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Medical Law Review
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Medical Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 505-530

doi: 10.1093/medlaw/fwv004

Advance Access Publication: March 9, 2015



1 Green Templeton College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK 2 School of Law, University of Leicester, University Road, Leicester LE1 7RH, UK Corresponding author. E-mail:


Medical law inevitably involves decision-making, but the types of decisions that need to §

be made vary in nature, from those that are purely technical to others that contain an °

inherent ethical content. In this paper we identify the different types of decisions that ^

need to be made, and explore whether the law, the medical profession, or the individual ^

doctor is best placed to make them. We also argue that the law has failed in its duty to V

create a coherent foundation from which such decision-making might properly be regu- §

lated, and this has resulted in a haphazard legal framework that contains no consistency. ^

We continue by examining various medico-legal topics in relation to these issues before L

ending by considering the risk of demoralisation. h

KEYWORDS: Medical law, medical ethics, morals, decision-making, de-moralisation d


Medicine and morality are inextricably linked.1 No one denies that procedures such as whether to participate in providing an abortion, the removal of nutrition and hydration from comatose patients, and questions such as whether to provide medical treatment to an intelligent teenager who is refusing to consent require profound ethical reflection.2 Not all medical practice is so ethically dramatic, but all health professionals, in all their personal and professional dealings, make explicit or implicit ethical

1 For a discussion see E. Pellegrino, 'Toward a Reconstruction of Medical Morality' (2006) 6(2) Am J Bioethics 65.

2 Moreover, all of them have been considered by the courts—see Janaway v Salford Health Authority [1986] AC 537; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821 and Re R (A Minor)(Wardhip: Consent to Treatment) [1991] 4 All ER 177, respectively.

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judgments—many of which are complex and repercussive. Because medical staff are as fallible as the rest of us, sometimes the high standards that they set themselves are not met, and there are moral or ethical failings.3 The latest in a long line of scandals was the case at the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, where staff were found to have routinely neglected patients and were guilty of, according to a public inquiry, 'conditions of appalling care'. Moreover, the Inquiry, chaired by Robert Francis QC, found that:

if all professional staff complied at all times with the ethics of their professions, there would have been no need for the plethora of organisations with commissioning and performance management responsibilities. It is because of the fact that not all boards are capable of maintaining acceptable standards or improving services at the required pace, or applying effective stewardship to the resources entrusted to them that healthcare systems regulators and performance managers

exist. It is because not all professionals do live up to the high standards expected if

of them that we have professional regulators. ... It does not need a public 3

inquiry to recognise that this elaborate system failed dramatically in the case of a

Stafford. As a result, it is clear that not just the Trust's Board but the system as a x

whole failed in its most essential duty—to protect patients from unacceptable <1

risks of harm and from unacceptable, and in some cases inhumane, treatment g

that should never be tolerated in any hospital.5 l

In other words, there was a failure of ethics—a failure to comply with the professional t

ethical standards explicitly expected of medical practitioners (and thus also a systemic n

failure by regulators to identify and address the issues), and also a failure by individual C

staff to act in a basically decent, moral way. While the focus of our paper is not the 4

events covered by Francis' report, we feel that the failure of ethics identified there L

highlights a fundamental question that does inform our paper. That is: what should h

be the role of the law in overseeing and intervening in issues of ethical significance? In d

order to address this, we must first begin by categorising what we see as distinct legal, £

ethical, and moral decisions. N



To begin with, we need to recognise that decision-making will take many forms, and 0

that if there is to be consistency then it must be appropriately categorised. Thus, in 5 this section we offer a generalised typology of medico-ethico-legal decisions, and an explanation of what we consider to be the distinctions between them. Essentially, we can divide the types of decisions to be made by doctors into three: legal, ethical, and moral.

3 Many of the recent scandals are identified and discussed in M. Dixon-Woods, K Yeung and C Bosk, 'Why is UK Medicine No Longer a Self-Regulating Profession? The Role of Scandals Involving 'Bad Apple' Doctors' (2011) 73(10) Social Science and Medicine 1452.

4 Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry (HC 947, 2013) Executive Summary page 7.

5 Ibid at page 8.

Briefly, 'legal' decisions are decisions where the doctor has no choice at all.6 Rather, the law has intervened and mandates or proscribes a course of action. These most frequently occur when the law determines that the choice should belong to the patient rather than the medical profession or individual practitioner.

'Ethical' decisions are those that the law leaves to the medical profession to regulate, and thus reflect the corporate morality of the profession. In other words, the profession requires that certain decisions are made in certain ways: if a doctor does not conform, some action will be taken against her and this will have professional (but not legal) consequences. Therefore, such decisions are made by the medical profession as a whole, rather than by medical professionals as individuals. This regulatory framework—which we refer to as professional medical ethics—can and must be distinguished from philosophical medical ethics, which is not intended to regulate and whose writers are not necessarily members of the medical profession. Thus, when we refer to 'ethics', we mean the latter, while 'professional medical ethics' refers to the former. As we argue below, when decisions are defined as 'ethical' in nature certain -§

presumptions are made. The most pertinent is that there is a coherent set of govern- 3

ing principles and a mechanism within the medical profession that enforces adherence a

to them. We should also make clear from the outset, however, that when we refer to o

decisions being 'ethical' in this way, what we mean is that we define the decision as r

being most appropriately made with reference to professional standards set internally, g

and we do not mean that there is anything normatively distinctive that allows it to be |

so categorised. r

Moreover, we should also make it clear that we are not here considering philosoph- t

ical medical ethics. As we demonstrate below in our discussion relating to informed n

consent, the courts do sometimes use philosophical medical ethics for their own 3

ends. This, we would argue, brings about its own challenges, not least the fragmented 4

nature of such discourse. This has been discussed elsewhere, and there is no room to 4

revisit that here. Rather, we focus on the way in which the law has in the past h

devolved decision-making authority to professional medical ethics. Indeed, we should g

also point out from the outset that we do not take any position on the question of ™

whether professional medical ethical guidance should be valid as an alternative regula- N

tory system to the law. Again, this is in part due to space constraints, but also because 3

we believe that it is enough, for the purposes of our argument here, to chart as we do e

below the fact that the law has had a habit of doing so. 7

We do not here include cases where the rules may be unclear, or where the rules are bent so that the 'correct' outcome can be arrived at (an example being the law relating to murder and removing life saving treatment from a patient in PVS, as seen in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789—see J Finnis, 'Bland: Crossing the Rubicon (1993) LQRev 329 and S Smith, End of Life: Principles and Policies for Regulating the Dying Process (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). For perhaps the classic exposition of such 'open textured' rules see HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1961). The inherently open nature of rules means that there is plenty of 'wriggle room', as demonstrated in the cases cited in this footnote. Nevertheless, some conduct will, we argue, always be contrary to the law as it stands today. For example, deliberately lying to a patient when asked a specific question about the risks inherent in cosmetic surgery would not be found to be reasonable conduct unless the legal lanscape were to change significantly. There are, then, limits to this 'wriggle room'.

See J Miola, Medical Ethics and Medical Law - A Symbiotic Relationship (Oxford: Hart: 2007).

A 'moral' decision is one which is entirely uninhibited by anything other than the conscience of the individual doctor. It may or it may not accord with the view taken by the medical profession as a whole. The law sometimes expresses respect for moral decisions: its acknowledgment of the right to conscientious objection to abortion is a good example. These categories are best demonstrated by way of example.

A. 'Legal' Decisions

As mentioned above, a 'legal' decision is one where the law takes charge and claims for itself the role of the body that defines acceptable conduct. It most frequently does this when it perceives the issue to relate to some right of the patient, and thus allows this to be used as a justification for regulating medical conduct.9 This is most clearly exemplified in the law relating to informed consent. The courts have effected a process of change over the past 30 years which has fundamentally altered the focus of the law from being based on the duties of the doctor (as defined by doctors themselves) to emphasis on and prioritisation of the patient's right to autonomy.10 More- 5 over, they have been transparent in acknowledging that the principal driver behind 3

this change has been an enhanced recognition and prioritisation of both the ethical a

aspects of informed consent (in contrast to previous courts that saw it as a matter of x technical medical skill), and patient autonomy.11 In the case of Chester v Afshar, this C

even led the House of Lords to declare that if the law does not protect autonomy, the g

law must be changed.12 l

This is not limited to informed consent, and indeed another excellent example of C this can be found in the case of Ms B v An NHS Trust.13 Ms B was maintained on a B

ventilator. She felt that her quality of life was so poor that she wanted to die, and n

asked her treating clinicians to stop the ventilation. They refused to do so, arguing C

that this would amount to killing her, and that this was 'unethical'.14 She went to "

8 Indeed, if nothing else it has a coercive power—due to the sanctions that may be applied following non- b compliance. In any decision it must therefore be seen as the 'master institution' able to claim ultimate d decision-making authority if necessary—C Haimer, 'Competing Institutions: Law, Medicine and Family in 0 Neonatal Intensive Care' (1999) 33 Law Soc Rev 17 at 21. N

9 We would argue that the particular right in question, in most cases, is the right to autonomy. The pattern o in medical law over the past 20 years has been very much one that has sought to move away from paternal- | ism and towards patient autonomy. See, for example, Lord Woolf, 'Are the Courts Excessively Deferential C to the Medical Profession?' (2001) 9 Med Law Rev 1, for an example of a senior judge who argues that the 7 courts had previously been overly deferential to the medical profession, but

states that this would now 2

change. 1

10 We see this statement as uncontroversial. The change is documented in J Miola, 'On the Materiality of Risk - Paper Tigers and Panaceas' (2009) 17(1) Med L Rev 76. Doctors' duties are of course still important: they have not been swept away by the burgeoning jurisprudential culture of rights. The complex relationship between rights and duties is well illustrated in R (Burke) v General Medical Council [2006] QB 273. We do not see duties and rights as (necessarily) competitors in the jurisprudential market place. Yet we contend that doctors' duties are increasingly seen as duties to facilitate patient autonomy. That does not mean that they are not truly duties.

11 Ibid.

12 Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41. The importance given to autonomy in that case is reflected in the title of the most significant commentary on it: S Devaney, 'Autonomy Rules OK' (2005) 13(1) Med L Rev 102.

13 MsBv An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWCH 429.

14 Ibid at para 57.

court to force them to stop the ventilation. The court applied the well-established and very simple legal principles: Ms B was a competent adult, and thus no medical treatment could take place without her informed consent; she not only did not provide this but actively refused to do so, and therefore to continue with medical treatment would constitute a battery. Thus:

[I]t is established that the principle of self-determination requires that respect must be given to the wishes of the patient. . . . To this extent, the principle of the sanctity of human life must yield to the principle of self-determination . . . and for present purposes perhaps most important, the doctor's duty to act in the best interests of his patient must likewise be qualified. On this basis, it has been held that a patient of sound mind may, if properly informed, require that life support should be discontinued. . . . It is simply that the patient has, as he is entitled to do, declined to consent to treatment . . . and the doctor has, in accordance with his duty, complied with his patient's wishes.

The ventilation ceased and Ms B died. What is of interest to us here is the fact that the medical profession tried to claim the issue of the desirability of Ms. B's survival as its own, by defining it as 'ethical' in nature.16 However the court, by recognising what it saw as the patient's right to autonomy, gave effect to that right by forcing the doctors to cease treatment. In this case, then, we can see that the law took control of a matter with ethical content and defined it as legal—an approach that we shall return to later.

B. 'Professional Medical Ethical' Decisions In this paper we define 'professional medical ethical' decisions as those that the law decides are best resolved by the medical profession itself. Thus it abrogates responsibility, and instead grants decision-making power to professional medical ethics. This is a dangerous notion, given that medical ethics is itself an amorphous concept.18 We cannot exclude the possibility that judges act in this way when they simply do not wish to become involved—in other words, the invocation of 'ethics' is little more than a policy decision that, as we argue below, occurs on an inconsistent basis in the sense that sometimes ethics are evoked, while at others they are conspicuous by their

15 Ibid at para 23, quoting Lord Goff in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, above n 2.

16 Miola, above n 7 at 168-173.

17 It is of course true that the individual clinicians who objected to the withdrawal of the life-sustaining treatment were not forced to participate in the withdrawal: the patient was transferred to a different hospital, under different clinicians, for that withdrawal. To that extent it might be said that the courts respected the ethical objections of the objecting clinicians. Yet, overall, the case makes our point: there was an award of damages to compensate the patient (or her estate) for the period of unlawful, non-consensual ventilation. The court viewed the problem through a legal lens, and that meant throwing away—or at least refusing to use—the ethical lens preferred by the objecting clinicians.

18 Not only is there a plethora of theories, sources and views, but there are also different forms of ethical discourse ranging from professional guidance to philosophical medical ethics. For an excellent account of the latter, see R Gillon, Philosophical Medical Ethics (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons: 1986). See, in particular, chapter 5.

absence.19 There are many examples of the law abdicating responsibility for ethical issues to professional medical ethics, particularly in the context of Bolamisation, and it must be acknowledged that in some cases this is now being reversed.20 Nevertheless several examples remain, and we would not wish to overstate the extent or significance of de-Bolamisation—Bolam is still there and the law still contains a (medically) paternalistic streak. One example is the operation of the law relating to the consent of minors. In the case of Gillick, the House of Lords determined that minors under the age of 16 could, in certain circumstances, make their own medical decisions. This was diluted by the Court of Appeal in the case of Re R, where Lord Donaldson MR held that Gillick could be distinguished, and that where a minor up to the age of 18 refused consent to medical treatment, the refusal could be trumped by either parent or by the court. The case was criticised on several bases. One was that it would allow major surgical procedures to be forced upon mature minors despite their refusal of consent for valid reasons.23 In the subsequent case of Re W, Lord Donaldson confronted these criticisms directly, and trusted in medical ethics to prevent this legal loophole being exploited:

Hair-raising possibilities were canvassed of abortions being carried out by doctors in reliance upon the consent of the parents and despite the refusal of consent by 16 or 17 year olds. Whilst this may be possible as a matter of law, I do not see any likelihood, taking account of medical ethics [that it should be allowed to occur].

19 See, for example, the case of Re G (Persistent Vegetative State) [1995] 2 FCR 46, where the ethical guidance ^ relating to removal of artificial ventilation was consciously adopted as the legal standard by judges. In con- V trast, there have been times where the courts have equally consciously denied even the ethical nature of the S decision taken by doctors—a good example being the cases of Blyth v Bloomsbury Health Authority [1993] y 4 Med Law Rev 151 and Gold v Haringey HA [1988] QB 481 relating to risk disclosure. See Miola, above n ^ 7 at chapters 4 and 7. e

20 The most obvious example relates to best interests, which has been de-Bolamised by the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Indeed, a concern to separate the test for best interests from that for negligence (Bolam) was one of the key aims in the Law Commission report that paved the way for the legislation—Law Commission, Mental Incapacity (Law Com 231: 1995) at para3.26. On a constitutional level the courts do seem increasingly interventionist. The most obvious example is the Supreme Court's insistence that the domestic courts have an obligation to examine critically the question of whether or not domestic legislation is compliant with the demands of the ECHR and that the fact that domestic legislation would be regarded by the Strasbourg Court as falling within the margin of appreciation is not determinative of the domestic court's decision: see R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38, eg per Lord Neuberger at [69]-[76]. This is not an anti-Strasbourg edict: it is a pro-judging edict.

21 See, for example, A Local Authority v E [2012] EWHC 1639. For an excellent analysis, see J Coggon, 'Anorexia Nervosa, Best Interests and the Patient's Human Right to "A Wholesale Overwhelming of Her Autonomy"' (2014) 22(1) Med Law Rev 119.

22 ReR(AMinor) (Wardship: Cornentto Treatment) [1991] 4AllER177.

23 Gillick was arguably diluted further in R (Axon) v Secretary of State for Health [2006] QB 539, where Silber J, reiterating and expanding Lord Fraser's guidelines in Gillick, emphasised that it was for the medical professional to determine, inter alia, whether or not it is the case that 'unless the young person receives advice or treatment on the relevant sexual matters, his or her physical or mental health or both are likely to suffer. In considering this requirement, the medical professional must take into account all aspects of the young person's health.' (At [154]). This sounds like an objective determination, but it cannot be. In demanding such a holistic determination, the law is giving a licence to practitioners to import into the determination of 'physical or mental health' matters that can only be described as ethical.

24 ReW (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court's Jurisdiction) [1992] 4 All ER 627 at 635 (emphasis added).

This is quite a bold course of action to take. Lord Donaldson is recognising that the law does not fulfil what he implies is its desired function, but at the same time he expresses such confidence in medical ethics as a regulatory tool that he is happy to delegate the issue to it.25 The fact that the court in this case appears to think of professional medical ethics as the medical profession's internal legal system is itself interesting, but for now it is sufficient to note that there are occasions where the courts, while recognising the ethical content of a case, nevertheless use this as a pretext for allowing the medical profession to make the requisite decisions, even if it presumes that it will do so in a certain way.

At this point we should alert the reader to an important distinction: the fact that we can identify an ethical element to a case does not mean that it is appropriate to consider the decision to be best made by professional medical ethics. Quite the opposite, in fact: the more 'ethical' the issues in a case are, the more reason there is for the law to take control, because an 'ethical' issue contains, by definition, elements other than issues turning on the appropriate exercise of technical medical skill. if

Doctors have no unique competence in the resolution of ethical issues. Thus, to use 3

Lord Donaldson's example, any decision regarding how to perform an abortion on a a

minor who objects would be mostly medical in nature (and therefore appropriately x

governed by the medical profession). But a decision regarding whether to do so is 0

ethical in nature, and doctors are no better able than non-doctors to make the g

'correct' decision. There is therefore a strong practical justification for making the l

judges the final arbiters over 'ethical' issues which find their way to the courtroom. 0

C. 'Moral' Decisions 5.

Where it is open to the individual to make her own decision, the decision is correctly 5

referred to as being 'moral' in nature.26 Neither the law nor the medical profession °

will (or should) impose any sanction on the medical practitioner for failing to make e

the 'correct' decision: the choice is for the doctor to make as an individual. Most 0

moral decisions, then, will not involve harm to the patient per se, or the patient will be 3

protected by alternative means. The rights protected, then, relate not to the patient §

but the doctor and her conscience. The most obvious example of this is the conscien- V

tious objection clause that exists within the Abortion Act 1967. Section 4(1) provides g

that: §§

[s]ubject to subsection (2) of this section, no person shall be under any duty, 2

whether by contract or by any statutory or other legal requirement, to participate in any treatment authorised by this Act to which he has a conscientious objection.

25 See J Miola, 'Medical Law and Medical Ethics: Complementary or Corrosive?' (2004) 6 Med Law Intl 251.

26 Of course, individuals may and do make decisions on a moral basis whether the law allows this or not— the fact that a particular decision is contrary to the law does not alter its status as a 'moral' decision. Indeed, it is possible for a decision to be contrary to the law yet morally acceptable to the actor herself. Examples might include mercy killing or revenge.

The purpose is to ensure that those who have a conscientious objection to abortion are not forced to participate in abortions. However, as s.4(l) makes clear, it is subject to the proviso (detailed in subsection 2) that this right to not participate does not apply where the life of the pregnant woman is at risk, or where there is a risk of grave, permanent physical or mental injury. Therefore, the 'right' of the doctor to follow the dictates of her own conscience is protected so long as the patient's health or rights are not to be sacrificed by her doing so. There is a balancing act: a 'moral' decision occurs where the patient might expect a certain treatment, but the law (and, for that matter, the medical profession) recognises that the issue is one where some might legitimately object to providing it and therefore so long as the patient does not suffer as a result the decision regarding whether to provide it should belong to the individual doctor, and that compulsion would be inappropriate. This might be distinguished from a case where compulsion would be appropriate as the underlying philosophy is considered unreasonable, such as where a racist doctor would refuse to treat other races.27 Here, the decision is more correctly termed legal or ethical, and sanctions can appropriately

be applied to those who do not comply. 3



If we are to regulate medical behaviour adequately, it is critical that the law is able to o

recognise which problems are best resolved by each of the categories. Needless to say, l

the most problematic of the boundaries between these categories is that between the c

law and ethics. This is our focus here.28 To be clear: by 'professional medical ethics' a

we mean the ethics of the profession—in other words, professional standards created n

and enforced by the profession itself—not individual doctors. Too often medical C lawyers have upbraided the law for leaving decisions to 'doctors', when in reality what

is meant is that decisions are left to the profession and its ethics.29 For many academic L

medical lawyers, the allegation has been that medical law has traditionally been overly h

deferential to the medical profession, and that this has led to a medicalisation of non- d

technical issues—a development that has failed to protect patients, or has even 0

endangered them.30 Sheila MacLean puts it well: N

No matter the quality of medicine practised, and no matter the doubts of 3

doctors themselves about the appropriateness of their involvement, human life 7

27 To give another example, in 2000 the Chief Executive of the UK Transplant Services Authority took early retirement following a furor over accepting organs from a man in Sheffield who added the condition that it could only go to a white person (see S Boseley, 'Transplant Chief Loses Job Over Racism Row' The Guardian, 23 February 2000, available at <> (last accessed 16 May 2014). See T Wilkinson, 'What's Not Wrong With Conditional Organ Donation?' (2003) 29(3) J Med Ethics 163.

28 This is not least because it has long since stopped being seen as acceptable for decisions to be left to individual doctors in a systematic fashion, so the 'moral' category is, broadly speaking, defunct. Even in matters of technical skill the law judges conduct by referring to what others would do, which can be considered a collective standard.

29 See, for example, I Kennedy, The Unmasking of Medicine (London: George Allen and Unwin: 1981).

30 This is a prevalent theme in the work of Ian Kennedy, such as The Unmasking of Medicine and see also I Kennedy, Treat Me Right: Essays in Medical Law and Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1991).

is increasingly medicalised. In part, this is the result of the growing professionalism of medicine, in part our responsibility for asking too much of doctors. In part, however, it is also because the buffer which might be expected to stand between medicalisation and human rights - namely the law - has proved unwilling, unable or inefficient when asked to adjudicate on or control issues which are at best tangentially medical.

We agree that the law was overly balanced in favour of medical professionals, often in issues not actually involving matters of medical expertise.32 However, we would also argue that the law has utilised ethics in a haphazard way which does not constitute a deliberate policy of medicalisation.33 Professional medical ethics, if used at all, has been as often as not used as a tool to help the court come to a decision at which (perhaps on other grounds) it has already decided to arrive. The temptation for the law may be to solve the problems created by its dysfunctional relationship with professional medical ethics by taking more control itself. This, as we argue below, is what it p/ has done, albeit unwittingly. However, we can identify two failings in how the law 3 deals with ethical issues: the first can be termed structural: the second relates to the a actual content of the law's analysis. Before that, however, it is necessary to provide an o example of the dysfunctional relationship between law and medical ethics in practice. g To demonstrate this, we need only return to the example cited above regarding g minors and consent. It will be remembered that Lord Donaldson stated that while he l acknowledged that it would be legally possible to force an unwanted abortion on a 17 gg year old on the basis of a parent's consent, 'medical ethics' would prevent this. He

content to leave a lacuna in the law because he was confident that professional i

medical ethics would act as a guardian and prevent it being exploited. Thus his Lord- §

ship assumed that 'medical ethics' would effectively police the medical profession's <§

conduct. However, as one of this paper's authors has previously argued, not only do L

the GMC and BMA guidelines relating to this issue contain no specific prohibition of h

such a procedure, but doctors are repeatedly encouraged to seek legal advice in order g

to decide what they should do.36 Thus the BMA guidance regarding the medical treat- 0

ment of minors provides, inter alia, that: N

a person with parental responsibility can legally consent to her undergoing the §

termination. In all cases, the patient's views must be heard and considered. If an ,

incompetent minor refuses to permit parental involvement, expert legal advice 1

31 S MacLean, Old Law, New Medicine: Medical Ethics and Human Rights (London: Pandora Publishing: 1999), at page 2.

32 See I Kennedy, The Unmasking of Medicine, above n 29.

33 See J Miola, Medical Ethics and Medical Law: A Symbiotic Relationship, above n 7.

34 This could certainly be said to be the case in cases at the end of life, where professional guidance has been influential—see Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, above n 2; Re G, above n 19 and R (Burke) v General Medical Council, above n 10.

35 Indeed, we would also argue that as the law has yet to identify the fact that it does have a dysfunctional relationship with medical ethics, this is not a conscious decision. It is more likely that the reason for the increased judicial control is an often imperfectly executed attempt to prioritise autonomy. See C Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death: The Tyranny of Autonomy in Medical Ethics and Law (Oxford, Hart, 2009).

36 Miola, above n 25.

should be sought. This should clarify whether the parents should be informed

against her wishes.37

The result is that the law delegates responsibility to decision-making to professional medical ethics, while professional medical ethics in turn abrogates responsibility back to the law. This circular process results in a regulatory vacuum that is most likely to be filled by the conscience of the individual medical practitioner—the consequence being that a decision that should have been adjudicated by either law or ethics will be made by morality instead. Thus the outcome that post-war medical ethics has sought to avoid (namely that the conscience of the individual practitioner should determine questions of ethical complexity) will be far more likely: the doctor may well do what she would have done in any event—before engaging in any structured ethical reflection.

We do not argue that all judicial interactions with professional medical ethics are similarly dysfunctional. Rather, we believe that the seemingly ad hoc, unpredictable if nature of medical law's use of medical ethics betrays a lack of thought on the part of the judiciary: Lord Donaldson, for instance, seems to have thought little about to what he was abrogating responsibility. We can find some interactions that are structurally sound, such as the law relating to informed consent. In that area, the law has consciously taken control, but has imposed a minimum standard of conduct that nevertheless finds itself below the ethical standard prescribed by the GMC. The law therefore requires only that the doctor explain to the patient the purpose of the procedure and lists the material risks inherent in the proposed procedure. The GMC, however, mandates a bespoke interaction, requiring the doctor to find out the patient's individual requirements and desires and tailor the information to them.

Thus, it is possible for a doctor to be acting unethically (and lay herself open to professional sanction) despite acting lawfully—the conduct must fall far below the ethical standard to come even close to breaching the legal standard. This is what we see as being a structurally sound interaction between medical law and professional medical ethics: there should be a progressively higher standard applied as the quality of the conduct works its way through from the legal minimum, past the ethical middle ground and up to the gold standard of moral behaviour.44 Indeed, it should be noted

37 BMA, Consent, Rights and Choices in Health Care for Children and Young People (BMA Books, 2001), at page 172. Emphasis added.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 See J Miola, above n 7. Indeed, it is not even entirely clear if he was referring to professional standards published by the GMC, BMA or Royal Colleges or a more critical form of medical ethics by academics.

41 Ibid, chapter 5.

42 See Chatterton v Gerson [1981] 1 ALL ER 257 and Sidaway v Board of Governors ofBethlem Royal Hospital [1985] 1 ALL ER 643.

43 See GMC, Consent: Patients and Doctors Making Decisions Together (GMC, 2008).

44 In relation to the latter, we refer to this as a 'gold standard' in the sense that it must be even more demanding than the ethical standard, even if it is in practical terms unattainable. For example, with informed consent it might, if the doctor is so minded, involve an amount of time being spent finding out about the patient's preferences that is impractical but designed to be sparing nothing in the quest for finding out what the patient would want to know and thus respecting her autonomy.

that the structure only works this way around. If it is inverted, so that the law demands a higher standard than the professional ethics, then it becomes possible for a doctor to be acting in accordance with her professionally imposed standards yet still illegally. Needless to say, this constitutes an unsound structure. Lord Donaldson's example—which must assume that medical ethics contains a different standard to the law if he is confident that the law's lacuna will not be exploited—also makes two other assumptions about the relationship between medical law and professional medical ethics. Those assumptions are that medical ethics acts as an alternative system of regulation to the law, and then following that that both work together to achieve the right result. Neither can be counted upon.

Moreover, even if the relationship between law and ethics is the appropriate one, the ethical principles must still be applied competently by the law for the law-ethics synergy to produce the right result.45 Here, and again, the law has proved itself to be less than successful. The example we use of structural competence—informed consent—itself illustrates the problem of inadequate ethical content. It is perhaps if

ironic that the more that the law relating to informed consent has recognised the ethical component to the provision of information the less it has trusted medical ethics to adjudicate on the reasonableness of medical conduct.46 Furthermore, the principal driver behind the significant changes in the law has been an explicit judicial recognition of the ethical content of the issue and a corresponding desire to prioritise the principle of autonomy. This culminated in the decision of the House of Lords in the case of Chester v Afshar that we mentioned at the beginning of this paper, where the court went so far as to state that if the law did not adequately protect autonomy, then even the law must be changed.47 Their Lordships even engaged with the question of what autonomy might mean, with Lord Steyn providing a long quote from Ronald Dworkin to demonstrate what autonomy should look like:

The most plausible [account] emphasizes the integrity rather than the welfare of the choosing agent; the value of autonomy, on this view, derives from the capacity it protects: the capacity to express one's own character-values, commitments,

45 Indeed, it would be utterly pointless for the law to involve itself then to offer poor ethical analysis itself. For an example of poor ethical reasoning by the courts see J Coggon and J Miola, 'Autonomy, Liberty and Medical Decision-Making' (2011) 70 Cambridge LJ 523. Of course, while it is easy to criticise, it is more difficult to define what would constitute adequate analysis—or indeed who would determine whether it was so. We consider this question to relate to the application of the principle rather than the principle itself. This could only really be resolved if there were to be some consensus or definition of what the correct ethical analysis should be. A mechanism for achieving this would be the establishment of a committee which would seek to achieve this synergy between law and ethics. Such a body was proposed in the concluding chapter of Miola, above n 7. Such an authoritative voice exists in the USA in the shape of the President's Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues. In the case suggested above by Coggon and Miola, whether the courts had indeed confused autonomy and liberty might be explored by just such a committee.

46 See J Miola, above n 7, chapter 4. We would argue that it is at the discretion of a court to decide whether an issue was one of technical medical skill or contained an ethical element to it. This distinction—between issues that form a part of the technical skill of the doctor and those that do not—forms the basis of our distinction between 'ethical' and 'technical' decisions. See I Kennedy, The Unmasking of Medicine, above n 29, 78.

47 Above n 12.

convictions, and critical as well as experiential interests-in the life one leads. Recognizing an individual right of autonomy makes self-creation possible. It allows each of us to be responsible for shaping our lives according to our own coherent or incoherent-but, in any case, distinctive-personality. It allows us to lead our own lives rather than be led along them, so that each of us can be, to the extent a scheme of rights can make this possible, what we have made of ourselves. We allow someone to choose death over radical amputation or a blood transfusion, if that is his informed wish, because we acknowledge his right to a life structured by his own values.

The problem—no matter whether one agrees with Dworkin's definition—is that the House of Lords failed to create legal rules that put this vision into effect. Rather, it assumed that simply requiring the doctor to provide information as a 'list of risks' to the patient would automatically result in the latter making an autonomous decision.49 Of course, this is not the case at all. The account of autonomy apparently assumed is if embarrassingly simplistic. Indeed, it is arguably not an account of autonomy at all, but 3

rather a description of liberty.50 Nevertheless, what this does demonstrate is that the a

judiciary are increasingly willing to take responsibility for regulating medical decision- x

making.51 Moreover, even in the case of medical negligence—where doctors' conduct C

was traditionally all but rubber stamped by the law—judges have begun to second- g

guess medical decisions.52 l

However, a glance at the cases where this has happened shows that judges are not c

involving themselves only in questions of technical medical skill, but are ready to do t

so also when dealing with broader questions in respect of which doctors do not enjoy n a unique competence. Certainly, many of the examples cited in textbooks of

cases 3

where courts have rejected defendants' evidence by second-guessing the views of 4 medical experts involve such broader questions. In Penney, the decision not to retest L

cervical smear slides that were inconclusive (and labelling the results negative) h

resulted in some women not being diagnosed with cervical cancer early, and was d

found to be unreasonable by the court.54 AB v Leeds involved the decision by the hos- ™

pital to remove organs from dead patients without the knowledge or consent of rela- N

tives—a common practice at the time, but found to be unreasonable. And in 3

Richards the court found for the claimant on the basis that the hospital's multi-site e

layout, which meant that a consultant took an hour to travel to attend a patient, unrea- 7

sonably denied the patient the benefit of timely treatment.56 These are not issues of 0

48 Ibid at para 18, quoting R. Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion and Euthanasia (New York: Knopf: 1993).

49 See Coggon and Miola, above n 45.

50 Ibid.

51 Woolf, above n 9.

52 See Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232.

53 For a full discussion see R Mulheron, 'Trumping Bolam: A Critical Analysis of Bolitho's 'Gloss' (2010) CLJ 609.

54 Penney v East Kent Health Authority [2000] Lloyds Rep Med 41.

55 ABv Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust [2004] EWHC 644

56 Richards v Swansea NHS Trust [2007] EWHC 487.

technical medical skill—they are instead questions relating to whether to do something, or how to organise the performance of tasks. They are areas in which, we would argue, the court is more than entitled to make up its own mind rather than deferring to medical opinion or common practice.57

The problem is, though, that if the law is to accept or even demand responsibility for making such decisions, then it must ensure that both the structure and the content of its ethical reasoning are sound. As we have argued above, so far the law has not demonstrated that it has adequately, if at all, thought about these issues and sought coherence. Given that this is the case, we must ask ourselves whether the law

is equipped to mediate in such matters. Indeed, we have spent so long being sure that o

the medical profession shouldn't be making such decisions without oversight that we O

have neglected to examine the credentials of the overseers. We rectify this below. e


So, then, for the sake of transparency and coherence, we must break out of the circu- :

larity whereby law defers to ethics and ethics defers to law. How is that to be done? 3

We are in no doubt that law needs to be the senior partner. We make the case for that a

contention below. Furthermore, since that is our view it is tempting to adopt the x

easiest route to establishing law's supremacy—the overruling of the Bolam test. But C

the easiest routes are not always the best. The topography of medical law is complex. g'

Or at least it should be, since it should reflect the complexity of its astonishing sub- |

jects, human beings. C

There are some areas of medical practice where some degree of deference to t

medical opinion is appropriate. There will always be such areas, but they will n

decrease in importance as the evidence-based medical revolution continues. If the lit- C

erature conclusively demonstrates that treatment X is preferable to treatment Y, and X 33

and Y are economically comparable and equally available, then there is no responsible L

body of medical opinion that would endorse Y. But the revolution will never be com- h

plete. Medicine will never be completely a science rather than an art. The law can and d

should acknowledge that since human beings cannot be perfectly pigeonholed, nor O

can their pathologies, and accordingly that the exercise of medical judgment and dis- N

cretion must be protected if patients are to have the benefit of bespoke rather than 3

off-the-peg medicine. e

The Bolam test has often been abused in clinical negligence cases, leading to culp- 7

able defendants escaping liability. That abuse was squarely and effectively addressed 0

in Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority—a case which simply put in italics 5 the word 'responsible' in the Bolam test. 'Responsible' had lain low, unexamined and undemanding since 1957. It emerged in Bolitho, promising to end the culture of

57 This is because the medical profession cannot claim any unique competence in making that decision, so the reason for the law not to intervene is removed. See, in general, the work of Ian Kennedy, and in particular 'What is a Medical Decision?' in I Kennedy, Treat Me Right, above n 30.

58 These, in particular, are areas where clinical competence comes to the heart of the issue. In other words, these are issues of technical medical skill.

59 Above n 52.

immunity that a sloppy reading of the Bolam test had engendered.60 That promise, we think, has been realised, although it is hard to demonstrate it definitively from reported cases.61 The real change has been in the judicial mood: a change in the traditional deference of practitioners to medical practitioners, manifested in a reluctance on the part of defendants to fight cases that are on the borders of Bolam-respectability. Indeed, as the last section shows, the courts have certainly become more interventionist. Bolitho, then, has done its job of restoring Bolam to its proper limits and allowing the courts to re-engage in decision-making.62 We can think of no necessary or desirable changes to the substantive law that would make more satisfactory the operation of the Bolam test in clinical negligence cases. We are less happy about the way that o

Bolam operates elsewhere—and particularly in the law relating to the determination O

of best interests, to the law of consent, the law of confidentiality, and to resource allo- e

cation questions. O

A. Best Interests :

How does one decide whether or not it is in the best interests of an incapacitous 3

patient to undergo a particular treatment? Does the Bolam test have any role to play? 33

And if it does, should it? In Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation)63, Lord Goff, speaking x

in the context of whether or not sterilisation was in the best interests of an incapaci- C

tous adult patient, said this: g

[T]he doctor has to act in the best interests of the assisted person. In the case c

of routine treatment of mentally disordered persons, there should be little diffi- t

culty applying this principle. In the case of more serious treatment, I recognise that its application may create problems for the medical profession; however, in making decisions about treatment, the doctor must act in accordance with a responsible and competent body of relevant professional opinion, on the principles set down in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582... Mr. Munby... [deployed] the argument that, in the absence of any parens patriae jurisdiction, sterilization of an adult woman of unsound mind, who by reason of her mental incapacity is unable to consent, can never be lawful. He founded his submission upon a right of reproductive autonomy or right to control one's own reproduction, which necessarily involves the right not to be sterilised involuntarily.

The argument based on reproductive autonomy failed. The Bolam test was held to have a central place in the determination of best interests. This looked suspiciously like a decision motivated more by a desire to allow doctors the freedom to do what they thought best than one motivated looking beyond the purely medical in

60 Exemplified by the judgment of the House of Lords in Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority [1985] 1 All ER635.

61 Avery useful survey of post-Bolitho case law was conducted by Mulheron in 2010—above n 53.

62 M Brazier and J Miola, 'Bye Bye Bolam: A Medical Litigation Revolution?' (2000) 8 Med Law Rev 85.

63 [1990] 2 AC 1.

64 At 78. Lord Bridge agreed: see 52, as did Lord Brandon (66-68) and Lord Griffiths (69).

ascertaining the patient's best interests, particularly given the reference in the quote above to 'creating problems' for the medical profession.65

Re F raised some awkward questions. The notion of 'best interests' presupposes that there is, theoretically, a definitely right answer to the question: 'is this intervention in the best interests of X?'—in other words that best interests inquiries are attempts to find where the objective best interests of X lie. If that's so, how can the Bolam test, which could conceivably contain several bodies of opinion that it would be reasonable for a doctor to follow, properly have a voice at the table at all—let alone a decisive voice? What was the role of the court? Was it merely to satisfy itself that the clinicians concerned had assessed best interests in a way that would be endorsed by a responsible body of clinicians? In such a scenario, the law would be little more than a rubber stamp. What if there was a responsible body that said that it was not in the patient's best interests to be sterilised? According to the pre-Bolitho reading of Bolam, this would not matter and the doctor could proceed in any event. It is for this reason that we argue that the law framed in this way was little more than an exercise in maximising ways of allowing the doctor to do as she pleased. if

Surely questions about the sterilisation of an incapacitous adult can never be 3

definitively resolved by reference only to the narrowly clinical criteria with which a

Bolam is most commonly (and most obviously properly) concerned. They will neces- x

sarily be infused with the ethics of the profession and the individual morality of the C

clinicians. Re F failed to acknowledge this. Its retreat into Bolam was an abdication of g

judicial responsibility. That abdication created terrible problems for the law.66 It is a good and depressing illustration of what happens when judges fail to judge. C

Yet what happened next (10 years later) is a good and heartening indication that ^

when judges do judge, things get better. And here we begin to lay the ground for our n

contention that law should be unafraid to assert its primacy over ethics. In Re S (Steril- C

isation: Patient's Best Interests)67 the Court of Appeal addressed the questions begged 4

by Re F. It was bracingly pragmatic; L

I would suggest that the starting point of any medical decision would be the principles enunciated in the Bolam test, and that a doctor ought not to make any decision about a patient that does not fall within the broad spectrum of the Bolam test. The duty to act in accordance with responsible and competent professional opinion may give the doctor more than one option since there may well be more than one acceptable medical opinion. When the doctor moves on to consider the best interests of the patient he/she has to choose the best option, often from a range of options. As Mr Munby has pointed out, the best interests test ought, logically, to give only one answer.68

65 In the case of ReB [1987] 2 All ER 206, only a few years earlier, Lord Hailsham had held that the incompetent patient should enjoy all of the treatment that the competent one could expect. We view the decision in Re F as the House of Lords' attempt to put this into action by removing the contraints on medical professionals while trusting them to execute this. It would explain why best interests were seen in such strictly medical terms in Re F.

66 Indeed, as we noted in n 20 above, even the Law Commission was critical of the conflation of best interests with Bolam.

67 [2000] 2FLR389.

68 Per Butler-Sloss P at 400.


In these difficult cases where the medical profession seeks a declaration as to lawfulness of the proposed treatment, the judge, not the doctor, has the duty to decide whether such treatment is in the best interests of the patient. Bolam merely narrows down the options, and the judge then picks the best one. The judicial decision ought to provide the best answer, not a range of alternative answers. There may, of course, be situations where the answer may not be obvious and alternatives may have to be tried. It is still at any point the best option of that moment which should be chosen.69

This was surely right. It put Bolam in its place (as an initial check to ensure that maverick doctors did not contribute inappropriately to best interests determinations), preserved the crucial notion that best interests determinations are objective determinations, and, most significantly, reasserted the principle that it is the law, not pro- if fessional, ethics-infused opinion, which is the ultimate arbiter of medical action and inaction.

B. Informed Consent

We have touched on this already, and need not address it again in any detail. Bolam used to rule (or be perceived as ruling) in clinical negligence cases involving allegedly inadequate counselling. The cornerstone case was (and is) Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital. As so often happens in medical law, the case was perceived as laying down something very different from what it in fact says. The ratio of Sidaway is actually very elusive. Yet it was uncritically cited as authority for the proposition that in consent cases a doctor would escape liability if the information he had supplied was that that would have been supplied by a responsible body of medical opinion.71 There are elements in the speeches that support that proportion, and there are elements that do not. The dogmatic citation and re-citation of the simple Bolam reading became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Practitioners and first instance judges assumed that that is what it said. But, as we have noted, the case was eventually re-read. Lord Scarman's view, previously buried, was disinterred; the 'prudent patient' test crossed the Atlantic and found its way into some professional guidelines, and the scene was set for the assertion, in Chester v Afshar, for a formulation based squarely on patient autonomy.

69 Ibid; see too Thorpe LJ at 402-3. In this formulation, the Bolam element tends to protect clinicians, while the 'wider considerations' element tends to protect patients.

70 [1985] AC 871.

71 See Blyth v Bloomsbury and Gold v Haringey, above n 19.

72 See Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust (1999) 48 BMLR 48 and Wyatt v Curtis [2003] All ER (D) 493.

73 Notably those of the Senate of Surgery of Great Britain and Ireland, The Surgeon's Duty of Care: Guidance for Surgeons on Ethical and Legal Issues (1997); and the General Medical Council Seeking Patients' Consent: The Ethical Considerations (1999) and its successor, GMC, Patients and Doctors Making Decisions Together (2008)).

74 Above n 12.

The decision in Chester is hard to defend in its entirety. The court essentially held that a loss of autonomy was actionable damage.75 This had the effect of almost dispensing with causation, as any failure to warn of a material risk (the breach of duty), would cause the harm (loss of autonomy); thus, the breach would necessarily and automatically have caused harm. Surely the right thing to have done was not to have assessed quantum as the entire value of the injuries that accrued to the claimant as a result of the operation. That outraged, entirely unnecessarily, the useful conventions of proximity, foreseeability and reasonableness in the law of tort. The claimant should have received modest damages for the breach of her Article 8 right to be informed properly. Chester was not about the Bolam test. It was agreed that the defendant should have given a warning that he failed to give. But the main point here is that Chester's decisive move away from the traditional ways of analysing clinical negligence cases indicated a very welcome judicial readiness to judge—to the point of changing the law when it is thought to be deficient.

C. Confidentiality

Confidentiality is one of the first 'ethical' issues taught to medical students, and there are very full guidelines from (for instance), the General Medical Council dealing with it.76

The courts have traditionally been deferential to the healthcare professions' own view of their ethical obligations. Indeed that deference has sometimes been complete capitulation. Thus in R v Department of Health ex p Source Informatics, (which involved pharmacists) Simon Brown LJ said, having reviewed the authorities:

To my mind the one clear and consistent theme emerging from all these authorities is this: the confidant is placed under a duty of good faith to the con-fider and the touchstone by which to judge the scope of his duty and whether or not it has been fulfilled or breached is his own conscience, no more and no less. One asks, therefore, on the facts of this case: would a reasonable pharmacist's conscience be troubled by the proposed use to be made of patients' prescriptions? Would he think that by entering Source's scheme he was breaking his customers' confidence, making unconscientious use of the information they


The reference to 'conscience' here may make it look as if personal morality, rather than corporate ethics, is the touchstone of legal liability, but that cannot be right. There is no doubt that there are many wholly depraved pharmacists whose consciences happily endorse conduct that would be frowned on by the profession's regulator. Regulators exist precisely because individual consciences cannot be relied upon. Simon Brown LJ assumes that the conscience of a reasonable pharmacist is one informed by and concordant with the ethical rules of her profession. That follows from the reference to 'reasonable'. Yet in the context of, for instance, conscientious

75 See Devaney, above n 12.

76 See General Medical Council, Confidentiality (2009).

77 [2001] QB 424, at para 31.

objection to abortion (a pure example of personal morality), the reasonableness of the objection is not an issue. We would support the latter stance, and suggest that the 'conscience of the reasonable pharmacist' is a contradiction in terms.

Ex p Source Informatics, then, seems like a clear example of the law meekly following the professions. If it represents the law, we contend that the law is wrong—wrong because abdication of jurisdiction (which is what Source Informatics is) can never be legally right. But it does not represent the law. That is clear enough from W v Egdell, which indicated that one determines whether or not there has been an actionable breach of confidence by deciding whether the public interest in non-disclosure is outweighed by the public interest in disclosure, and makes it clear that the court is the ultimate arbiter of where the public interest lies. It is clear, too, from Article 8 of the ECHR, the lens through which questions of confidentiality now tend to be viewed. Article 8(1) provides that everybody has a right to a private and family life, which includes a right to privacy regarding medical information. Article 8(2) lists the exceptions to the rule that this right to privacy must be maintained. It includes public f health, public safety and the prevention of disorder or crime.79 In deciding whether or not there has been an actionable breach of confidence, one identifies and weighs the Article 8(1) right against the societal considerations in Article 8(2). The views of the professions are evidence—no more—pertinent to the judicial resolution of the tension between 8(1) and 8(2).

Just as there is a notional right answer to the question: 'Is this intervention in the patient's best interests?', we suggest that there is a notional right answer to the question: 'Should that information be disclosed?' Identifying those answers is quintessen-tially a judicial job. The law, recognising the difficulty of the job, will be forgiving to those professionals who use a route to their own answers different from the one that a judge, rightly directed, would use, or who reach an answer slightly different from the 'right' one. However that sympathy with the exigencies of healthcare practice does not mean that the law has abandoned its insistence on the idea of a right answer, and still less that it has surrendered its own arbitral sovereignty.

D. Resource Allocation

Resource allocation is notoriously difficult legally, ethically and morally. We make no attempt to summarise the law here.80 The basic public law position was summarised by Buxton LJ in Rv North West Lancashire Health Authority exp A:

1. A health authority can legitimately, indeed must, make choices between the various claims on its budget when, as will usually be the case, it does not have sufficient funds to meet all of those claims.

2. In making those decisions the authority can legitimately take into account a wide range of considerations, including the proven success or otherwise of

78 [1990] Ch 359.

79 See MS v Sweden [1997] ECHR 49 and Z v Finland [1997] ECHR 10, and in the English courts A Health Authority vX and Others [2001] EWCA Civ 2014.

80 For a short summary see C Foster, 'Simple Rationality? The Law of Healthcare Resource Allocation in England' (2007) 33 J Med Ethics 404.

the proposed treatment; the seriousness of the condition that the treatment is intended to relieve; and the cost of that treatment. 3. The court cannot substitute its decision for that of the authority, either in respect of the medical judgments that the authority makes, or in respect of its view of priorities.

The traditional public law position pertains: the court will not interfere unless the decision is Wednesbury unreasonable (frankly irrational: a very high hurdle to clear) or procedurally flawed. To state the obvious: healthcare resource funding decisions kill, maim and save. It is perhaps curious (although understandable) that such obviously repercussive decisions are quite so hard to review. In making decisions about healthcare resource allocation, NHS bodies will (effectively non-reviewably) take into account not only data justified by the objective utilitarian tools of Quality Adjusted Life Years per Pound, but also views which can only bear the name of ethical or moral. The courts' reluctance to adjudicate must partly be a distaste for getting ■§

embroiled in this ethical/moral battleground—as well as a concern about opening the 3

floodgates to litigation by disaffected patients, so clogging the courts. a

But precisely because the decisions are so difficult, and so 'ethical', we think that x

the courts should (with appropriate procedural safeguards to stop tidal waves of litiga- C

tion swamping the court lists) be prepared to grapple with these life and death g'

funding decisions. It is arguably anomalous to spend a huge amount of intellectual |

and emotional energy, as well as a great deal of money, deciding whether it is in the c

best interests of a patient in PVS to have artificial nutrition and hydration withdrawn, t

and yet turn a Nelsonian blind eye to the fact that the continued maintenance of that n

PVS patient necessarily means the death of many entirely salvageable people whose treatment could have been paid for with the funds spent on the nasogastric feeding.

There are some encouraging signs of judicial frustration with the status quo of nonintervention. In Bull v Devon Health Authority (which concerned the allegedly inadequate provision of staffing for the post natal care of a child) Mustill LJ, obiter, noted that the courts might not be able to dodge for ever the issue of liability for policy decisions concerning funding.

E. Law or Ethics?

Problems in medicine do not come neatly packaged with a label saying 'legal' or 'ethical'. But most problems in clinical negligence claims, other than those involving informed consent and resource allocation, are uncontroversially the province of the law. Problems concerning consent (and particularly the determination of best interests), confidentiality, resource allocation, the withdrawal and withholding of treatment, reproductive technology and the use of body parts will generally have a significant ethical

81 [2000] 1 WLR 977 at 997.

82 Associated Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223.

83 [1993] 4 Med LR 117. See too the comments of Pill LJ in Knight v Home Office [1990] 3 All ER 237.

84 Jurisdiction over medical problems can be correspondingly difficult to determine. That is one (bad) reason to approve of the holistic jurisdiction of the regulators, who unblushingly and unreflectively conflate questions of law and ethics.

component. In these 'ethical' areas, which should take the lead? Law or professional medical ethics? We have seen that the question has to be answered in order to avoid an embarrassing and sometimes dangerous philosophical pass-the-parcel, with law passing the buck to ethics, and ethics handing it back again.

We think the answer is clear: the law. The law has in place, as bioethics does not, structures and procedures for the detailed examination and adjudication of ethical questions. The courts are not as good as Parliament at taking societal temperatures (they do not have the time, the resources or the expertise), but they are better than the GMC. The regulatory codes of the professional bodies are often intelligent, thoughtful and useful documents, compiled after wide consultation.85 But the processes of consultation, however thorough, are not and cannot be anything like as transparent as the process of examination that occurs in a public courtroom. The consultation exercises are disproportionately affected by the representations of vocal pressure groups, the process of taking account of the responses and grafting them into the final code is often obscure, and only if there is a gross failure of process or a barn-door f illegality in the final product will the code be reviewable. There is too much of the 3

smoky room for these codes to have the same sort of credibility as an Act of Parlia- a

ment or a judicial decision reached after prolonged public argument. It cannot be for- x

gotten, either, that the regulatory organisations may have their own internal politics or C

(unspoken) ethical presumptions—luxuries denied to the judges.86

The law has the advantage, too, of having to decide.87 That is often uncomfortable, l

but it produces a quality of thought that is absent when one simply has to say what c

principles might, in the abstract, apply. There is a reason why comments made obiter t do not have the same authority as those which are part of the ratio decidendi. Ethics, n

even when embodied in a formal code that purports to circumscribe acceptable professional conduct, will necessarily be unable to be as prescriptive as the law. Ethics will have to take into account the penumbra of acceptable opinion. It will never be able to shake off the objections to Bolamisation that we have identified above. The amorphous must always give way to the structured, for reasons of certainty, transparency and fairness.

And the law has a final, decisive advantage: power. It has the authority to decide, and the obligation to do so. A regulatory tribunal can, wielding its own domestic statute book (its regulatory code) have a crucial impact on a profession and on the individuals who make up the profession. There is nothing unreal about the power of the GMC to strike a doctor's name from the register. But when all is said and done, the GMC is a creature of the Medical Acts,88 the procedures of the tribunals by which

85 For example, the GMC guidance on consent (above n 43) is a document which requires a far higher standard of conduct than the law, and is therefore far more effective at protecting patient autonomy. See S Fovargue and J Miola, 'One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The GMC, the Common Law and "Informed" Consent' (2010) 36 J Med Ethics 294.

86 This is not to say that judges cannot themselves also be distracted - for a powerful argument to this effect, see J Montgomery, 'Law and the Demoralisation of Medicine' (2006) 26(2) Legal Stud 185 at 189-193.

87 See Foster, above n 35, 182-3. It should also be noted that there is some resistance amongst some teaching ethics to the notion that there can be 'right answers'—see, for example, AC Molewijk and others, 'Teaching Ethics in the Clinic: The Theory and Practice of Moral Case Deliberation' (2008) 34(2) J Med Ethics 120.

88 The latest (consolidating) version of which is the Medical Act 1983.

its powers are exercised are creatures of subordinate legislation, and both are ultimately reviewable by the court. We have not delineated the exact boundaries of law, ethics and morality. It is impossible and undesirable to do so. We have indicated that ethics and law often mix. We would not want it otherwise. Law unleavened by ethics would be cold and unfit for its purpose of serving warm humans.

We are conscious that we have elided the question of the relationship between law, ethics and morality and the question of who should be the ultimate arbiter of questions to which law, ethics and morality each have something to contribute. Given the forensic realities, that seems to us to be inevitable. It does not follow from this that we do not support enthusiastically methods of resolving conundrums in medical life which do not involve the courts. Far from it—and we would also note that addressing the issue of circularity will depend on such a delineation being found. We endorse, for instance, Richard Huxtable's view that Clinical Ethics Committees (CECs) have a significant role to play in such problems.89 There is no contradiction in that endorsement. It is inconceivable that a rightly directed CEC would recommend an illegality, if and final recourse would always be to the courts. 3 With the law's power comes responsibility—the responsibility to decide. As we a have noted, that responsibility has often been inappropriately shirked. That shirking x has sometimes been because of a feeling by the courts that they are not intellectually C equipped to second-guess doctors (Bolam at its worst—more or less corrected by g Bolitho), or, even if so equipped, should not (Sidaway, as conventionally understood, | and perhaps Re F). Sometimes it has been a constitutionally understandable concern C about the appropriate limits of judicial intervention (some of the resource cases), or a ^ worry that if jurisdiction is accepted, the courts will be swamped (some of the n resource cases). Sometimes, though, it has been because of a failure or a refusal to C acknowledge the primacy of the law. This generally comes with a failure to realise that 4 the law, properly wielded, can respect and embody both professional ethics and per- L sonal morality. We should also note that this responsibility to decide does not in itself h guarantee good decisions, and indeed the courts have in the past made some clear d mistakes in this regard.90 0 The relationship between professional ethics and personal morality is a relation- N ship which the law must, now, take into account—at least when it is dealing with 3 public authorities, as will usually be the case in medical litigation. Article 8 of the e ECHR will be in play in many disputes. Private concerns (including moral concerns) 7 are the business of 8(1): societal concerns (including broader ethical considerations) 0 are the business of 8(2).91 It is the court's job to resolve the tension between those 5 (often competing) concerns. Accordingly, even if it was acceptable, prior to the

89 R Huxtable, Law, Ethics and Compromise at the Limits of Life: To Treat or not to Treat? (London: Routledge: 2013).

90 An obvious example lies in the enforced caesarean cases, which were clearly mistakes in law—in particular the first one, where the woman's capacity was not in question (Re S (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] 3 WLR 806). See M Thomson, 'After Re S' (1994) 2 Med Law Rev 127.

91 This can be seen in the issue of confidentiality, where Art 8(1) gives the right to the patient, but it is subject to the exceptions based on more utilitarian social concerns contained in Art 8(2). See E Wicks, Human Rights and Healthcare (Oxford: Hart: 2007) Chapter 6.

Human Rights Act 1998, to ignore ethical and moral concerns, it is acceptable no longer. The law, then, should set the minimum standard. If regulators want to demand more of their professional members (ethics): fine. If an individual member wants to demand more of herself than the law/the regulator (morality): fine.

Setting the minimum standard requires some judicial creativity. That creativity has often been stifled by over-ready deference to medical ethics. But the law can do the job whose responsibilities entail the status of final arbiter. There was no need for Lord Donaldson's unhappy formulation in Re W. Should the unwilling 17 year old be forced by her parents to have an abortion? No. But that is really because abortion is a rather special type of 'treatment'. It cannot simply be lumped together with appendectomies. A little bit of nuance would have gone a long way. The case wasn't beyond the creative powers of the common law.

V. WHAT ABOUT THE DANGER OF 'DE-MORALISATION'? At this point we should consider the danger warned of by Jonathan Montgomery, -§

who has argued that the move away from Bolam and other factors have led to the law sucking the moral shape out of medicine. More precisely, he argues that the increased focus on 'choice' for patients, (both within the NHS and in the law more generally) has created a marketplace where 'anything goes'. Thus,

the discipline of healthcare law is at risk of being transformed—moving from a discipline in which the moral values of medical ethics (and those of the non-medical health professions) are a central concern, to one in which they are being supplanted by an amoral commitment to choice and consumerism. In other words, that the morality is being taken out of medicine by legal activity.

He argues that sometimes the limitation of choice increases autonomy and ensures that moral values are more fully considered. Since the moral zeitgeist of modern medical practice insists that such choice should be increased, not decreased, the moral zeitgeist, he suggests, is wrong. In order to demonstrate this demoralisation in action, Montgomery provides the example of the law relating to informed consent (which governs how much information a doctor needs to give to a patient about the risks, benefits and alternatives regarding any particular treatment before the patient's consent is legally valid). He notes that the law in the area has been seen to exist to protect patient autonomy in a positive way:

In traditional terms, commentators have seen that doctrine as a means of promoting the autonomy of patients—their ability to take control of their lives and to shape them as they wish. The choices they make are one of the ways in which they shape their own life stories. Ensuring that patients receive good quality information is part of the process of enabling them to exercise such

92 J. Montgomery, 'Law and the Demoralisation of Medicine', above n 86.

autonomy. On this account, autonomy is a positive value reflecting the sort of people we believe fully reflect our human potential.93

However the way in which the law has developed has been shaped by its response to medical paternalism, and Montgomery's position—with which we agree wholeheartedly—is that what the law has done in reality as opposed to in theory has been to seek to limit the power of medical professionals rather than promote the autonomy of patients. The purpose therefore becomes a negative one rather than a positive one, although the concept imagines that the positive notion of autonomy will result from the removal of the negative notion of paternalism. This is important because, as Montgomery demonstrates, the principles can be warped or wrongly deployed to achieve precisely the opposite of what their users intend. He gives the example of the Data Protection Act 1998 and its requirement that if data is to be transferred abroad the controller must either obtain the informed consent of the data subject or take steps to ensure that the same level of privacy protection is in place. He argues that

companies far prefer the consent 'route' because this essentially absolves them of |

responsibility for ensuring standards. In this way, W

an apparent increase in informed consent has actually served to reduce the obli- jj

gations of researchers to protect the interests of participants. Promoting partici- |

pants' ability to shape their lives would be more enhanced by the researchers .

maintaining the responsibility for protecting privacy. The law has substituted a /

formal requirement of openness for a substantive one of protection. Perhaps 8

more tellingly, the people protected by informed consent are the researchers 5

and drug companies not the research participants. The legal doctrine of informed consent has actually undermined autonomy as it has reduced the force of the moral obligation on researchers to protect the ability of participants to shape their own lives.94

Montgomery criticises the previous generation of medical lawyers, such as Ian Kennedy, for their analysis of the doctor-patient relationship, and medical law generally, as something of a battle between doctor and patient, with the winner being she who gets to decide. He notes that, for authors such as Jo Jacob, rejecting medical expertise was to throw the baby out with the bathwater because 'professional knowledge, experience and values are all inculcated in an integrated process of training and apprenticeship'.95 According to Montgomery,

one could extrapolate from his argument that to use the Bolam test as a benchmark of acceptable practice was not to abandon normative judgement, as some have seen it, but to reinforce the values of the health professions. From this

93 Ibid at 187. We would agree that the law has sought to prioritise autonomy (see, for example, J. Miola, 'On the Materiality of Risk: Paper Tigers and Panaceas' above n 10), although we would also note that the conception of autonomy utilised is simplistic and more akin to liberty (see Coggon and Miola, above n 45).

94 Montgomery, above n 86 at 188.

95 Ibid at 200.

view, the ascendancy of the ideology enshrined in the Bolam test is a positive choice to build on the moral nature of medicine.96

Yet the Kennedy-ites have won, and the new breed of more interventionist judges have encouraged the marketplace and created a vision of medical practice that is trans-actional rather than moral in nature:

[the new breed of judge] rejects deference to the health professions, sees healthcare as equivalent to other (commercial) enterprises and, therefore, to be regulated from outside without any trust in industry values and without any special rules for healthcare. This constructs the position of the patient as consumer dictating what should happen, with little scope for moral independence of health professionals. Such a construction is essentially value neutral and once more serves to marginalise the moral content of medical law. It can be seen that this new approach to judging healthcare practice is consistent with other developments that serve to 'demoralise' the enterprise of medical or healthcare law. d

It is a powerful argument, and it is buttressed by his persuasive demonstration that f

the law has failed to use (or use appropriately) the powers that it has. Given our j similar analysis of the law's failing above, it is no surprise when we again declare our |

agreement with this point. But does Montgomery's thesis present a challenge to ours? .

By seeking to encourage a more interventionist approach by the law, are we risking / losing focus on morality and submitting to a feral marketplace where choice is king? £

It may well be that we are, but the challenge is one that we feel can be met by S. furthering his argument, which is one with which we broadly agree even if we come to §

a slightly different conclusion. First, it should be noted that the 'market', which 0 undoubtedly exists, relies not just on demand but also supply. Therefore it is notice- e

able that in almost all areas of ethical controversy—whether it be extreme cosmetic surgery, removing ANH, performing experimental treatment on patients or any of the myriad other examples that could be used—one always seems to be able to find a doctor who is willing to perform the procedure. It is therefore not enough, in our view, to lament the creation of the market and suggest that there is nothing that can be done to stop it, which is what some might do.98 Rather, we would argue that something can be done. The supply of the ethically dubious activities can be cut off. Both the law and, in theory, medical ethics are equipped to truncate the supply. Secondly, decisions involving issues of ethical complexity are precisely those in which, as we have argued above, doctors have no unique competence. There is therefore no reason why they should fall to be decided by medical professionals and their ethics. Indeed it is worth restating our view that, ironically, the more ethical in nature a decision is, the less justification there is for allowing medical ethics to become the arbiter.

This reclamation of decision-making capacity by the law from the medical profession is central to Ian Kennedy's work, and it stands the test of time very well.

96 Ibid at 201.

97 Ibid at 206.

98 Montgomery, it should be noted, does not argue on this basis.

Montgomery's counter argument, that judges have come to accept Kennedy's view and that the effect of this has been a demoralisation of medical practice, is equally persuasive. However, we believe that both of their positions can be seen as creatures of their time. Montgomery's argument is both logical and coherent: the law has on several occasions, as we argue above, proved itself unwilling or unable to assess ethical issues adequately. But the reason that a reversion to Bolam, which is what Montgomery suggests at the end of his paper, would be a mistake is that Kennedy's argument is equally logical and coherent in the context of the law as it was when he was writing. Indeed, if Montgomery's argument is a reaction to judges approaching the law in the way that Kennedy advocates, Kennedy's analysis was equally a reaction to the law as it o

was being applied when he was writing. We therefore argue that Kennedy was correct C

about the law being overly paternalistic in the 1980s, and the fact that doctors were 3

claiming responsibility for making decisions that were outside of their field of expert- co

ise. In this context judicial interventionism and de-medicalisation are entirely reason- h

able suggestions. :

Moreover, it is worth remembering that many of the legal changes that did priori- 3

tise autonomy and patient choice were brought about by specific instances of medical ^

misbehaviour—a prime example being the Human Tissue Act 2004 (hereinafter x

HTA) which was a direct response to the organ retention scandals that laid bare the sT

failings of the previous legislation. When looked at in isolation, the HTA seems to g

support Montgomery's point: the almost unthinking reliance on individual consent makes it more difficult to obtain organs for transplantation, and thus lessens the c

number available, to the detriment of society as a whole. But the Act's philosophy is t

at least comprehensible when placed in context—it was an explicit response to the n

fact that doctors had been removing and retaining organs without the knowledge and consent of patients or relatives.

Finally, a third, related point. Since there are plenty of examples of poor yet unpunished medical conduct before the law de-Bolamised, we believe that medical ethics has not demonstrated itself to be an effective regulator. Indeed, even after the law's change in attitude, there was nothing to stop medical regulators from actually regulating. To use the example of extreme cosmetic surgery, even if the law allows it, that does not mean that it is not within the ambit of the GMC to refuse to allow registered medical practitioners to perform some or all procedures. Thus if we are to remoralise medicine through Bolam we may well simply end up in the situation that we were in before and that is, in our view, a step back rather than forwards.

VI. CONCLUSION While we disagree with Montgomery's conclusion, we do not disagree with his diagnosis of the problem. Thus we would argue that many of the key issues in medical law cases today are not medical but ethical in nature, and that therefore the law is not just entitled but obliged to be the final arbiter. However, we certainly agree with him that the law's treatment of decisions requiring ethical engagement is patchy at best. There are two reasons for this. The first is that, historically, the culture of non-intervention meant that the law simply refused to engage in debates and abrogated responsibility to the medical profession. The second is that, once the paradigm shift in judicial attitudes identified by Montgomery took place, the quality of the law's ethical reasoning

has not always been of the highest calibre. Despite this we would argue that, both in terms of legitimacy and structure, the law is potentially best placed to make such ethical decisions. If the structure is right then the content can be improved.

Indeed, this is our solution to the problem: we believe that the law needs to recognise that it has this role. There needs to be a conversation regarding when it should intervene to claim ownership and hence start engaging in ethical debate itself. The circularity we describe has occurred because that conversation has not happened. It is urgently necessary.