Scholarly article on topic 'Scenario Building on Law No. 7 of 2012 about Social Conflict Intervention: The Possible Future of Land Conflict Management in Indonesia'

Scenario Building on Law No. 7 of 2012 about Social Conflict Intervention: The Possible Future of Land Conflict Management in Indonesia Academic research paper on "Political Science"

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Procedia Environmental Sciences
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{"Scenario building" / "Land conflict" / "Conflict management" / "State violence"}

Abstract of research paper on Political Science, author of scientific article — Novri Susan

Abstract Many criticisms have been directed to Law No. 7 of 2012 on Social Conflict Intervention (SCIL) which was passed by the parliament in April 2012. One of the criticisms is linked to a possibility of creating state violence. This paper reveals some implementation consequences of the Law No.7 of 2012 by adopting a scenario building approach. The scenario building approach is a narrative or story that foresees a future of society, either in a positive or negative condition. In this paper, the land conflict is one of notorious conflicts in Indonesia; it becomes a main narrative issue of scenario building on Law No. 7 of 2012, particularly, the land conflict that is based on customary land issues. Therefore, this paper has its main question: how does scenario building method reveal the consequences of Law No. 7 of 2012 in the case of land conflicts? The scenario building in this paper is based on the discourse analysis of media social construction theory through the case of land conflict in Lampung Province.

Academic research paper on topic "Scenario Building on Law No. 7 of 2012 about Social Conflict Intervention: The Possible Future of Land Conflict Management in Indonesia"

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Environmental Sciences

Procedia Environmental Sciences 17 (2013) 870 - 879

The 3rd International Conference on Sustainable Future for Human Security


Scenario building on Law No. 7 of 2012 about social conflict intervention: The possible future of land conflict management

in Indonesia

Novri Susan*

a Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University, Karasuma-Higashi-iru, Imadegawa-dori, Kamigyo-ku, Kyoto, 602-8580,


Many criticisms have been directed to Law No. 7 of 2012 on Social Conflict Intervention (SCIL) which was passed by the parliament in April 2012. One of the criticisms is linked to a possibility of creating state violence. This paper reveals some implementation consequences of the Law No.7 of 2012 by adopting a scenario building approach. The scenario building approach is a narrative or story that foresees a future of society, either in a positive or negative condition. In this paper, the land conflict is one of notorious conflicts in Indonesia; it becomes a main narrative issue of scenario building on Law No. 7 of 2012, particularly, the land conflict that is based on customary land issues. Therefore, this paper has its main question: how does scenario building method reveal the consequences of Law No. 7 of 2012 in the case of land conflicts? The scenario building in this paper is based on the discourse analysis of media social construction theory through the case of land conflict in Lampung Province.

© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.

Selection and peer-review under responsibility of SUSTAIN conferenee's committee and supportedby Kyoto University; (OPIR), (GCOE-ES), (GCOE-HSE), (CSEAS),)RISH), (GCOE-ARS) and (GSS) as co-hosts.

Keywords: Scenario building, Land conflict, Conflict management, State violence.


1. Land Conflict in Indonesia

Indonesian Social Development Paper by World Bank shows that the second highest level of conflict cases in Indonesia is the land conflict, while criminal is at the top level [1]. According to Henry Rustandi Butarbutar, Head of Conflict Division of BPN (National Land Agency), in 2007, there were 2,615 land conflicts and dispute cases, and in 2009, the conflicts increased up to 7,000 cases [2]. While according to Head of BPN, Joyo Winoto, until January 2010, there were 9,471 cases of land disputes and conflicts in

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +818042481279 E-mail address:

1878-0296 © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.

Selection and peer-review under responsibility of SUSTAIN conference's committee and supported by Kyoto University; (OPIR), (GCOE-ES), (GCOE-HSE), (CSEAS), (RISH), (GCOE-ARS) and (GSS) as co-hosts. doi: 10. 1016/j .proen v .2013.02.105

which 2,913 cases have not been resolved [3]. Even though, based on BPN's report, most of the land conflicts have been resolved, civil society organizations mention different data: many unresolved land conflicts violate communities' rights, particularly, land conflict between customary community and company or state owned enterprises (BUMN); those are not reported formally by the government. KPA(Consortium for Agrarian Reform) reported that there were 106 land conflicts in 2010 involving 517,159 families in the conflict of 535, 197 hectares land; the incident caused 3 farmers killed, 4 farmers shot and 80 farmers arrested by the police [4]. In addition, 69,975 families were suffering because of land conflicts during 2011 on 472,048.44 hectares [5].

Those land conflicts were often handled by the state using means of violence and alleging the community members as law violators or criminals. In many cases, vertical land conflicts between communities against companies or state are transformed into horizontal conflicts among communities. The phenomena are followed with security guards or pamswakarsa recruited from people around the villages by a company. Hence, the land conflicts are basically mixed types of conflict, namely vertical-horizontal land conflicts. This conflict dynamics is socially complicated. However, in some testimonial reports, the police - as state representatives - often stand to protect community members who are at the company's side or the security guards themselves. This happened in North Sumatera, between PT. Mazuma Agro Indonesia and the community when the police and pamswakarsa did violent actions [6] [7]. Due to the phenomena, what is the possible future of land conflict management under Law No. 7 of 2012?

1.1. Scenario Building

Through the case of land conflict in Lampung, Indonesia, SCIL needs to be foreseen in its implementation by adopting the scenario building concept, whether it creates state violence or not. Scenarios are stories or narratives that foresee a future that might happen in society, including the reasons behind of positive or negative conditions, and the consequences of a state policy, collective action or system. It is not a method to reach consensus around a particular single concept of the future, but it is more to elaborate the political, social economic and cultural realities of a situation. As Mietzner and Reger pointed out, scenario is about strategy to see a possible future which contains uncertainty [8]. According to Alcamo, the basic elements of typical scenario are: 1) Description of step-wise changes in the future state of society and environment. 2) Driving forces, the major factors that influence the change described. 3) Base year. 4) Time horizon and time steps. 5) Storyline, a narrative description that highlights the scenario main features including the relationship with the driving force [9].

The scenario building on Law No.7 of 2012 in this paper is based on FGD and interview with members of some local communities during the field research in Mesuji and Tulang Bawang in 2010 and 2011. The driving forces of SCIL implementation included the habitus of politics, court system quality, police performance, company and community's interest and action. The possible futures basically are divided into positive and negative possible future. The positive future can instantly be traced from the situation when Law No. 7 of 2012 can reach its goal by creating a "conflict transformation", whereas for the possible negative future, the Law No. 7 of 2012 creates a state violence. Before analyzing SCIL by using scenario building approach, this paper elaborates firstly the fundamental fallacy of SCIL and habitus of political elites in Indonesia's power structure.

1.2. The Fallacy of Law No. 7 of 2012

Fundamentally, the perspective of conflict management explains that every social relationship, either in economics or politics, has a nature of conflict. Every human being and particular collective groups as a

social subject cannot deny reality of relative needs which are represented by subjective knowledge, interests and goals in shared social environment. The reality is obviously always relative and dynamic. Relative needs that lead to any social relationships are not directly towards a consensual condition, but through a process of dynamic interactions of diversity, disagreement and competition from each social subject's needs. Furthermore, the dynamic interaction process creates substantively the vary conflicts phenomena in the arena of social life, such as markets, schools, corporations and offices.

Based on the philosophy mentioned above, conflict is a social relation dynamic between and among social subjects within a particular social arena. In this perspective, the conflict is not always a situation of physical violence between social subjects. The practice of violence has different dimensions, though it can intersect with the phenomenon of conflict. However, simplistically, Social Conflict Intervention Law (SCIL) Intervention through Article 1, paragraph 1 states that "social conflict, hereinafter referred to conflict is a clash with the physical violence between two or more groups of people or groups" [10]. The SCIL's definition on conflict is possibly creating a state violence. Through article 1, paragraph 2, SCIL has a possibility to create and increase state repression and violence which are deemed capable of realizing "conflict prevention, cessation of conflict and post-conflict recovery". Article 1 paragraph 7 points out that conflict "is a condition that occurs within the community or region where the law and order in society and the activities of government services are threatened".

If the SCIL is translated into a policy, the conflicts between civil society groups and private sectors, in which the government involves, can be directly interpreted as a threat to the national security. Moreover, the Article 30 of SCIL permits governors and regents/ mayors to ask military resources to deal with "conflict situation". This article is possibly utilized for a benefit of protecting narrow interests of certain political and economic groups. For example, a conflict between indigenous farmers and a private company or state-owned enterprises could easily be defined as "a situation of conflict" that threatens the national or regional security. In many cases, by looking at the behaviour of the state over the years, small farmers or indigenous communities are subordinated by state violence.

In fact, the phenomenon of conflict is not always manifested by the practice of physical violence. It can occur in both physical violence and peaceful practice. Whereas, the SCIL states that every conflict includes a clash and a physical violence. The physical violence is a social practice that is created through a process of simultaneous between instinct of "animal prone" and the "instrumental ratio" that intentionally uses force to achieve the needs of the social subject. The phenomenon of social conflict can be affixed to physical violence when social subjects enter the simultaneous process. Violence has always been a constraint for each conflict to reach consensual condition. Therefore, the communities with a strong established social structures and cultural systems tend to encourage their institutions to transform conflict into a consensual condition.

In the modern world, that institution is called local wisdom in the customary structures; the position of customary structures becomes sociologically very important in the settlement of social conflicts. Although, SCIL in Article 37 includes local wisdom of the traditional institutions as part of conflict resolution mechanism, there is no substantive emphasis that social conflicts caused by state policy could be solved by traditional mechanisms. Instead, it emphasizes that all social conflicts are only product of interest conflicts among communities, as stated in Article 5. Even though it is not rare for power groups, such big company and political elites to often utilize civic groups to divert the vertical dimension of conflict into horizontal social conflict. This inadvertence of regulations on the practice of SCIL potentially creates a deteriorating conflict which transforms into the form of collective violence.

1.3. Habitus of Political Elites

The second issue related to SCIL implementation is the habitus or political habit of central and local governments. Normatively, SCIL, through article 9, encourages local governments that become powerful actors in social conflict management to follow the principle of good governance, to enforce the laws and to preserve the cultural values and local wisdom. However, the article 9 can be possibly ignored or deleted due to political practice habits which are characterized dominantly by narrow interests, unresponsive to public voice, and oligarchy. There are still many political elites at governmental structure that favour economic capital groups in a land conflict between communities and private sectors. They often ignore people's aspiration, but they advocate a capital interest.

Habitus is a concept about social practiced created by Pierre Bourdieu [11]. Habitus means a dialectical phenomenon that concurrently structures and is structured by process of historical realities; it is a "structured structure" built in empirical realities of a specific period. It creates habit-forming practices and thoughts that connect to the strategic likelihoods opened to individuals and strata in a given historical moment [12]. The habitus of elites at local governments can be observed, too from their choices to use violence to deal with various cases of conflict, such as that when the local governments have chosen state violence option to handle the cases of land conflict in Mesuji, Bima, Jambi and other places of Indonesia. The reality of political power in Indonesia, the habitus of both central and local, is still negative, such as alignments that often happened on specific groups who benefit themselves, making security as a business and ignoring the aspirations of grass root people in many issues of public policy [13]. Therefore, the combination of SCIL materials and habitus of political elites in Indonesian government will be able to create a state violence.

2. Land Conflict Management

Theoretically, conflict management aims to prevent any forms of violence during the conflict dynamics in order to create more opportunities of peaceful dialogue [14-17] However, Pruitt and Eubin point out that conflict management in real conflict dynamics can be developed in various forms of groups' practice and social system. The conflict dynamics itself is proliferated and driven by conflict strategies, namely contending, avoidance, withdrawal, compromise and problem solving [18]. In an ideal concept of conflict management, a problem solving strategy should be carried on by all conflicting parties when other strategies seemed to be non productive. Non-productive conflict strategy can be seen through the destructive effects, such as protracted violent conflict, death, injury, dysfunction of social order and environmental damage.

According to Zartman [17], when conflict management is undertaken by government, basically, it goes to the concept of governance. Regarding with the governance as a conflict management, Zartman pointed out that any conflict dimensions can be governed by using 'procedural attempts' of RAISAR (reconciling, allocating, submerging, adjudicating, repressing) [17]. Repressing would be a violent exercise of state by considering some crucial conditions, such as to stop communal violent actions that cannot be settled down by peace process. In peace and conflict studies, the exercise of violence by state can be allowed to handle conflict situation, but it has to be controlled publicly. However, the state violence is often being employed by political elites in power structure to gain a section interest. Therefore, repressing - as one of conflict management approaches - is abused.

Land conflict management by government means the governance process of managing land conflict between two or more social-subjects, namely individual and collective groups, by deploying a certain institutional framework and habitus of politics. Institutional framework is a system that contains legal laws, regulations, mechanism or procedures, custom and norm; while habitus of politics is the practice of

elites and leaders, such as mayor legislator or police that usually used in power structure of state. Habitus determines a political approach of elites in power structure in handling conflict whether it will take in the form of violence or not. Hence, the conflict management as governance basically engages institutional framework and habitus of political elites in power structure.

Relating to institutional framework which can be showed by the legal framework or laws, Indonesian land conflict management has several laws that regulate directly or indirectly land conflicts, namely Law No. 5 of 1960 on Basic Agrarian Law (BAL), Law No. 22 of 2012 on Land Acquisition for Public Interest, Law No. 20 of 1961 on Cancelation of Land Rights, Presidential Decree No. 55 of 1993 and Presidential Regulation No. 36 of 2005, jo. No 65/2006. Some related laws to land conflict management can also be seen at Law No. 41 of 1999 on Forestry, Law No. 18 of 2003 on Plantation, Law No. 7 of 2004 on Water Resources, Law No. 27 of 2007 on The Management of Coastal Zones and Small Islands and Law No. 4 of 2009 on Mineral and Coal. Currently, SCIL becomes new institutional framework of land conflict management since this law can include any social conflicts, including land issues.

Habitus of political elites in Indonesia's power structure related to governance and conflict management mostly occur in the form of political violence. In such an authoritarian regime, political violence of state can be seen clearly. As the case of Indonesia, during New Order era (1969-1998), according to Susan, the regime often undertook political violence to force people to obey and follow central government policy, such as what had happened in Aceh during 1979-2006 [19].

The main purpose of political violence is to guard interests of particular groups of elites in power structure. Political violence obviously never obeys and grasps democratic principles, such as peace dialogue and negotiation mechanism. Therefore, John Keane points out that the exercise of violence by a government has to be democratised. He proposed ten rules to democratize violence. The ten rules consist of; 1) the motives and context of the violent. 2) Exercise caution and heap doubt upon the schemes and plans of those who talk of 'necessity' and call for the hardest possible remedies. 3) Civility and freedom cultivated at the level of civil society. 4) Repeal or Prevention of the 'privatisation' of the means of violence. 5) Prudential rules in a search for 'peace' among civilians and their government. 6) Cultivation of public awareness on political dilemmas in relation to when the means of violence can be deployed. 7) Any means usage of communication to publicise acts of violence to debate publicly. 8) Conscientious testing on ethical aspects in public space in order not to cause a representative symbolic violence. 9) Development and canvass support for civil virtues (humility). 10) Culturing 'guilt and shame' [20].

What Keane [20] stated on exercise of violence by considering democracy principles is an ideal concept. Practically, the exercise of violence by state often happens without following democratic values and mechanism. Although Indonesia is a democratic state, violence is undergone by the government without asking public opinions. Instead of using democratic values and mechanism, the government uses political violence against the people to protect a 'non participatory' policy.

3. Context of Land Conflict in Lampung Province

This paper discusses briefly the context of land conflicts in Lampung in order to give a clear setting for the scenario building of SCIL. The province of Lampung is situated in the southwest region of Sumatra Island, Indonesia, covering a total area of 35,376.50 square km (about 1.74% of Indonesian area), bounded by the Indian Ocean to the west, Bengkulu and South Sumatra to the north, Java Sea to the east, and Sunda Straits as the southern border. This province was formed in 1964 under Law No. 14 of 1964; it has 12 regencies (kabupaten) and 2 municipalities (kotamadya).

Lampung is one of provinces in Indonesia that deals with exacerbated violent land conflicts. According to Joko Umar, the Vice Governor of Lampung, since 2008 there are averagely 40 land conflict cases every year in Lampung. However, the capacity of government to solve the conflict is not optimal

yet. Umar states that the government could only handle 8-10 land conflict cases [21]. During 1995-2005, there were 91 land conflict cases on 427,964.5 hectares of land with 133,738 victims. It is estimated that 80 percents of those cases are between communities and companies. Civil society elements perceive that the government does not have a good will to seek the problem solving for those land conflicts. As Iwan Nurdin, the Secretary General KPA (Consortium for Agrarian Reform), asserts that "Indonesia's government is still lack of commitment to handle seriously the land conflicts. Moreover, the government's leaders and policy tend to take a side of companies rather than to solve the problem of land conflict" [22]. For more detailed data of land conflicts in Lampung Province see the table 1.

Table 1. Land Conflict Cases in Lampung Province

No District/Municipality Cases Victims Hectares

1 South Lampung 24 34,065 98,500.15

2 Tulang Bawang 17 22,547 93,630.00

3 North Lampung 11 4,347 23,902.50

4 East Lampung 11 12,240 60,335.15

5 Central Lampung 10 8,265 46,005.88

6 Way Kanan 8 9,294 43,571.00

7 West Lampung 5 38,700 61,500.00

8 Bandar Lampung 4 1,284 470,00

9 Tanggamus 1 86 50,00

TOTAL 91 133,738 427,964.53

Source: Dewan Rakyat Lampung [23]

Chief of Regional Police (Kapolda Lampung), Brigjen Pol Jodie Rooseto ensures that Lampung is dealing with most difficult land conflict cases. He testifies that there are currently land conflict cases between 11 big companies and communities in Lampung [24]. Companies recruit local people from around villages as pamswakarsa (the acronym of Pasukan Pengamanan Masyarakat Swakarsa / Civil Defense Forces created by Society). Some local community members in Mesuji and Tulang Bawang testify that pamswakarsa is recruited by company to blur the conflict between local community and company to become a social conflict of inter-community. Most of big companies in Lampung create pamswakarsa, such as PT. Silva Inhutani Lampung and PT. Barat Selatan Makmur Investindo. Civil society elements, such as AGRA Lampung (the Alliance of Agrarian Reform Movement), argue that the recruitment of pamswakarsa from the members of community can create a horizontal conflict [25]. Pamswakarsa will claim that they have a right for the status of land use in Lampung. One of customary community's leaders in Tulang Bawang testifies, "We have ever protested the company that occupied our land. After the protest, we fought with pamswakarsa. We chose to draw back to our homes after knowing some members of pamswakarsa were neighbours". The conflict situation can be diagnosed that land conflict between community and company is blurred intentionally through a horizontal conflict. When the land conflicts are blurred by horizontal conflict, SCIL can likely be used by the government to intervene by considering it as a social conflict phenomenon.

4. Scenarios Building on SCIL Implementation

At the first week of January 2025, the land conflicts in Lampung between some companies and local communities have been transformed into "horizontal violence". The transformation is started by the involvement of Pamswakarsa. The horizontal violence of land conflict among the communities spread over in Mesuji, Tulang Bawang, North Lampung and South Lampung. There is an insecure situation within society. Social prejudice, intimidation, armed clashes among communities and cycle of violence

have torn the Lampung Province into a deep social chaos. Hundreds people are injured and thousands people become refugees. The issue of land conflict between company and local communities is sunken by ethno and religious sentiments. Governor, with the approval of Provincial House of Representative (DRPD I), states the "conflict situation" is at provincial level (SCIL article 15 (3)). The conflict situation applies until 90 days maximum (SCIL article 22). The Governor of Lampung Province, Regents of each regency, Police and military force consent to terminate the horizontal violence based on SCIL.

4.1. Scenario 1: State Violence

Due to the violent horizontal conflict situation, during the first week of horizontal violent conflict, the Governor of Lampung requests TNI (Indonesian Military Forces) to support POLRI (Police of Republic of Indonesia) in handling horizontal violence of land conflicts (SCIL, article 33 (2)). TNI is under the coordination of POLRI (Article 34 (1)). The main duty of POLRI and TNI is to undertake peacemaking process through a persuasion and or means of violence (force). The goal of peace making process by POLRI and TNI is to deescalate violent actions, to prepare reconciliation between community-pamswakarsa and local community and to undertake emergency rescue for the conflict survivors (SCIL article 32). The Governor of Lampung creates two special committees; first committee aims to handle refugees and the second one aims to undertake reconciliation program. In order to prevent conflicts of horizontal violence from getting worse, the governor issues a policy that restricts and closes areas of four regencies (SCIL, article 27).

Violent conflicts between Pamswakarsa community and local community have been escalating during the second week of January 2025. More people are injured and killed. Pamswakarsa community builds their base around plantation areas and villages near the companies, while local community controls more villages since they are more dominant in numbers. The two conflicting groups mobilize the members to attack and to retaliate. Pamswakarsa personnel are more skilful in attacking and using homemade weapons because they have got a semi-military training from company and the police resort command. The issue of ethno and religious sentiments is worsening the conflict situation.

The power structure of the Lampung Province is surely dominated by political Elites who have a network of interests with the companies. All of regents in Lampung also have investments and businesses in plantation companies. Meanwhile, POLRI, during the period of land conflicts between company and local community, gets financial support from companies to secure their forest and plantation areas. The outbreak of horizontal violent conflict becomes a momentum for political elites to blur the root causes of land conflict between companies and local communities. The interests of the political elite and police are creating un-neutral implementation of social conflicts intervention. The mission of peacemaking has been deviated into a movement of securing political elites interest. In practice, the joint security forces between POLRI and TNI are doing more protection to the Pamswakarsa community. In the fourth week of January 2025, some members of the local community are shot by the police members.

The alignments of POLRI and TNI stimulate local communities' anger. In the first week of February 2025 the local communities mobilize the members to some plantation areas which become the basis of Pamswakarsa community. The local communities express their anger by destroying the company's office and police posts/offices in some locations and expelling Pamswakarsa community. The local communities occupy the plantation and forest of some companies. The community's leaders request the government to solve the main problem of land conflict between community and company. However, in response to the local community's occupation, the government prefers to focus on the issue of occupation. The governor requests POLRI and TNI to undergo a special operation for securing the public facility, national economic interest, and conflict survivors. POLRI justifies the special operation with the criminal law which considers the occupation as an unlawful action. The special operation is undergone jointly

between POLRI and TNI personnel to clean the area of companies' plantation from the local community's occupation.

The special operation by POLRI and TNI is undergone in the fourth week of February 2025. There is an issue within local community that the special operation is financed by some companies. Therefore, the local community's leaders state their disappointment to the government and decide to keep occupying the plantation areas until there is a clear problem solving for the land conflict. Following the local community resistance, POLRI and TNI start using means of violence, such as rubber bullet and tear gas. The special operation personnel force the local community to leave the plantation areas that belong to companies. At the same time, Pamswakarsa community also attacks the local community. The special operation gets successful in forcing local community to withdraw from the plantation areas. Dozens of local community members are killed and hundreds are injured. However, the local community never gives up for their grievances. The state violence is continually created by the government. One of community leaders states to the mass media that, obviously, the government is going to murder them all.

4.2. Scenario 2: Conflict Transformation

After the local election in 2024, Lampung is governed by transformational leaderships at regencies and provincial levels. Political elites in power structure nurture democratic governance in which the people's aspiration are listened and accommodated. The governor always prioritizes a deliberative process before creating and implementing any policies. POLRI at provincial to resort levels, court and attorney institution enforce the law indiscriminately. When land conflicts in four regencies have changed into horizontal violence in the second week of January 2025, the governor holds an emergency meeting with all regents, mayors, DPRD I and other local government institutions. The meeting is to reveal the problem root of the horizontal violence. The government has reached a common understanding that horizontal violence is fundamentally rooted by the land conflict between company and local community. Based on this understanding, the governor creates three special committees.

The first committee is aimed to undertake an emergency rescue to conflict survivors and refugees (SCIL, article 32. This committee consists of social department, Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja (Civil Service Police Unit), NGOs and BPBD (Regional Disaster Management Agency). The second committee is to undertake peacemaking program in order to stop the violent conflict escalation (SCIL, article 33). The committee consists of POLRI and TNI. And, the third committee is aimed to undertake a reconciliation process and peace talk for resolving the problem root of violent conflict. The special committee consists of government's representatives, both provincial and local levels, and customary institutions (SCIL, article 40). The Governor of Lampung Province becomes the supervisor directly to the three committees.

The emergency rescue committee is working effectively by distributing aids to conflict survivors. The committee gives a hand to all communities without discrimination. The survivors of horizontal conflict can be saved from the violent conflict escalation. POLRI and TNI implement the peacemaking mission neutrally. The leaders of POLRI and TNI reject gratification and bribery from some companies in order to keep the neutrality of committee. The committee is able to convince the local communities that the government is now trying to solve the problem of land conflict. The peacemaking committee can de-escalate the violent conflict into a stable and safe situation. The Governor efficiently catches the ripe moment of conflict de-escalation to find a way out of the problem. The mechanism used is dialogue and negotiations involving all conflicting parties, including companies. Committee on reconciliation and peaceful dialogue immediately invites the local community, Pamswakarsa community, related companies, BPN (National Agrarian Agency) and other governmental agencies.

In the first week of February 2025, the reconciliation and peaceful dialogue committee is successful in reconciling pamswakarsa community and local community. The government, with the help of NGOs, will indemnify the communities' loss of material. In the third week of February 2025, the government starts undertaking a negation and peaceful dialogue between companies and local community. The government mediates the land conflicts with the principle of neutrality. The negotiation and peaceful dialogue needs a long time since the problem root of land conflicts are complicated. However, the government has a commitment to find the problem solving in land conflict through a transparent negotiation and peaceful dialogue.

5. Conclusion

SCIL's materials have a fallacy on the definition of conflict that can give a wrong method on a social conflict intervention. Furthermore considering the habitus of political elites in Indonesia's power structure, which is characterized by the practice of undemocratic governance, SCIL is possibly utilized to blur the problem root of land conflicts between local community and company. Therefore, the possible future of land conflicts in Indonesia will be managed by a state violence rather than conflict transformation.


This paper is part of dissertation research funded by Doshisha University during 2010 and 2011, under the supervision of Prof. Eiji Oyamada and Prof. Hisae Nakanishi.


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