Scholarly article on topic 'Co-investment paradigms as alternatives to payments for tree-based ecosystem services in Africa'

Co-investment paradigms as alternatives to payments for tree-based ecosystem services in Africa Academic research paper on "Earth and related environmental sciences"

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Abstract of research paper on Earth and related environmental sciences, author of scientific article — Sara Namirembe, Beria Leimona, Meine van Noordwijk, Florence Bernard, Kukunda E Bacwayo

Multiple paradigms have emerged within the broad payments for ecosystem services (ES) domain for internalizing externalities of local land-use change decisions. These range from reward of ready-made ES delivery (commoditised) to reward of processes of ES generation (co-investment). Evidence from tree-based projects in Africa suggests that currently, only carbon sequestration and emission reduction are ‘commoditised’, however in an artificial way where payments are not matched to ES delivery, but adjusted or supplemented with co-benefits. Co-investment in stewardship alongside rights is more widespread and versatile for a variety of ES. Efficiency concerns of co-investment schemes can be addressed when commoditised ES or profitable enterprises with positive ES externalities evolve from these.

Academic research paper on topic "Co-investment paradigms as alternatives to payments for tree-based ecosystem services in Africa"

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Current Opinion in

Co-investment paradigms as alternatives to payments for tree-based ecosystem services in Africa§

Sara Namirembe1, Beria Leimona1, Meine van Noordwijk1, Florence Bernard1 and Kukunda E Bacwayo2

Multiple paradigms have emerged within the broad payments for ecosystem services (ES) domain for internalizing externalities of local land-use change decisions. These range from reward of ready-made ES delivery (commoditised) to reward of processes of ES generation (co-investment). Evidence from tree-based projects in Africa suggests that currently, only carbon sequestration and emission reduction are 'commoditised', however in an artificial way where payments are not matched to ES delivery, but adjusted or supplemented with co-benefits. Co-investment in stewardship alongside rights is more widespread and versatile for a variety of ES. Efficiency concerns of co-investment schemes can be addressed when commoditised ES or profitable enterprises with positive ES externalities evolve from these.


1 World Agroforestry Centre, ICRAF, P.O. Box 30677, Nairobi 00100, Kenya

2 Faculty of Social Sciences, Uganda Christian University, P.O. Box 4, Mukono, Uganda

Corresponding authors: Namirembe, Sara (


Payment for Environmental Services (PES) is a conditional instrument where environmental stewards are given incentives to maintain or improve the flow of environmental services (ES) by those that benefit from these flows. For tree-based systems, various PES approaches with different levels of conditionality [1*,2**] are used. A synthesis ofPES lessons in Asia categorised PES into three paradigms: 'Commoditisation' of Environmental Services, 'Compensation' for Opportunities Skipped and 'Co-investment' in

§ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the

Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

Stewardship' [3]. Commoditisation' entails recurrent payments for actual delivery of a specified ES conforming to market-based mechanisms. A subcategory establishes a direct link between environmental service performance and existing commodity markets, generally through a process of eco-certification [2**]. 'Compensation' entails payment for acceptance of restrictions or achievement of a condition or proxy to specified environmental outcomes. 'Co-investment' entails conditional rewards that are not market-driven, involving flexible contracts entrusting resource management and monitoring with local communities, with broad performance sanctions. Co-investment rewards are based on either proxies trusted to deliver a specific ES, a set of best-bet practices trusted to deliver an unspecified set of ES, or permits for actions trusted to generate positive ES externalities. In these projects, mostly financed from public or donor sources [4-6] due to lack of ES demand, emphasis is not placed on measuring outcomes, but rather, on motivating actions or 'good land use practices' for ecosystem health as a public good (Table 1).

In Africa, many tree-based PES projects fall within the 'softer' PES paradigm with characteristics of 'co-investment' and without explicit frameworks for monitoring and evaluating environmental service outcomes. It has been argued that this tends to be less efficient and not much different from past Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDP) [7]. This desk review examined the 'state-of-the-art' in fifty tree-based PES projects in Africa from inventories and other publications (comprising 27 carbon sequestration and emission reduction, 17 biodiversity conservation, 2 watershed function and 4 bundled ES) to recommend design of efficient and fair PES in the African context (summarised in Figure 1 and Annex 1). We examine how variations in conditionality with land owners affect fairness and efficiency in delivering ES outcomes. Levels of conditionality with land owners were not always clear-cut, but guided by criteria presented in Table 1, projects could be generalized into the following categories: 30% 'commoditisation', 12% 'compensation' and 58% 'co-investment' (Table 2).

How realistic is commoditisation in tree-based projects?

Tree-based projects generate multiple ES values [8] but so far demand that fits the commoditisation model exists for only carbon sequestration or emission reduction services, where projects are assessed per unit carbon, proven through third-party verification and certification.

Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2014, 6:89-97

This review comes from a themed issue on Sustainability challenges

Edited by Cheikh Mbow, Henry Neufeldt, Peter Akong Minang, Eike Luedeling and Godwin Kowero

For a complete overview see the Issue and the Editorial

Available online 1st December 2013

1877-3435/$ - see front matter, © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Table 1

Categorisation [2**,3] of tree-based PES projects in Africa

Reward mechanism Sub-category Performance indicator Preconditions Type of reward Principle for establishing reward Examples of source of reward Strictness of conditionality




Commoditisation of environmental services (ES) as such

Environmental service branding of established commodities

Payment for effort proven or trusted to generate specified ES

Delivery of specified ES above agreed baseline level

Audited compliance with certification standards, with clarified force major clauses

Adherence to restrictions or proxies for generation of specified ES beyond legal requirements

Proof of actions known for generation of specified ES

Incentive for a set of Achievement of efforts for ecosystem mutually negotiated

management without specifying ES

Incentives for private businesses that generate positive ES externalities

Clarity of property rights on land, trees and ES; compliance with legal requirements for ES generation Existing commodity markets with interest in ES enhancement

Legality of ES reducing practices that are foregone and now compensated

Mechanisms can include creation of preconditions for other reward mechanisms

actions for maintaining or enhancing existing/ base line condition of an ecosystem

Maintaining or enhancing baseline condition of ecosystem

Cash or in-kind rewards to individuals or groups. Sometimes with co-benefits

Maintenance of market share (traded volumes) and/or price

Cash or in-kind rewards to individuals or groups. Sometimes with revenue or benefit sharing

In-kind to groups. Inputs, for example, seedlings, labour. Sometimes with capacity building and advisory support

In-kind:-access to or (co-) ownership of resources or support of conservation friendly enterprise, for example, bee keeping. Benefit sharing

License permits, rights or (co) ownership of resource to businesses or community organisations.

Willingness of buyers to pay for ES additional to a baseline status

Willingness of consumers to pay premium price for quality of production process rather than the product as such

Willingness of sellers to accept compensation for opportunity costs for maintaining or enhancing existing baseline ES status

Mutual sharing of roles to achieve livelihood and ES outcomes. Ownership of ES sometimes distinct from ownership of livelihoods. Precautionary investment in management plans for meaningful participation of local stakeholders as insurance banking for ES without market demand.

Willingness of buyers to pay for high value commodities or services that may maintain or enhance unspecified ES(s).

Global regulated or voluntary carbon markets

Eco-certified coffee, cacao or tea; Forest Stewardship Council certification oftimber




wildlife tourism or

niche market



Conservation organisations, conservation funds, carbon brokers




Conservation funds;



National governments

Payment proportional to quantity of specified, verified and certified ES additional to a baseline.

Certification standards and auditing practice are under public scrutiny

Payment proportional to opportunity cost of land and/or of adherence to specified restrictions or conservation actions.

Payment proportional to effort (e.g. number of trees planted) for achieving ES outcome

Negotiated rewards provided fully and good relations maintained, with continuous negotiation and encouragement of good performance. Rewards can be completely withdrawn but this is rare.

Permits upheld provided there are no negative environmental impacts

Figure 1

PES and PES-like mechanisms in Africa

PES paradigms in Africa

0 Co-investment A Commodification

Compensation Ecosystem service Q Carbon FR Biodiversity H Water

1 I Bundled

No 1 Project 17 Green resources [30] 35 1 Amboseli [6]

Commoditised 18 Shompole Ecotourism Development [35**] Co-investment - based on a set of practices for a combination of ES

1 Village based management of woody savannah [19] 19 Foundation for Protected Areas & Biodiversity; Protected Areas & Network [6] 36 Trust Fund for Dzanga-Sangha Reserve [5]

2 Ibi Batéké [38] 20 Tanzania land Conservation Trust [36**] 37 Northern Savanna [6]

3 Humbo Assisted Natural Regeneration [38] 21 Kasokwa Community Chimpanzee Conservation [31] 38 Foundation for Financing Protected Areas [5]

4 Western Kenya Agroforestry [31] Co-investment - based on proxy 39 Tropical Forest Conservation Fund [5]

5 Makira Conservation [25] 22 Shea butter carbon (concept) [38] 40 Foundation for Protected Areas & Biodiversity [5]

6 Mantadia Biodiversity Corridor Conservation [25] 23 Greenbelt movement [38] 41 Eastern Arc Mountain Conservation Endowment Fund [5]

7 Ankotrofotsy Afforestation 1000 ha [25] 24 Biodiversity Corridor Conservation [38] 42 Joint Forest Management [31]

8 Acacia Senegal plantation 7,869 ha [38] 25 Trees of hope (PV) [38] 43 Mgahinga Bwindi Impenetrable Forest Conservation Trust [31]

9 Trees for Global Benefits (TGB) SOFALA [38, 16] 26 Lurio forest plantation (PV) [30] 44 Participatory Environmental Management [31]

10 TGB Plan Vivo (PV) [26, 31] 27 Community-based Rangeland Rehabilitation [39] 45 Co-Management in national parks & Forest Reserves [31]

11 Acacia community plantations [19] 28 FACE [31] Co-investment - business/ permits with positive ES externalities

12 The International Small Group Tree Planting [16] 29 Ewasso Ngiro South Development Authority [31] 46 Wildlife Management Areas [45]

13 Nile Basin [31] 30 Baviaanskloof Patensie project [31] 47 Budongo Forest Eco-tourism [31]

14 Wildlife Works [38] 31 Kilombero Valley Teak Company Ltd (KVTCL) [5] 48 Arabuko Sokoke Forest Management & Conservation [31]

15 Kibale Forest wild Coffee [31] 32 Bio energy resource Ltd (BERL) [38] 49 Mabira Forest Reserve Eco-tourism [31]

Compensation 33 Lake Naivasha Watershed Management [40] 50 Community Based Forest Management [5]

16 Cocoa carbon [38] 34 Equitable Payments for Watershed Services [5]

Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability

Commodification, compensation and co-investment rewards for tree-based ecosystem services for selected projects in Africa.

Table 2

Reward mechanisms for tree-based PES projects in Africa

Reward mechanism Number of projects Ecosystem services




Carbon, B Biodiversity, B Water, General.

Commoditisation is not applied in any of the current payments for watershed services [9] or biodiversity schemes in Africa. Of the 14 commoditised projects, 11 involved transactions between small-scale farmers or national governments mostly financed by the World Bank Bio-carbon fund and multi-national entities. In general, ES sellers had limited expertise and capacity to cover upfront costs of such projects, and therefore received just a fraction of the carbon proceeds. For example, the portion of carbon proceeds land owners received was 10% under Green Resources in Tanzania [10] and $4/t for carbon prices ranging between US$6 and US$20/t under Ecotrust in Uganda [11]. They sometimes regarded such projects with suspicion [12]. Nonetheless, it was carbon payments that made projects viable in the first place, providing non-carbon payments that motivated farmers to participate. Regular guaranteed payments enabled farmers to access health, school and financial services for example, in Ecotrust [13].

Projects were established on large government (or aggregated smallholder) properties resulting in large volumes of credits and low per ton costs of transaction and implementation. This tended to exclude the poor or those without land titles [13,14,15**], except for some pro-poor projects such as TGB and TIST [16]. Aggregated smallholdings were less competitive [17], and the preference for large government land areas resulted in projects with multiple (e.g. [18-20]) or communal land tenure (e.g. Nile Basin and Humbo Projects [21*]), where establishment of ownership of carbon rights became problematic.

This review could not establish the opportunity costs resulting from restriction in flexibility ES providers could exercise in alternating landuses under these projects, which were designed to span 20 years to 100 years. In theory payments should be elastic based on global carbon prices, but they were mostly fixed (e.g. [19]), based on

opportunity cost estimations or the price of carbon at the time of agreement [11]. Fixed carbon prices are easier to manage [22] and may buffer farmers against extreme price reductions, but may also unfairly cap their potential profits in case of price surges. There was also likelihood that recurrent project costs would increase over time [23,24]. Payment was often low, thus project proponents packaged it in various ways to create incentive. For example, it was aggregated over a shortened period (e.g. ECOTRUST made 30 year payments within the first 10 years [13]), made as a lump sum for a development program (e.g. Ankotrofotsy [25]), purposely coincided with times of need such as beginning of school [11], offered as credit guarantee for loans [13], or supplemented with co-benefits [11]. This artificial commoditi-sation has long-term implications on compliance [26*], as was observed in a carbon-contract project in Malawi [27*].

The potential for commodity-based compensation through price premiums could not be established in this review, but the single example of Kibale coffee showed that branding for such niche markets could be challenging [28].

Is compensation of proxies more appropriate for tree-based systems?

Most 'compensation' schemes involved governments or community groups with formal land tenure [29*], setting aside land for biodiversity services for long periods, with restrictions on grazing, agriculture and use of fire. The 'buyers' then translated the restrictions into ES outcomes that they sold. Green Resources [30] for example paid a 99 year land lease to the Tanzania government for tree plantations, then developed and sold carbon credits [31]. Similarly, in the Tanzania Land Conservation Trust (TLCT) project, land was leased for 99 years and communities were compensated for restrictions in favour of wildlife conservation as tourism business was developed.

Opportunity-cost based 'compensation' schemes aiming to avoid worsening the prevailing status of landowners, have gained from research on reverse auction [27*,29*] and conjoint analysis for designing contracts and estimating opportunity cost. In many on-going schemes though, 'compensation' was often low, based on the minimum level from sellers' willingness to accept (WTA) payments [32]. It was even lower for poorer land owners in remote locations with low market exposure [33,34]. Where institutions restricted resource ownership and rendered many actions 'illegal' and ineligible for compensation (e.g. Shompole project [35**] and TLCT project [36**]), the WTA was artificial and costs from landuse restrictions, displacement of livelihoods [34], increased wildlife numbers and tourist traffic [35**,36**] were not really 'compensated'. In some instances (e.g. Shompole and TLCT), commitments of compensation were not fully honoured by the companies that had the concessions. Therefore, compensation was rarely achieved and with the tendency to capture rent by

proponents or buyers, it is debatable whether this model is fairer than the 'commoditisation' model.

Is co-investment better than payment?

Co-investment projects were the most widespread, often having evolved from government supported participatory forest management. Land ownership was not always a pre-requisite for participation in co-investment projects. Most projects provided an easement in community access to forest resources on public or government controlled land (e.g. Joint forest management and eco-tourism projects in Uganda and Tanzania). Many of the project designs provided for inclusion of smallholder farmers and women, for example, Greenbelt [37], Trees of Hope

[38], community based rangeland management in Bara

[39] and use of payment vouchers by EPWS [40]. However, some co-investment projects working directly with government tended to exclude local people (e.g. FACE Foundation [31]) or made no provisions for their involvement (e.g. Kilombero [41]). The buyer-seller subdivision was sometimes indistinct as agreements were based on co-valuation of agreed interventions and sharing of roles [42,20]. Nevertheless, power dichotomies existed as in other PES paradigms [43,44].

Incentives were conditional to satisfaction of performance indicators of effort, which were assessed over large time intervals (sometimes 5 years). Performance was judged subjectively using a binary scale as either 'good' or 'poor' (e.g. Equitable Payments for Watershed Services — EPWS — projects in Tanzania and Kenya). Sanctions to withdraw or sustain incentives were sometimes negotiable. Delivery of ES was not made explicit, which avoided overdue focus on a single ES, but also obscured project effectiveness. In EPWS projects, payment was made for proxies in trust, and whether desired ES outcomes were achieved was then verified through subsidiary measurements outside the agreement. Sometimes private-sector led commoditised sub-projects were nested within co-investment projects, for example, FACE Foundation [31], Lurio Forest Plantation [30], Ewasso Ngiro South project [31] and BERL project [38].

Incentives were mostly in-kind including granting of access or ownership rights, or support with start-up costs for community enterprises. Rewards were given collectively, encompassing free riders too. The incentive, often determined top-down was not valued against cost of effort. There is no evidence from experimental impact analysis to show effectiveness of projects. However, performance at project level was generally low, even though based on broad indicators. The risk of communities viewing incentives as entitlements [1*] could not be overruled.

Incentives were supplemented with revenue or co-benefits from ecotourism (e.g. Mabira, Budongo [31] and Wami Mbiki [45] projects) and commoditised sub-projects (e.g.

in Kilombero Valley Teak Company). Commonly though, these are what motivated performance and potential for improving efficiency by making them conditional should be explored. In instances where the practices themselves were substantially beneficial (e.g. EPWS [46], Ecotrust [47], Arabuko Sokoke, Wami Mbiki and Mbomipa), performance increased and projects attracted more participants.


The strength of PES in improving natural resource management is in its emphasis on conditionality. However, in its strictest 'commoditised' form, it stagnated at only delivering tree-based carbon sequestration and emission reduction services, dependent on external global markets and likely to crowd out other conservation motivations [15**]. Commoditisation could not fully mimic market principles as payments needed to be adjusted because of low carbon prices to ensure fairness. Its tendency to focus on piecemeal ES, made it difficult to fit into existing governance frameworks [48], knowledge demanding and expensive. Given what ES buyers are WTP, options for financing ES accounting costs from sources other than the ES providers (e.g. through partnership with national research institutions), should be explored.

'Co-investment' though more widespread in the African market-scarce context is criticised for its potential erratic compliance [49]. It can potentially deliver a range of ES to society through a systems focus [50], beyond what could be driven by ES buyers. However it must demonstrate the intended improvement in per hectare performance beyond ICDPs [51,52] by directly targeting and accounting for ES outcomes rather than targeting inputs, activities and incomplete proxies. Performance can be improved through strengthening conditionalities, translating proxies into ES outcomes, nesting commoditised ES subprojects into co-investment projects, and developing profitable enterprises with positive ES externalities within co-investment projects. None of the paradigms provided satisfactory incentives for landowners. However, co-investment incentives in certain instances created opportunities for development of commoditised ES.

Commoditisation enhances efficiency, but because it is applicable only where markets exist and these have not expanded widely for tree based projects, ES flows can only be ensured if compensation and co-investment alternatives demonstrate efficiency. Provisions for strengthening capacity to account for ES outcomes in co-investment projects (such as finding supplementary financing, training staff and partnering with research institutions) need to be developed as good practice to enhance efficiency in targeting investments. This might build the trust necessary for catalysing evolution of commoditised ES demand.

Appendix A

See Table A1.

Table A1

Categorization of PES mechanisms in Africa

No. Project Buyer Seller Conditionality: Payment for...


1 Village based management World Bank Biocarbon Villagers CO2 at US$3.50/t Co-benefit:

of woody savannah [19] Fund (WBCF) capacity building

2 Ibi Bateke [38] WBCF; Danone NOVACEL 2.4 MtCO2 in 30 y - reforestation

and reduced shifting cultivation; co-

benefit: schools/health facilities;

forest products

3 Humbo Assisted Natural World Vision Ethiopia 7 community cooperatives 0.88 MtCO2 in 30 y - reforesting,

Regeneration [38] foregoing grazing, fuelwood

collection and charcoal in 2728 ha

forest; co-benefit: access

4 Western Kenya Agroforestry WBCF Community Over 1.2 Mt soil carbon -

[31] agroforestry and other practices

5 Makira Conservation [25] Mitsubishi Group rock Ministry of Environment, 9.5 MtCO2 in 30 y

group; Pearl Jam WB; Water, Forests, & Tourism


6 Mantadia Biodiversity Foreign countries Local government; MEWFT 1.2 MtCO2 in 30 y reforestation;

Corridor Conservation [25] 25 MtCO2 in 30 y from REDD; Co-

benefit: agricultural productivity

7 Ankotrofotsy Afforestation 3 C Factor was conducting Tany Meva Foundation 0.18 MtCO2 in 60 y; co-benefits:

1000 ha [25] negotiations in 2008; no with 3 local community development, incomes and capacity

updated information groups building projects

8 Acacia Senegal plantation WBCF; Deguessi Groupe Local communities 0.45 MtCO2 by 2017 Co-benefit:

7869 ha [38] gum, land access for inter-cropping

9 Trees for Global Benefits Tetrapak; Future Forests Nhambita Community 2.1 MtCO2 in 99 y Co-benefit:

(TGB) SOFALA [38,16] U&W Humbleside Association community development;

Individuals livelihoods, credit

10 TGB Plan Vivo (PV) [26*,31] Same as above Farmers through 0.05 MtCO2/y for 100 y

Environment Conservation

Trust (Ecotrust)

11 Acacia community Achats Services 15 000 farmers 1.8 MtCO2 by 2017 Co-benefit:

plantations [19] International Gum, firewood, timber, capacity


12 The International Small CAAC 4309 farmer groups 0.5-3 MtCO2 CAAC owns carbon

Group Tree Planting [16] Co-benefit: tree ownership; welfare


13 Nile Basin [31] WBCF National Forestry Authority 0.28 MtCO2e in 20 y

(NFA) & communities

14 Wildlife Works [38] NedBank Group Ltd Community 49 MtCO2e in 30 y - restricted

grazing Co-benefits: youth


15 Kibale Forest wild Coffee Kibale Forest Foundation Arabica farmers Maintaining biologically diverse

[31] Uganda Coffee Trade ecosystems for premium price for

Federation coffee


16 Cocoa carbon [38] To be identified Farmer groups Halting expansion of farms into

unprotected forest and forest

reserves for REDD

17 Green resources [30] Green Resources Tanzania government Land and taxes. Company owns


18 Shompole Ecotourism Shompole Community Shompole Group Ranch Exclusive conservation area —

Development [35"] Trust Kenya Wildlife 10 000 ha

Service, African

Conservation Center, Art of


19 Foundation for Protected GEF + GoM Various Reducing slash and burn —

Areas & Biodiversity; biodiversity

Protected Areas Network [6]

20 Tanzania Land Conservation Investors in wildlife via Manyara Ranch Setting aside or selling land' grazing

Trust [36"] African Wildlife Foundation restrictions — conservation. Co-

benefit livestock improvement

21 Kasokwa Community Tourists, researchers, Communities Restricted land use — conservation

Chimpanzee Conservation schools Co-benefit: tourism revenue

Table A1 (Continued)



Conditionality: Payment for. . .

Co-investment-based on proxy

22 Shea butter carbon (concept) [38]

23 Greenbelt movement [38]

24 Biodiversity Corridor Conservation [38]

25 Trees of hope (PV) [38]

26 Lurio forest plantation (PV) [30]

27 Community-based Rangeland Rehabilitation [39]

28 FACE [3О]

29 Ewasso Ngiro South Development Authority [31]

30 Baviaanskloof Patensie project [31]

31 Kilombero Valley Teak Company Ltd (KVTCL) [5]

32 Bio energy resources Ltd (BERL) [38]

33 Lake Naivasha Watershed Management [40]

34 Equitable Payments for Watershed Services [5]

35 Amboseli [6]

To be identified

Clinton hunter Foundation

Associacao Envirotrade Carbon Livelihoods Environment Ministry

FACE Foundation - Dutch Electricity Generating Board

Spanish Government, GEF, Green Belt Movement Not identified

Flower farmers DAWASCO, Coca Cola UNEP/UNDP, FAO

Co-investment-based on a set of practices for a combination of ES

36 Trust Fund for Dzanga-Sangha Reserve [6]

37 Northern Savanna [6]

38 Foundation for Financing Protected Areas [5]

39 Tropical Forest Conservation Fund [5]

40 Foundation for Protected Areas and Biodiversity [5]

41 Eastern Arc Mountain Conservation Endowment Fund [5]

42 Joint Forest Management [31]

43 Mgahinga Bwindi Impenetrable Forest Conservation Trust [31]

44 Participatory Environmental Management [31]

45 Co-Management in national parks and Forest Reserves [31]

Co-investment-business/permits with positive ES externalities

46 Wildlife Management Areas Tourists [45]


Donors Donors

Various donors Various donors

Forestry & Bee keeping Division, Ministry of Natural Resources & Tourism UWA


Government (UWA/NFA)


Community forest associations Mandtadia government and communities Farmers

Green Resources

Local community, Bara Province

Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA)


Baviaanskloof Patensie




Upstream WRUAs Villages

Amboseli Park, Group Ranches, Communities

Landowners Community Landowners Landowners Landowners Landowners

Village governments




47 Budongo Forest Eco-tourism [3О]

Ecotourism business

Wami Mbiki and Mbomipa Societies

Communities JGI

Tree planting Co-benefits: portion of carbon revenue Reforesting 1500 ha degraded land — carbon

Linking fragmented habitats for 14.6 MtCO2e Co-benefit: fruit gardens Tree planting for livelihoods and carbon Co-benefit: pledged carbon cash

Tree planting. Developers own carbon.

Forestry/rangelands rehabilitation for carbon. Co-benefits: community development

Reforestation of degraded park FACE owns carbon

Reforestation, regeneration of Mau forest and adjacent land-carbon

Labour for land rehabilitation

Establishment of timber plantations; co-benefit: 10% of carbon revenues Jatropha seeds — 15 000 trees

Soil and water conservation practices (SWCP) SWCP

Reforesting landscapes for biodiversity

Joint management plan to restore landscapes (JMPL) — biodiversity Increasing landscape productivity to spare biological corridors JMPL

Joint forest management —


5-10 y management plan — biodiversity

Participation in forest conservation — management plan

Management plan. Community institutions strengthened — biodiversity

Forest access rights in return for protecting resource use areas

Right to develop business that enhances forest status — management plan - same -

Table A1 (Continued)

No. Project Buyer Seller Conditionality: Payment for...

48 Arabuko Sokoke Forest Management and Conservation [31] 49 Mabira Forest Reserve Eco-tourism [31] 50 Community Based Forest Management [5] KNH-NABU, USAID Birdlife International, WWF NFA Local District Authorities Community Communities Village governments - same - - same - Full forest ownership for conservation management plan

"Numbers in brackets indicate literature sources presented in the reference list.

References and recommended reading

Papers of particular interest, published within the period of review, have been highlighted as:

• of special interest •• of outstanding interest

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Annu Rev Environ Resour 2012, 37:389-420. Relates PES paradigms to multiple economic-analysis scales and altruistic behaviour.

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Report prepared for WCS TransLinks Program.

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