, the school cultivates leadership skills in women, including conflict management and organization. This program views the representation of women in decision-making at all levels as the highest manifestation of the consciousness of the values of peace.24 The alumnus of the school are among the backbone of agents of peace in the community and families.

• MOSINTUWU Women's School (organized by the Institute MOSINTUWU)

More than100 women from 15 villages in Poso became members of this school. Most participants were subsistence farmers, fishermen, and housewives, and they are from various religions, ethnicities, and classes.

The MOSINTUWU Women's School encourages commitments to the collective struggle for peacemaking. In this school, women learn how to gain access and to interact across boundaries of identity. The school also encourages women to organize and advocate for their local communities. At the same time, women participate in the women's congressional of Poso in struggling for peace and economic, cultural, social, and political equality. The core of the school's activities is to disseminate the idea of peace and implemented it at micro levels such as the family and neighborhood.25

5. Conclusion

Some points of the discussion can be highlighted. First, while state actors have paid more attention to the perpetrators of the conflict such as ex-combatants and elites, civil society has paid attention to women who are working to break the cycle of violence. Second, the role of women is often overlooked in post-conflict governance. Civil society has encouraged women to be significant players as peace builders. Civil societies empowered women as important agents in breaking the cycle of violence. Civil society's movement in building peace has been silent and consequently has attracted little media attention. In the context of human security, this study shows that civil society has also been on the frontline in maintaining peace by working to break the cycle of violence in a post-conflict society. In this sense, civil society has become an essential part in post-conflict governance, involved in the intangible peace building mission.

6. Acknowledgements

We would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Ritsumeikan University and the University of Jember for all support that enabled us to do fieldworks. We also thank my two anonymous reviewers. We are solely responsible for the contents of the paper.


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