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Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 172 (2015) 540 - 547
Global Conference on Business & Social Science-2014, GCBSS-2014, 15th & 16th December,
Kuala Lumpur
Obstacle Faced the Democratic Transition in Egypt in Muhammad
Mursi Era
Ahmed A. M. Atawnaa*, Mohammad Redzuan Othmanb
aUniversity of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur 50603, Malaysia
Abstract
Egypt has had an influential role in the Arab and Muslim world. After the 25 January uprising (2011), the focus has been on the democratic transition process in this country, which has faced a lot of obstacles that make it very difficult, slow and prone to failure. These obstacles related to internal and external factors. The performance of Muslim Brotherhood, the opposition, the media, the counter-revolution and the deep state is very crucial in this transition stage. As well, the regional and international position from the elected authority has an effective role, particularly on the Egyptian economy.
© 2015The Authors. Published by ElsevierLtd.This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.Org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of GLTR International Sdn. Berhad.
Keywords: Political Islam; Egypt; Muslim Brotherhood; Democratic Transition; Arab Spring.
1. Introduction
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) became the ruling party in Egypt after the 25 January uprising. The Egyptian political scene showed that FJP is the only party that has the ability to lead Egypt in this stage. After dismantling the former ruling party, the National Democratic Party (NDP) and many new parties have realized they are not effective and popular in the Egyptian streets based on the parliamentary elections unlike the FJP, the political arm of Muslim Brotherhood (MB), who has the largest number of members, and a considerable number of leaders, figure, scholars, professors and experts. President Muhammad Mursi, for example, is an expert in engineering, and Sa'd al -Katatni, the FJP chairman is a professor. This made them more confident that they would be able to lead the post- 2011 uprising
* Corresponding Author. Tel.: +6-01128021032. E-mail address: ahmed_atawna@yahoo.com
1877-0428 © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of GLTR International Sdn. Berhad.
doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2015.01.400
era, even they were alone. They believed that their team of experts will lead the renaissance of Egypt.
In short time, they spread throughout Egypt. With the help and support of MB, the FJP managed to open divisions in every district and city. They managed to conduct the internal elections all over the country and form a democratic party with elected leadership and institutions. Their organized mentality that had inherited from the parent movement (MB) helped them to form accurate and highly built party. They wrote and published the regulations, the election programs and the platform of the party in less than one year; while some of other political parties were still trying to organize themselves. They have published a strategic plan to rebuild Egypt and transform it to be a modern and developed country. Their project of renaissance clearly outlines the short and long terms plans, the comprehensive vision as well as the goals. On the other side, the opposition parties lack clear programs and visions.
Post- 2011 uprising Egypt needs a confident, strong and organized ruling party which is able to face threats and challenges fuelled by what called the deep state, the counter- revolution, the anarchy, lack of security, and the gangs. It also needs the support of the honest and loyal Egyptian people. For example, many problems have come to the surface directly after the uprising since Mursi was elected as a President of Egypt. The need for a strong ruling party became more necessary when the parties failed to make a national coalition. The lack of solidarity between the revolutionary parties resulted in the one-ruling party system again. The national responsibility and the response to the will of the people who elected the FJP party and his candidate Mursi forced FJP to move onward and defend the people interests.
2. Obstacles in the Road of Change
The path to the modern democratic state in Egypt is crowded with obstacles. The high ambition of the revolutionaries who suffered a lot to get rid of the autocratic regime is not easy to be achieved. Egypt is one of the third world states that never has an elected civil president, or government. People of Egypt have never enjoyed their freedom before the uprising. Their life for many years was a compound of fear, poverty, struggle, and wars. But they managed to keep the hope, moderation, tolerance, joy and patience. Their life has been a special blend that can be seen in Egypt only.
The special nature of the Egyptian people resulted in a civil uprising that could not get rid of all bad components of the former regime. The people and the leaders of the uprising and parties were very keen to have a peaceful uprising. The revolutionary parties did not use any violence or military means. This was considered as a triumph without heavy bloodshed, destruction or military confrontations, and it led to quick desired results. However, it was not able to uproot all the corrupted and unfriendly institutions of the previous regime.
Few months after the uprising grave difficulties started to appear in the democratic track. Many parties from inside and outside Egypt started to put sticks in the wheels of the transition. They have tried to hamper the change and development in every aspect of life. They want to send messages to the Egyptians and the people in the Arab world that the 'Arab spring' is not a real change and has a great risk on the future of their countries. These obstacles are briefly discussed below.
2.1. The Political deterioration under Mubarak
During Mubarak's era (1981-2011), the Egyptians were deprived of their basic political rights. All these rights were violated under the coverage of the corrupted laws enacted by the ruling party (NDP) to severe their interests and to rule the country alone. The emergency law had been imposed all the time, accompanied with an absence of pluralism, political freedom and freedom of expression and protest. The opposition leaders who tried to protest against this unjust situation were sent to prison. Most of them and MB leaders, in particular, had been arrested for many times including the current president, Mursi. The presidential elections did not happen, only, in advance known results, referendums to renew the mandate for the president was hold many times. The parliamentary elections had been faked every time (Tadros, 2012).
This situation led to the lack of political experience, especially among the opposition. They did not have the chance to practice politics. They did not have the chance to found parties and play a real role in the official political life. They did not have the opportunity to talk freely to the media. These parties were not able to build and produce political leaders equipped with political skills. It is noticeable that the prominent opposition political leaders, who are leading
the political life now in the government and in the opposition, are among those who had the chance to develop their abilities in Sadat's era. The majority acted as leaders of student movements in the 1970s when Sadat widened the political freedoms margin. Abd al-Mun'im Abu al-Futuh, Hamdain Sabahi, Isam al-Aryan and many others were the leaders of the student's unions in 1970s (Mubarak, 1995).
The 30 years of Mubarak's era was a mass grave for political abilities and political activists. There were two choices for the political activists either not to participate in the political activities or to stay in prison and suffer from all kinds of oppression. Egypt was considered as a state of 'political illiteracy' in this era. People and activists were deprived of talking, discussion and participation in politics. Politics was open just for the NDP cadres and leaders who were characterized as arrogant, corrupted and opportunistic. They used to accuse the opposition leaders, especially MB leader of credulity, lack of knowledge and lack of political experience and skills (Al-Baz, 2007).
Mubarak's regime damaged the civil and personal life of people. They suffered a lot from the security fist of the regime. The heavy attendance of the security agencies in people's life made them suspect that anyone might be a security agent or a spy (Mukhbir). The fear from the security spies spread widely to the extent that the Egyptians have stated a proverb, "even the walls have ears," (al-Hidan liha Wdan), According to Yusri Al-Faham.
In the internal security, Mubarak relied on two notorious security agencies: the police force and the State Security Investigation Service (SSI). These two security services interfered in all aspects of life. People suffered from their tough means used to deal them with. The violation of human rights on the hand of these agencies was regular, intensive and widespread. Many persons were killed in their detention centers. The most famous one was Khalid sa'id who became a symbol of the 25 January uprising. The Facebook page called Kuluna KhalidSa 'id (We are all Khalid Sa'id) was the main page urging people to take part in the uprising.
These security services deliberately used to humiliate people. They not only arrested people out of the law, but they tortured them without legitimate reasons. In some cases, they sexually abused the detained people. This role changed the police from being in the service of people to be in the service of the regime. By time, it became the enemy of people. In the 25 January uprising, the revenge of the police and the state security services was among the main objectives of the protesters. Most of their headquarters were attacked and burned.
The previous regime left a heavy economical legacy. The alliance between wealth and authority separated Egypt into two classes. The vast majority had suffered from poverty, and the very rich minority monopolized the major sectors of business. Two thousand businessmen seized 24 percent of the Egypt's national income. Most of the NDP leaders were from the rich class. They misused their official positions and accumulated enormous wealth, while more than 9 million of the Egyptians were unemployed, according to FJP election program 2011.
The spread of poverty gave rise to many negative social phenomena, in some cases with cultural effects. A large number of slums, especially in Cairo, appeared in Egypt. Millions of the Egyptian lived with inhuman conditions in these slums. The beggars could be seen anywhere. The thugs had strong relations with the regime. The ruling party had used them many times for specific missions, even in politics. The last time was in what known as the Ma'rakat al-Jamal (camel battle). The worst phenomenon is 'robbery' which has become tradition for a wide number of people. As Husam Awad said; In Cairo, anyone could be a target for the thieves, in streets, buses, restaurants and elsewhere. The poverty forced millions of the Egyptians to work overseas. They were willing to work in every job to gain money. In some countries, like the Arab Gulf countries, they faced a lot of humiliation from the governments and the locals. After the uprising, the Egyptian people wherever they live have started to regain their dignity, freedom and glory.
Mubarak's regime had corrupted all the aspects of the Egyptian life. He left a worn-out society and state. Corruption was a part of the government institutions and officials nature. They coexisted with it, and reached the point that the officials had not felt that there was any need for change. Mubarak corrupted the state institutions as well as a great number of people. The officials who had acted in a bad manner and those who undergone this kind of actions became more and more corrupted. It is a kind of Tasahur 'desertification', as Sharif Al-Kharashi called it.
Mubarak's state was rife of bribery including the policeman in the street, the governmental institutions and the presidential palace. Many businessmen used to pay for Mubarak's sons to facilitate their business. Meanwhile, the amount of the bribe depended on the service. After the uprising, many officials who occupied senior position faced charges of corruption and theft of public money (Tadros, 2012).
2.2. International and Regional non-Cooperation
Mubarak's Egypt was a cornerstone in a regional alliance that called axis of moderation. In the Middle East, this axis has been supported by the west, in particular the USA. The countries of this axis participated with USA in the 'War on Terror.' They had adopted tough security policies against the Islamic movements, especially those who declared their hostility to USA and its policies in the region. The United States depended on them in many dirty works that violated the basic human rights. Their prisons witnessed flagrant violation of the human right and inhuman ways of torture (Lynch, 2011).
The USA and the western countries have supported this axis because of its position from the occupying power 'Israel' that recognizes its legitimacy and its right of existence on the Palestinian land. Egypt had also led the efforts to convince the Palestinians to hold peaceful negotiations with 'Israel' and abandon the army struggle. Egypt had been the main regional sponsor for the peace process in the Middle East. Mubarak's Egypt had taken a hostile stance from the resistant movements in Palestine and Lebanon. In the 2008-2009, the Israeli War against Gaza and less than 48 hours before the war, the Israeli foreign minister threatened the Palestinians from Cairo after a meeting with Mubarak and his staff. This considered as an announcement of war from Cairo backed up with full support from and cooperation with Egypt(Stacher, 2009).
The former Egyptian regime had received special economic and political support and patronage from USA and other western countries for its role in the war on terror and the war against the resistance in Palestine and the commitment to the peace process. As a result Mubarak had believed that his legitimacy did not come from the Egyptian people but from the foreign support, particularly USA and 'Israel'. Therefore, he was not concerned with his nation interests, and his prime focus was on the satisfaction of the west and Israel. This was one of the main causes of the 25 January uprising.
Despite the vital role that Mubarak had in the Middle East, the western powers, especially USA, decided to abandon him when they had realized that there was no hope for him to maintain his regime. The west chose to stand beside the popular uprising in attempt to appear that they were still faithful to the principles of liberty, dignity, human rights and freedom of choice. The USA and its alliances in the world had done their best to support what called the liberal and secular parties in Egypt, hopping that these parties would be the alternative from Mubarak's regime. But the reality appeared that these parties did not have the ability, from different aspects, to lead Egypt after the uprising. The only party who could lead was the FJP.
After the FJP victory in parliamentary and the presidency elections and became the ruling party, the western countries felt very ambivalent towards these developments in the political scene in Egypt. On one hand, they talked much about their support of the democratic transition in the 'Arab spring' countries. On the other hand, they are not willing to support the Islamic parties to take control in these countries. This is a hypocritical position on democracy and its principles. The western powers have tried to abort the efforts of the first Egyptian elected president, Muhammad Mursi, to build the democratic state. They have tried to impose their conditions on him using the Egyptian economical needs, as happened with the World Bank loan that Egypt tried to take to recover its economy.
Regionally, many regimes in Arab countries have been very afraid of the democratic change in the region because they are totalitarians, and have never practiced democracy. They know that people freedom means the end of their authorities. These regimes have never been chosen by their people. All of them are dictators, and depend on the security services and the external support, especially from USA, in their rule. They do not have any kind of legitimacy. After the spread of the 'Arab spring' in many countries: Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Syria, the other Arab countries have started to work internally and externally to avoid the political tsunami in the region. Internally, they have made some pro forma reforms. The rich countries have started to improve the financial situation of the people by increasing the salaries, offering more jobs and so on. Externally, they have worked resolutely to abort the democratic transition in the countries of the Arab spring. They have stopped any economic support for these countries. They have supported the opposition of the new democratic regimes. They have also launched an intensive media campaigns that focus on some bad phenomena accompanied the democratic transition, especially the economic difficulties. Through these campaigns, they have tried to frighten their own people from the change, claiming that it will bring the worst. They have also aimed to hinder the new democratic authorities' efforts in building new democratic states.
Finally, this crucial political confrontation in post- 2011 uprising Egypt might represent a regional and international confrontation. It is the confrontation between the ambitions of the Islamic political movements, which represent the will of the vast majority of the people, to establish the Islamic, democratic, independent, free and modern state that they have worked for it since long time, and the foreign influence on the current governments to resist any democratic transition. The influence that aims to secure the interests of the foreign powers, secure the occupying power (Israel), and preserve the totalitarian regimes.
2.3. The Role of the Opposition
Since the FJP became the ruling party in Egypt, two types of opposition have been found. The first one has come from the Islamic parties that some of them split from MB, and the others are not from the same Islamic school of thought. The second group includes the national secular and leftist parties, who are the majority of the opposition parties. They have founded a wide coalition called Jabhat al-Inqadh al-Watani (National Salvation Front) (NSF)(Masetti et al., 2013).
The Islamic opposition is separated into two groups. The first includes the Islamic parties: the Salafists (al-Nur Party) and the Jihadists (al-Bina' wa al-Tanmiyah) who have different intellectual reference from the MB. Historically they do not agree with the MB method of working for Islam. They have their own scholars and interpretative method. They do not believe that MB is the perfect representative for Islam. Sometimes they had clashed with MB (Tammam, 2012).
The different Islamic visions that the Salafists and the Jihadists have did not prevent them from cooperating with FJP and president Mursi. They have shown a lot of flexibility and realism. They have supported FJP and Mursi against the secular opposition because the common issues between them and FJP are more than the others. These parties and MB have the same ultimate goal, the reestablishment of the Islamic Caliphate. Therefore, they consider all the differences with MB are marginal. Despite this, in some issues they have opposed FJP policies such as the date of implementation of the Islamic law and the international relations and the relation with Israel and Iran in particular.
The second Islamic opposition parties are those who split from MB, such as al-Tayar al-Masri and Misr al-Qawiyah. The leaders and cadres of these parties were from MB cadres. They have the same internal education, the same intellectual school and the same final goals. They disagreed with MB on organizational and political issues, such as the way of leadership, the political priorities after the uprising and in some cases about personal positions or behaviors.
The same background and the same ultimate goal for FJP and these parties have not played positive role in their relations. The relationship between them has been very tough and uncharitable. MB and FJP look to these parties as defected parties not as new political parties that can cooperate with them. The lack of political tolerance has appeared clearly in this issue. The FJP leaders, cadres and members still launch endless attack against them in different ways. As well, these parties have tried to take opposite political stances that promote their position as new opposite parties regardless of their historical background. They have taken political positions which have made them appear as a real defiant opposition.
The other major part of the opposition is the coalition of national secular and leftist parties (NSF) that consists of more than 35 groups; the main parties are: the Egyptian Social Democratic party, the Constitution party and the Egyptian Popular Current. The parties in this coalition have different political backgrounds and different visions and programs for the future. However, their stance from FJP as a ruling party has united them. They have a common goal; that is to prevent FJP from achieving its goals to establish an Islamic state in Egypt. They want to build up a secular state. They are afraid of the FJP program that, from their perspective, may lead to a religious state. Objective analysis for the historical political and intellectual background of the NSF reveals that their opposition to FJP program and ruling is based on combined factors: ideology, politics, fears, and desires (Masetti et al., 2013).
The secular opposition claim that they have modern, liberal and respectful program that deserve to rule Egypt. At the same time they claim that the Islamic program that FJP adopted is reactionary and non-democratic, and depends on rhetoric claims. In reality, from their perspective, this program failed in many Islamic countries such as Sudan and Afghanistan. This claim has made the opposition feeling superiority and arrogance. Some of them do not accept and cannot imagine that MB figure is the ruler of Egypt. They want, like the former regime, from MB members to be
followers not rulers. They get used to see them in the prison, not in the governmental offices (Al-Qudaimy, 2008).
A lot of the opposition leaders have personal aspirations since some of them failed in the presidential contest. One of them, Hamdain Sabahi, got more than 4.8 million votes. They think that the Egyptian people did not choose Mursi because he is the best. They chose him because they did not want to vote to the old regime candidate, Ahmad Shafiq. The revolutionaries had no choice except Mursi since the runoff was between two only, Mursi and Shafiq. This belief made some of the opposition leaders think that if president Mursi failed and an early election held they would win. As Sharif Al-kharashi believes; the desire to be the president was the hope of some of the opposition leaders.
Despite of the large number of the members of NSF (35 groups), they have a very weak attendance in the political developments. Their influence in the political scene is also weak. Their alliance is not as strong as they desire, and has a lot of disagreements. They could not force president Mursi to respond to any of their political demands such as rewriting the constitution or changing the parliamentary elections date. They have not been a real challenge for FJP rule. This weakness has made them worried that FJP will perform like the former ruling party NDP. They think that the MB Islamic political culture and the great number of the members of MB will lead FJP to be the new version of NDP. Since then, the term of Ikhwanization (Brotherhoodization) has appeared.
2.4. The Role of the Deep State
The fact that the 25 January Uprising was civil has helped the remnants of the old regime to maintain their positions and interests. The uprising has not totally dismantled the structure of the old regime because the Egypt's revolutionaries were eager to preserve the state institutions as a national property. Only, the leadership of the old regime was displaced; the rest of the regime has stayed in their positions with all responsibilities. The Egyptian politicians and experts have called the former regime institutions and officials as the 'Deep State'.
Decades of governance helped the NDP cadres and members to penetrate in all the institutions and positions of the state. Most of the senior officers in the ministries, presidential institutions, the judiciary, and the security agencies were members in the dissolved NDP. The uprising did not change their loyalty and their political ideology. They may have loyalty to Egypt, but surely they will not be loyal to MB and its program. They will not be part of president Mursi renaissance program and they will not help MB and FJP to take control of Egypt. MB has been an opponent for the Deep State. It used to work against them everywhere and every time (Tadros, 2012).
The security services, which are the most important part of the Deep State, especially the internal security services had never been with the Egyptian people, in particular MB members. Since 1940s, the security services have treated MB as an enemy and as agents for foreign powers. They have been educated that MB and its members are the main threat for the country, the state and the national security. The former regimes accused MB and its members with all the evils that the Egyptian had known. It is very difficult to change the mindset of these services in short period. By time, their viewpoint toward MB may change (Abd Al-Majad, 1991).
The other main aspect of the Deep State is the corruption. The corruption was very common in Mubarak's Egypt. The leaders and many of the officers were corrupted. Any step toward the reform and accountability would be a real threat to their interests in different official positions. They might be sent to prisons due to their behaviors during Mubarak's era. Hence, they have been doing their best to deactivate the transition in Egypt (Phillips, 2009).
The media has had a very influential role in Egypt after January Uprising. Great shift in freedom of media happened after the 25 January uprising. During Mubarak's era the media was not free. The security hegemony affected freedom of media like many other aspects of the Egyptian life. No one could appear on the TV and criticize Mubarak or his regime, and those who did so faced different kinds of troubles in their life by the regime. The political parties, in particular, the opposition parties, among them MB, never had the chance to set up their own media such as a satellite channel.
The uprising opened the door widely for journalists and politicians to express their opinions in everything. Many new satellite channels were opened, and many new journalists and political analysts appeared. It is normal to criticize the authority. The first time in Egypt's history that everyone, even the president, can be criticized. Every official policy, stance or statement can be analyzed, criticized, rejected and attacked by any journalist or politician. The president himself becomes one of the main issues that discussed daily. A real freedom of media and expression started in FJP's Egypt.
Nevertheless, the division in the political scene in post- 2011 uprising Egypt has affected the media. The media has divided sharply between the proponents and the opposition of the new regime. Tough media campaigns have started between the two parts. Different kind of accusations and a lot of defamation, curser and lack of respect have appeared though the Egyptian TV channels and news papers. They have displayed a very bad, horrible, and pessimistic view for Egypt. Watching the Egypt TV channels made audiences think that within few months the country will witness sectarian war, collapse of the economy and bankruptcy, civil war, hungry uprising and so on. Such media is owned by figures of the former regime and supported by foreign powers as FJP believe.
2.5. Muslim Brotherhood problematic political Mindset and Performance
The political mentality of MB was one of the obstacles in front of the democratic transition. The formation of this mentality was first influenced by abnormal circumstances of oppression, torture, exclusion, and enforced exile under tyranny regimes paving the way to build quite inflexible political mindset. These factors, in addition to the intensive ideological education that focus on the extraordinary role of MB as an Islamic movement in rebuilding the Egyptian people and society according to the Islamic principles, have shaped the MB political mentality. This political mentality depends only on its party cadres, do not trust the others, suspect in everything and strongly believe in conspiracy (Sa'id, 2008).
President Mursi and his party FJP did not pay attention to the complications that faced Egypt after a long autocracy governance that requires wide national coalition from the revolutionary parties, in particular those who supported them in the presidential elections. They took the responsibility alone, only two of the Islamic parties, from tens of the Egyptian parties, shared them. This helped in founding a wide national opposition coalition.
In view of the fact that MB and FJP wanted to completely implement their project, they would not be able to build any coalitions. Any coalition should depend on the common issues between the two parties, the opposition and the ruling party. It is very difficult for MB and FJP to build any coalition if they want to implement their program completely. Although they have their own project that helps them to achieve their strategic goals, they should take into account the crucial time that Egypt lives and serves the interests of the country on their own interests as Sharif Al-Kharashi said.
MB and FJP believed that the ruling Egypt was a historical opportunity that should not be lost. They should do their best to achieve their goals and carry out their program. This is their right that democracy secures since they are the majority. This perspective made MB and FJP accelerate to achieve their program. The enthusiasm to invest the historical moment might made them not wisely considered the importance of the collective working and the cooperation with other parties, particularly in this time. In a short time after the uprising MB and FJP managed to have a large number of opponents in Egypt, even from those who was their revolutionary partners. They lost a large number of friends. Together their policy and the constant planning against them by their opponents led to various troubles to their country and finally to a military coup in July 3, 2013 (Masetti et al., 2013).
In addition to the political mindset, MB and FJP suffered from the lack of political and ruling experience. Under non-democratic regime, it is very difficult to find experienced political parties. As noted earlier Mubrak's ruling party was the only one that had full support and chance to work and develop his abilities in Egypt, while MB and many other parties were not allowed practice real political work, except the limit role in some parliament's sessions. They were busy with thinking how to avoid the security measures against them. They did not have the time and the space to develop their abilities (Tadros, 2012).
The situation became more difficult when they chose a person who lacked the necessary charisma for the presidency. Since the first day of his candidacy Muhammad Mursi has appeared as a weak president. MB announced that Khairat al-Shatir, the strong man in the GGO, would be its first candidate and Muhammad Mursi would be the second since al-Shatir had a legal problem that might lead to cancel his nomination. Therefore, his party weakened his position before the opposition did so. The Egyptian media and the opposition have benefited from this point in their attack on Mursi, even after he became the president.
As a president, Mursi did not appear strong and confirmed in his performance. He had not been able to act as a revolutionary leader. He had been seen as a double-minded, and not confident in his decisions. He had taken decisions and changed them or could not apply them because of the rejection of the opposition or the judiciary power. The lack
of experience, the weakness and the lack of knowledge of his consultants, the direct interference of the MB leadership in the presidential decisions and the great desire of change have led to many mistakes. These mistakes harmed the image of the president before his people and led to the resignation of most of his team, in particular those who are not MB members.
3. Conclusion
The long way of MB political struggle has enabled them to be the main political party in Egypt. Their political arm (FJP) was the ruling party for the first time in the history. All the measures taken against them failed. The majority of Egyptian people are still supporting them. The leaders, cadres and members of MB and FJP have great desire and hope to lead Egypt toward development, stability, democracy and leadership of the Islamic world.
FJP which was leading Egypt at a historical moment is a democratic party with Islamic identity. This party is in the way to create its own style of democracy that combines between the fundamental principles of democracy and the Islamic values. The other secular and leftist parties are not influential, and do not have the ability to lead democratic transition in Egypt. The heavy legacy left behind Mubarak's regime, and the great challenges or obstacles on the way of democratic change, among them the military coup; need a strong leading political party that has experts, cadres and members with vast popularity like the FJP. The military coup will delay the democratic transition but it will not put an end to the process.
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List of Interviewees
Al-Faham, Yusri Abd al-Dayim. Former MB Cadre. Interview by author. Kuala Lumpur City, May 7, 2012.
Al-Husaini, Sa'd. Member of the GGO of MB and Member of the Executive Bureau of FJP. Interview by author. al-Qahirah City, July 11, 2012. Al-Kharashi, Sharif. Secretary of Socialist Labor Party at al-Bihairah district. Interview by author. Damanhur City, July 15, 2012. Al-Mursi, Muhammad Abd al-Rahman. Member of General Guidance Office of MB. Interview by author. al-Qahirah City, July 11, 2012. Awad, Husam. Former MB Cadre and Member its political Committee 1994-2002. Interview by author. Kuala Lumpur City, November 11, 2011. Hishmat, Muhammad Jamal. Member of the General Consultation Council of MB and Member of the Egypt parliament. Interview by author. Damanhur City, July 3, 2012.
